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THE COMING DEMOCRACY 



BY THE SAME AUTHOR 



BECAUSE I AM A GERMAN 

By Hermann Fernau 

Edited, with an Introduction, 
by T. W. Rolleston 

$i.oo net 

"A masterly and courageous attack on Prus- 
sianism." — The Times. 

"... his work is interesting and of conse- 
quence because it adds another voice to those 
already crying out in the European wilderness 
for more sanity and justice and righteousness 
and democracy in the conduct hereafter of Eu- 
ropean affairs." — The Bookman. 

"... Mr. Fernau pleads his case with 
dispassionate earnestness. He is no reviler of 
his country — he mourns for it — but rather the 
defender of its better self against its worst." — 
The New York Evening Post. 

"... a scathing arraignment of the German 
motives behind the present war. It contains 
a clear and terse statement of Germany's case 
against Prussianism, but it is in no sense a plea 
for the Allies." — The Boston Globe. 



E. P. BUTTON & CO., New York 



THE 
COMING DEMOCRACY 



BY 

HERMANN FERNAU 

AUTHOR OF "BECAUSE I AM A GERMAN" 



"The civil constitution of every State must be republican" 

Immanuel Kant, Ferpettial Peace 



NEW YORK 

E. P. BUTTON & CO. 

68i FIFTH AVENUE 



v<^ 






COPYRIGHT, 191 7, 
By E. p. button & CO. 



^^rVi- 



pKnted in the Qtiited States cf Htnmca 



PUBLISHERS' NOTE 

The American reader of "The Coming Democ- 
racy" will note in several places, for example on page 
122 and page 259^ that the author of this book is 
thinking of Russia as an empire and an aggressive 
autocracy, v^hose political aims must be guarded 
against. The explanation of this is of course that 
the original German version of this book was pub- 
lished in Berne, Switzerland, just before the Russian 
Revolution broke out, and this fact should never he 
lost sight of while reading the hook. The title as 
published was "DurchI . . . Zur Demokratie." 

The suddenness with which the Russian Revolution 
broke out in March upset a great many political 
theories and political prophecies, not only in Germany 
but in this country and in England. One can imagine 
if the author of "The Coming Democracy" had 
delayed publication for another three months with 
what joy he would have hailed the Russian Republic 
and what a lesson he would have read in the triumph 
of the Russian people for the people of his own 
land. 

Another great and significant event which he did 
not foresee was the entry of America into the war 
on the side of the Allies. This again would certainly 
have given him great encouragement and a proof of 



vi PUBLISHERS' NOTE 

the final triumph of democracy which he could have 
made use of so effectually in his appeal to his own 
people. Written as it was before these two momen- 
tous happenings in the march towards universal 
democracy, the book is a remarkable piece of forward- 
looking and constructive work, especially considering 
the source from whence it comes. 

As Herr Fernau's earlier book, "Because I am 
a German," was an appeal to his people tO' find 
out with whom lay the guilt of willhig and commenc- 
ing this appalling war, so this new book, "The 
Coming Democracy,'* is an appeal to them to 
make it forever impossible that any man or clique 
of men should be in a position to plunge the world 
into such horrors again. 

Friends of democracy cannot but sympathize with 
this German citizen who sees, even as we see, the 
danger and iniquity of great hereditary privilege; 
and they must especially commiserate with him be- 
cause those whom he accuses are of his own blood 
and his own speech. 

It is safe to say in the days tO' come when Germany 
has recovered her senses that this courageous call by 
a German to Germans, this merciless yet judicial ar- 
raignment of the German dynastic political system,, 
will be looked back to as a landmark in the history of 
German progress. 

The Publishers. 



CONTENTS 



I 

PAGE 



Some Problems for Future German Historians . . 1 



n 

Of Dynasties in General and the German Imperial 

Constitution in Particular 36 



III 

The Basis of the Dynastic Power 70 



IV 

The Principles of German Policy: also a History 
OF the Events Leading up to the World- 
War 94 

MANIFESTATIONS OF GERMAN MILITARISM— WILLLOE 
n. AND THE WORLD PEACE— THE HAGUE CON- 
FERENCE AND ITS CONSEQUENCES— WHY ALL 
ATTEMPTS AT UNDERSTANDING WERE WITHOUT 
RESULT — PREMONITIONS OF THE STORM. 

vii 



viii CONTENTS 

V 

PAGE 

The German Dynasty and the German Notion of 
Culture. To which is added a Study of 
the Intellectual Antecedents to the 
War 159 

german philosophers, professors, and histo- 
rians — international law! on this side and 
on that — the german racial science and 
deductions therefrom — concerning the free- 
dom of german culture — german culture, 
then and now. 

VI 

The German's Fatherland 212 

VII 
The Origin of and Meaning of the War . . . 233 

THE opinions OF GERMAN PACIFISTS AND SOCIAL 
democrats — DYNASTIC STATESMANSHIP AND WAR — 
THE MEANING OF THE PRESENT WORLD-WAR. 

VIII 

Onward! to Democracy! 267 

dynasty or humanity? — dynastic politics and 
culture — the prerequisite conditions for a 
european peace — the errors and advantages 
of democracy. 



THE COMING DEMOCRACY 



THE COMING DEMOCRACY 



I 



SOME PROBLEMS FOR FUTURE GERMAN 
HISTORIANS 

The task of German historians in the future will 
be in the highest degree both a thankless and a painful 
one. How will they ever be able to explain the en- 
thusiasm, the marvellous cohesion and the bed-rock 
belief in the holy mission of the German cause, with 
which the German people embarked upon this World 
War? Will they, no longer under the restraint of 
personal liberty, i.e., under the guardianship of the 
German General Staff, be honestly able to maintain 
those ideas as to the necessity for and origin of this 
universal conflict, which are prescribed in Germany 
to-day? Or, will they not, by the light of the over- 
whelming proofs already at hand, reject them as 
historically untenable ? Moreover, allowing that their 
love of truth compels them to it, how will they, in 
this case, be possibly able to explain to posterity 
that Germany did not rush into this World War with 
feelings of anguish and horror, but with a shout of 
joy, as though marching out to a festival ? 



2 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 

I fear that the German historians of the future 
will only be able to read the German newspapers 
(particularly the comic papers) of the first months of 
the war with reluctant amazement, so thoroughly 
un-German and barbaric will the extraordinary ideas 
of right and wrong, the intoxication of victory, the 
wrongheadedness, and, to speak plainly, the braggado- 
cio of the leading organs of the Press and men in Ger- 
many appear to them, in view of naked, historical facts. 

And their reluctant amazement will change into 
silent pain or sheer indignation as soon as they have 
studied the question: Was it necessary? Was the 
World War actually and really inevitable? Relieved 
from the thraldom of personal restraint, and now 
only engaged upon the unprejudiced establishment 
of historical truth, will it be easy for them to find 
an answer to this question? No! it need not have 
happened! It might have been otherwise! 

Then, finally, why was Germany, on August ist, 
1914, obliged to declare war upon Russia? Because an 
heir to the Austrian throne had been assassinated at 
Serajevo? Nobody regards this murder as a casus 
belli per se, because no one can imagine that, in 
civilised Europe, people have ever lived who value 
the life of a prince as equal to that of millions of 
humbler mortals. Moreover, later German historians 
will never understand how this murder was made a 
pretext for the ultimatum to Serbia, which set the war 
machine rolling. When, in 1894, the French Presi- 
dent, Carnot, was murdered in Lyons by an Italian an- 
archist did it occur to anyone in France to denounce 
the Italians as a ''filthy pack" (this is how the Austro- 
Hungarian statesmen and newspapers described the 



PROBLEMS FOR GERMAN HISTORIANS 3 

Serbs) and to declare that a "punitive force'^ must at 
once be launched against them? When the Empress 
Elizabeth of Austria was assassinated on the Lake 
of Geneva in 1898 by an Italian anarchist, did a single 
person in Austria ever moot the idea of an ultimatum 
to Switzerland, on the ground that the Swiss Federal 
Council was intriguing against Austria and supporting 
the Irredentist movement in Italy? Not a bit of it. 
The whole world was indignant at these acts. The 
murderers were punished, and everyone agreed that 
this was the only possible expiation. 

That, however, in 191 4, the Serajevo murder (which 
was not perpetrated by Serbs, but by Austrian subjects 
on, Austrian soil) was made the subject of diplomatic 
action against Serbia is a fact which deserves condem- 
nation from a legal point of view. A State which, in 
consequence of such an occurrence, makes such per- 
emptory demands cannot be regarded as pacific; it is 
aware, beforehand, that its action is sure to entail a 
risk of war. 

"The assassination of this prince at Serajevo did 
not cause this World War," German annals will reply 
to later historians. "That Germany, on August ist, 
1 914, was forced to declare war upon Russia was a 
consequence of her treaty obligations to Austria. 
The Serajevo murder was simply an outward and visi- 
ble sign of those Serbian and Russian machinations 
which had long been menacing Austria's position as 
a World-Power. Serbia felt herself strong, owing 
to her protection by Russia. Since we were allied 
with Austria, we could not permit this threatening 
attitude, and were forced, since Russia wilfully 
interfered in the Austro-Serbian dispute, to hurry to 



4 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 

our ally's aid against Russia. Thus the World War 
arose/' 

This statement can only be of intrinsic value for 
historical investigation if properly supported by 
evidence. But the historians of the future will look 
in vain for actual proofs of this Serbian and Russian 
menace. From multitudinous diplomatic papers, they 
will be unable to unearth a single document which 
unequivocally proves that Russia had actually en- 
couraged the Serbs to hostile resistance to Austria. 
As little will they be able to discover any reliable 
document whatever showing that the Serajevo murder 
was planned and carried out with the cognisance 
of the Governments of either Russia or Serbia. On 
the contrary, they will have to fall back upon No. 140 
of the Russian Orange Book, and the eminently con- 
ciliatory Serbian reply to the Austrian Ultimatum, 
as proofs that Russia recommended the Serbs to 
observe moderation, and that Serbia followed this ad- 
vice. For a more conciliatory reply than Serbia gave 
to Austria it is impossible to conceive. If nearly all 
German accounts maintain that Austria-Hungary was 
most terribly menaced,^ there are wanting, as already 
said : firstly, actual and historical proofs of this men- 
ace, and, secondly (and this is more important), ac- 

^ To pick out one instance from among hundreds : Prof. Her- 
man Oncken writes ("Deutschland und der Weltkrieg," Berlin, 
1915. P- 540) ' "It was inevitable that this cruelly wronged Great 
Power, after having so long and so patiently endured this men- 
ace, should rise up at this crisis. It was not a question of 
external prestige, no ! her very existence was in jeopardy, if she 
suffered this attack." What legally conclusive evidence has 
Prof. Oncken for his statement that Austria's "existence was 
ever in jeopardy"? 



PROBLEMS FOR GERMAN HISTORIANS 5 

tually credible evidence that Austria could not, through 
a Court of Arbitration, have attained her rights more 
cheaply and more reasonably than by sacrificing mil- 
lions of men. 

Future German historians, who will be better versed 
in the psychology of the cases of Prochaska, Fried- 
jung, etc., than we, will be forced to discredit the state- 
ments of the Austrian diplomats, who continually 
speak of "plots," without being able to adduce any 
tangible evidence in support of their statements. 

On the other hand, as regards Germany's treaty- 
obligation towards Austria, they must allow that, as 
events show, she was not only loyal in her observance 
of it but even officious. For Germany not merely 
presented a twelve-hour Ultimatum to Russia at the 
very moment when Austria herself had already de- 
clared her readiness to reopen negotiations with Rus- 
sia (Red Book Nos. 55, 56). She not only nullified 
this pacific attitude adopted by Austria at the eleventh 
hour, but declared war upon Russia full five days be- 
fore Austria herself, although the latter was alleged 
to have been so severely threatened. Surely greater 
loyalty was impossible! 

Unfortunately, the German historians of the future 
will be compelled to discount this "Nibelung-faith- 
fulness," when they further investigate the history 
of the war. For when on May 23rd, 19 15, Italy sud- 
denly declared war on Austria, then Germany, with all 
her loyalty to her alliances, entirely Ignored this new 
and much more dangerous threat to her ally. Was 
Austria's existence and her position as a Great Power 
less menaced by Italy than by Serbia? Who was in 
the sublime counsels of the diplomats of that day? The 



6 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 

fact remains, Germany did not declare war upon Italy. 
Either, then, so will our later German historians de- 
duce, our treaty-loyalty to Austria was truly sincere, 
but, if so, our attitude towards Austria in May, 191 5, 
was a breach of contract; or, perhaps after all, it 
was only a diplomatic lie, and, if so, our predecessors, 
if they genuinely desired peace, could as well have 
held themselves aloof from a conflict between Aus- 
tria on the one hand and Serbia and Russia on the 
other, as they could later from one between their ally 
and Italy. 

From the foregoing it is evident that neither the 
assassination at Serajevo, nor the constantly asserted, 
and ever unproven, Serbo-Russian intrigues, nor, 
even, the German treaty obligations to Austria, could 
be the real cause of the World War. Future German 
historians will exclaim: *'It is impossible that our 
ancestors could ever have declared war upon half 
the globe without having been first actually assaulted 
and attacked. Even if they were so enamoured of 
war, they would scarcely be so arrogant as to attack 
four Powers at once. It is evident that an attack upon 
our country, infringement of our national dignity, in 
short, an armed attack upon our Fatherland, must have 
driven us into war." 

But, ah! here we have a bona fide casus belli. 
(German White Book, p. 14.) "However, before 
a confirmation of the execution of this order had 
been received, that is to say, already in the after- 
noon of August 1st. . . . Russian troops crossed our 
frontier and marched into German territory.'* It 
is plain that we could not tolerate that. Of course, 
the German declaration of war naturally resulted from 



PROBLEMS FOR GERMAN HISTORIANS 7 

this Russian invasion. Let us examine the facts. 
Here we find (White Book, Exhibit 26) the official 
German declaration of war upon Russia. What? Is 
it dated August ist, 1914, 12.52 p.m.? How could it 
be known in Berlin at 12.52 p.m. that Russian troops 
had on the afternoon of that day crossed the German 
frontier? And what does that mean? The German 
declaration of war was not, of course, the result of an 
invasion of Russian troops ! "Seeing that Russia has 
refused to comply with this demand (the suspension 
of military operations) and by this refusal has an- 
nounced that its action was directed against Germany, 
I have the honour, etc. . . ." Accordingly it was not 
the Russian incursions (p. 14) that drove us to war 
with Russia, but (p. 46, Exhibits 26, 2y) the disre- 
gard of the Ultimatum addressed to Russia. This 
contradiction in the German official documents is ab- 
solutely bewildering. Did not the German Govern- 
ment know why it was bound to declare war upon 
Russia? Did Russian forces actually violate our ter- 
ritory, or did we only declare war upon that country 
because she refused an answer to an Ultimatum, 
which, from the short term set for reply, was bound 
to be regarded as an insult? What an extraordinary 
contradiction in such a serious and sanguinary af- 
fair! 

Our own supposition arising out of this contradic- 
tion (namely, that we did not declare war upon 
Russia because we were obliged, but because we 
wished) amounts to a certainty by the light of a 
semi-official article in the Pester Lloyd (Government 
organ of the Austro-Hungarian Government in Buda- 
pest) of May 27th, 1916. In replying to a speech 



8 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 

of the then English Cabinet Minister, Grey, in which 
he had emphasised the fact that the war would have 
been avoided had his proposals for a Diplomatic Con- 
ference (English Blue Book Nos. 6y, 84, loi, 103) 
been adopted, the article proceeds: "how great and 
unswerving was our determination to settle our differ- 
ences with Serbia in such a way that the criminal 
menace should be once and for all disposed of, Sir 
Edward Grey can be assured, since we can honestly 
state that : even had the Russian Government desisted 
from or suspended the mobilisation she had, despite 
her hypocritical assurances and avowals to the con- 
trary, been secretly continuing, Austria-Hungary 
would never have gone to any Conference, but would 
have insisted, untrammelled by any third party, on 
bringing her differences with Serbia to a final issue, 
in accordance with the necessities of her future se- 
curity.'* 

Even had Russia desisted from or suspended its 
mobilisation! Now every doubt has vanished. For 
it is no longer Germany's enemies who assert this, 
but a semi-official organ of the Austro-Hungarian 
Government making this ''statement" in "complete 
honesty." For us, this statement is an historical 
document, from which we, unfortunately, are bound 
with unequivocal clearness to deduce that Austria, 
backed up by Germany, absolutely determined upon 
war. 

SjT ^ ^ S|« !^ 

And what of France? It is true that we cannot 
understand how the German Government at that time 
could have become obsessed by the idea that a war 
^with Russia was inevitable; but it is still more un- 



PROBLEMS FOR GERMAN HISTORIANS 9 

intelligible why she was obliged to declare war upon 
France (and, as a result of this, unfortunately, 
upon Belgium also). Here we have the speech of the 
German Imperial Chancellor of August 4th, 1914, 
in which he states : "Bombing aeroplanes, cavalry 
scouts, and companies violating our Alsace-Lorraine! 
In this way, France, although no state of war has been 
declared, has broken the peace and actually attacked 
us." There appears to be here no possible doubt : we 
were, as the Chancellor solemnly assures us, "actually 
attacked!" It certainly strikes us as curious that 
the Imperial Chancellor in the very next sentence of 
the same speech confesses that we ourselves had al- 
ready crossed the French frontier before the declara- 
tion of war: "Of the French complaints as to viola- 
tions of their territory on our part, we can only allow 
one single instance. Contrary to express orders, it ap- 
pears that, on August 2nd, a patrol of the i^th Army 
Corps under command of an officer crossed the fron- 
tier." The Chancellor endeavours to invalidate the 
import of this fact by adding: "but long before this 
violation of territory occurred French aeroplanes 
penetrated into South Germany and threw bombs upon 
our railway communications." 

We cannot be blamed if, once having established 
the falsity of the German representations touching the 
Russian violation of territory, we here again require 
evidence of this "actual attack." First, we place 
on record that the German declaration of war, 
delivered by Herr von Schoen in Paris at 6.45 p.m. on 
August 3rd, 1914, did not refer to any infringement of 
territory, but only to the aeroplane aggression 
upon which the Chancellor insisted : "the German Ad- 



lo THE COMING DEMOCRACY 

ministration and military authorities have established 
a certain number of palpably hostile acts committed 
on German soil by French aeroplanes. Several of these 
have openly violated the neutrality of Belgium, by fly- 
ing over the territory of that country. One of them 
attempted to destroy buildings near Wesel, others v^ere 
observed over the Eiffel country, and another threw 
bombs on the railway line near Karlsruhe and Nurem- 
berg. I am commanded, and have the honour, etc. 
. . ." (French Yellow Book No. 147). 

The Imperial German Chancellor could have greatly 
assisted our investigations by furnishing dates and » 
details. But these are absolutely wanting in his speech. 
Hence we were obliged to scrutinize carefully the 
Wesel, Karlsruhe, and Nuremberg papers for the 
period July 25th-August 3rd, 19 14. The work was 
all the more arduous in that our search yielded, alas ! 
no result. Not one of these newspapers contains a 
single reference to the throwing of bombs. Can 
anyone believe that they would have remained 
silent in the face of such a sensational occurrence? 
But we have not been alone in seeking for evidence 
for the cause of the war as alleged by the Imperial 
Chancellor and the German Ambassador. Since the 
outbreak of this World War, honest German patriots 
made a like investigation and, discovering nothing, 
asked the German authorities for information. One 
of them. Dr. Schwalbe, editor of the Deutsche Medi- 
zinische Wochenschrift, received the following reply 
to his question in a notification from the Nuremberg 
Chief Magistrate (Oberbiirgermeister), dated April 
3rd, 19 1 6, and published in his weekly journal of May 
i8th, 1916: 



PROBLEMS FOR GERMAN HISTORIANS ii 

"The Acting General Commandant of the 3rd Ba- 
varian Army Corps in this city has no information 
that bombs were ever thrown by enemy aeroplanes 
upon the railway lines Nuremberg-Kissingen or 
Nuremberg-Anspach, either before or after the out- 
break of war. All such assertions and newspaper re- 
ports have been found to be false." 

Found to be false! Then the justification for the 
declaration of war upon France was a pure myth! 
Accordingly, we did not declare war upon France be- 
cause she "actually attacked" us, but because we in- 
tended to attack her under trumped-up pretexts ? So 
the whole business was a pure fiction? It is staggering 
to have to conceive that, in this twentieth century, 
there were people capable of such fabrications, and of 
solemnly proclaiming in the same breath: "Gentle- 
men, we are now on our defence!" and "Necessity 
knows no law !" 

In the East, incursions of Russian forces; in the 
West, aeroplane bombs on South German railways. 
In the East, an awkward contradiction between 
the Chancellor's speech and the German official 
declaration of war. In the West, a still more 
flagrant contradiction in two sentences of the same 
Chancellor's speech. On the one hand, the state- 
ment made in "full honesty" by a highly official 
publication that it had been determined at the 
outset to accept no Conference (i.e., war at all 
costs). On the other, the equally categorical state- 
ment of German officialdom, that the "actual attack" 
upon which the German declaration of war upon 
France was based is a pure fiction of the German 
Government. 



12 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 

This Imperial Chancellor is, indeed, a marvel in the 

world's history. 

* * * * * 

That, moreover, is evident from the speeches which 
Herr von Bethmann Hollweg has delivered since the 
outbreak of the war. For instance, in his celebrated 
speech of November 9th, 1916, he said: *The act that 
rendered this war inevitable was the Russian general 
mobilisation, ordered in the night 30th-3ist July." 
We confess we do not understand how, after twenty- 
seven months of war, anyone could talk to the German 
people in this way. The mobilisation in Russia, 
Austria, Germany and France was patently the re- 
sult of eight days' preliminary diplomatic negotia- 
tions, i.e., the final act of the great world drama, 
which opened with the delivery of the Ultimatum to 
Serbia on July 23rd. As one cannot tame a horse 
by his tail, so a play cannot begin with the fifth act. 
And this is most particularly true in this connection, 
because in the preamble to the German White Book 
(p. 6) we find the ominous words : **We were fully 
conscious of the fact (in giving Austria our sanction 
to this Ultimatum) that an eventual military action 
on the part of Austria-Hungary might bring Russia 
into the field, and thus, in accordance with our treaty 
obligations, involve us also in war." This sentence 
clearly shows that in German quarters, as early as 
July 23rd, 1914, the risk of a European war had 
been carefully and advisedly considered. Long before 
the Russian mobilisation had been proclaimed, Austria 
had declared war upon Serbia and begun it by bom- 
barding Belgrade. On its side, the German Govern- 
ment had rejected two English and two Russian 



PROBLEMS FOR GERMAN HISTORIANS 13 

proposals for mediation, and, moreover, had simply 
suppressed (no other word for it) a personal note 
from the Russian Czar (asking that the Austro- 
Serbian differences should be submitted to The Hague 
Conference). 

The discussion of the question of guilt must, accord- 
ingly, if it is to proceed without prejudice and con- 
scientiously, begin with the words "fully conscious" 
of the sentence cited above.^ To single out from 
this series of events the Russian mobilisation, and 
to treat it as something standing by itself, is not 
permissible and would only give the impression of a 
deliberate disregard of the events leading up to the 
mobilisation. 

But even if, out of courtesy to the Imperial Chancel- 
lor, we should pause and discuss the Russian mobilisa- 
tion as a thing by itself, we should be unable to agree 
with him. The Chancellor said : "As regards the de- 
fensive character of the Russian grand mobilisation, I 

*In my book "Because I am a German!" (London, Constable 
& Co.; New York, E. P. Button Co.) I, on pp. 96-102, formu- 
lated some of the preliminary essential questions which should 
be asked before the Russian mobilisation is discussed. Vide, in 
this sense also, pp. 82-8 of the same work, re the reply to a 
pamphlet of Dr. Helfferich. (Contradicting Herr von Bethmann 
Hollweg's assertion, his colleague Helfferich says, moreover, the 
Russian mobilisation was ordered on the "early morning of 
July 31st.") Again, in the German White Book (p. 13) it is 
stated that the Russian general mobilisation was ordered "as 
early as the morning" (of July 31st). Again, as to the question, 
When did the Russian general mobilisation take place? the 
German White Book replies: "in the forenoon" (Vormittag) 
of July 31st, Dr. Helfferich, "in the early hours (Friihrnorgens) 
of July 31st," and the Imperial Chancellor, "in the night from 
July 30th-3ist." Three German official statements contain, ac- 
cordingly, three contradictions. Which is one to believe? 



14 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 

will, in this place, expressly assert that, at the outbreak 
of the war in 1914, an instruction of the Russian Gov- 
ernment, issued as early as 19 12, contains the fol- 
lowing sentence: *His Majesty has given orders that 
proclamation of the mobilisation shall be, simulta- 
neously, proclamation of war with Germany.' " 

Here again, in order to oblige the Imperial Chan- 
cellor, we will not investigate the question why he only 
published this document after twenty-seven months 
of war, instead (as any other statesman in his position 
would have done) of doing so immediately, when from 
all sides Germany was being accused of having, of 
malice aforethought, brought about the war. More- 
over, we will for a moment suppose with the Chancel- 
lor that the Russian mobilisation actually took place 
earlier than the Austrian (how very assailable this po- 
sition is, and that, in any event, it can only have been 
a matter of a few hours, is demonstrated by Yellow 
Book No. 115 and Red Book No. 53^). Despite all 
these extenuating presuppositions, we are, after all, in 
a position to demonstrate the futility of Bethmann 
Hollweg's assertion (that the Russian general mobili- 
sation had rendered war inevitable, in that it was tan- 
tamount to a declaration of war) by four facts, which 
do not admit of any argument. 

Firstly J by the following telegram of the Czar to 
William II., dated Petrograd, August ist, 19 14 
(dispatched after the Russian and German general 
mobilisation had been ordered) : *1 have received 

^Cf., in this connection, also the description in "J'^ccuse" and 
J. W. Headlam "The History of Twelve Days" (London, T. 
Fisher Unwin), p. 220. 



PROBLEMS FOR GERMAN HISTORIANS 15 

your telegram, and understand that you are compelled 
to mobilise, but I should wish to have from you the 
same guarantee that I have given you, namely, that 
these measures do not mean war, and that we shall 
continue to negotiate . . ." (see German White Book, 
p. 12, the Czar's message of August ist). Here we 
have the solemn word of the Czar repeated, that mo- 
bilisation does not imply war. What moral and legal 
international justification had the German Govern- 
ment for disbelieving this solemn assurance of the 
Czar? Why did not William 11. reply to this telegram 
by giving the assurance requested, instead of by an- 
other demand for immediate demobilisation, and 
couched in the momentous words : *'Until I have this 
reply from you, I am sorry not to be in a position to 
enter upon the subject of your telegram" (German 
White Book, p. 114) ? Why? 

Secondly, Russia and Austria, both in 1908 and also 
later, in 1912, stood for weeks fully mobilised on their 
frontiers and did not go to war. Why? Because at 
the time neither of the negotiating diplomatists 
was secretly resolved upon war. Therefore, in spite 
of mobilisation on both fronts, the negotiations were 
carried on and the differences peaceably adjusted. 
Moreover, Count Berchtold, at that time Austrian 
Minister, expressly (Red Book No. 17) pointed to 
these precedents to make it manifest to all the world 
that mobilisation on one or the other side does not by 
any means signify war. 

But, thirdly, every child in Germany knew that 
a Russian general mobilisation was in itself by 
no means such an immediate danger for Germany 
as Herr von Bethmann Hollweg would lead us to 



i6 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 

believe. In consequence of its vast territory and de- 
ficient railway communications, Russia required for 
the full mobilisation of its forces about four times as 
much time as other European military States. This 
very comforting circumstance for Germany ought in 
itself to have enabled the German Government to wait 
without risk for a few days — that is, to continue the 
pourparlers. But the German Government, far from 
regarding this slowness of the Russian mobilisation as 
a welcome opportunity for further negotiations, relied 
upon it as a factor of prospective victory in its plan 
of war. In fact, the German war plan (down to the 
battle of the Marne) was, as far as is known 
to us to-day, based upon the slowness of the 
Russian and the rapidity of its own mobilisation. 
That is to say, it was, at the beginning, directed 
not against Russia at all, but against France and 
Belgium. This was so much the case that, relying 
upon the slowness of the Russian mobilisation, the 
German main army was launched through Belgium 
upon France, the East Prussian frontier being only 
garrisoned by insufficient forces, with the result that 
Germany lost the battle of Gumbinnen, relinquished 
half of East Prussia, and was forced, at the begin- 
ning of September, 19 14, to withdraw considerable 
forces from France and send them against Russia, so 
as to avert utter catastrophe in East Prussia. This 
brought about the defeat on the Marne, the bank- 
ruptcy of the German war plan, and the dismissal of 
its author, Moltke. The undoubted historical fact ac- 
cordingly remains that the German General Staff con- 
ceived the Russian general mobilisation to be, for 
weeks to come, so little dangerous, and its slowness 



PROBLEMS FOR GERMAN HISTORIANS 17 

so certain, that it built its whole war plan upon this 
theory and, immediately after the declaration of war, 
did not turn against Russia, but launched its forces ex- 
clusively against Belgium and France. All the same, 
Herr von Bethmann Hollweg dared to describe that 
mobilisation to his contemporaries as a war-storm 
which was to burst in the very next second, and which 
compelled Germany, for the sake of her existence, to 
strike madly in all directions. 

Fourthly, we must place on record the very ex- 
traordinary fact that Austria herself (for whose sake 
it was said the German Government acted with such 
precipitancy) had, indeed, mobilised almost simulta- 
neously with Russia, but quietly continued its diplo- 
matic negotiations with Petrograd (Red Books Nos. 
53 » 55> 56) > ^^^ ^^^ ^ot declare war upon Russia un- 
til five days later than Germany herself. 

The danger of the Russian mobilisation (which, 
according to Herr von Bethman Hollweg' s account, 
rendered the war inevitable) is thus refuted (i) by a 
solemn and reiterated assurance of the Russian Czar; 
(2) by historical precedents, and their quotation by the 
German ally, Count Berchtold; (3) by the formula- 
tion and execution of the German war plan; and (4) 
by the attitude of the Austrian Government itself, 
which deemed the Russian general mobilisation to be 
of such little danger that, in spite of it, it continued ne- 
gotiations and did not declare war upon Russia before 
August 5th. 

Viewed by the light of these historical facts, the 
statements and the logic displayed by the German Im- 
perial Chancellor do not appear to us to hold water. 
That nobody in the German Empire protested against 



i8 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 

them at the time is an extraordinary phenomenon, 
only explicable by the condition known as the ''Biirg- 
frieden/' Our ancestors denoted by ''Biirgfrieden'' 
that extraordinary institution by the aid of which the 
German Government could stifle every free utterance, 
and be in the right in any and every event. 

Herr von Bethmann Hollweg proceeded to say in his 
speech : *The Hague Tribunal, which he (Lord Grey), 
it is true, suggested, is, of course, apparently very 
momentous; but it was offered when Russian forces 
had already been dispatched against us." Here, again, 
this sentence shows us how convenient for the then 
German statesman (free from all responsibility to- 
wards the people) this Burgfrieden was. 

Firstly, Lord Grey did not suggest The Hague Tri- 
bunal, but the Serbian Government did so in its reply 
to Austria (French Yellow Book No. 49). This pro- 
posal had been already made to Austria on July 25th, 
when there was nowhere any talk about Russian 
troops. Instead of adopting this proposal, the Aus- 
trian Government simply broke off negotiations and 
declared war upon Serbia. For this action of his al- 
lied Government, as precipitate as it was brutal, Herr 
von Bethmann Hollweg never found a single word of 
blame, on the contrary (German White Book, p. 7) 
he expressly approved it. 

Secondly, The Hague Arbitration Tribunal was 
suggested by the Czar in a despatch to William II. 
This despatch bears date July 29th, 1914. Twice 
repeated, it was neither answered by the German 
Government nor made known at all to the German 
people. It was only when the Moniteur OfUciel 
of the Russian Government (January 31st, 191 5) 



PROBLEMS FOR GERMAN HISTORIANS 19 

indicated the existence of this despatch that the Ger- 
man Government condescended to admit that it had 
been received, and then issued it in a second edition of 
its White Book. This fact alone is more illustrative of 
the guilt for the war than all the Chancellor's utter- 
ances together, down to November 9th, 19 16. Let us 
keep the dates clear : The Hague Arbitration Tribunal 
was proposed by Serbia on July 25th and by the Rus- 
sian Czar on July 29th, 19 14. The Imperial Chan- 
cellor stated in his speech of November 9th, 191 6, 
that the Russian mobilisation "was ordered in the 
night July 30th-3ist, 19 14," and in his speech of Au- 
gust 4th, 1 9 14, he said that "Russian troops had al- 
ready crossed our frontiers in the afternoon of August 
1st." Whence, it appears, in the first place, that The 
Hague Tribunal was twice proposed at a time when, as 
yet nowhere, "Russian troops were marching against 
us," and, in the second place, that Herr von Beth- 
mann Hollweg was compelled knowingly to represent 
facts differently than they historically proved to be. 
For only in this way could he, in apportioning the 
blame, get rid of the most material fact that The 
Hague Tribunal was twice offered him and his Vienna 
colleague, when no Russian troops whatever were 
being moved against us. 

The Imperial Chancellor proceeded to lay stress in 
his speech on the point that he had exercised pres- 
sure in Vienna in favour of peace, and advised the 
acceptance of Grey's mediation proposal. He referred, 
in making this assertion, to two despatches. As to 
the first, he said : "the instructions I gave our Am- 
bassador in Vienna on July 30th are well known." 
The text of these instructions the Imperial Chancellor 



20 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 

had already made known in his speech of August 19th, 
19 1 5. He then added that he had had this despatch 
pubhshed in the EngHsh Press shortly before the 
outbreak of the war. And it was actually printed 
in the Westminster Gazette of August ist, 191 4. But, 
otherwise, it is omitted from all official budgets of 
documents, and notably from the German White 
Book. The facts regarding this despatch are as fol- 
lows: It was published in one single English news- 
paper and nowhere else. It was not until twelve 
months later that the German Chancellor announced 
this publication as his work. English historians have 
deduced from this remarkable fact that the so-called 
document was a fiction and was, at the critical mo- 
ment, sent to the English paper with the sole intent 
of restraining England from war, that is to say, of 
creating the impression that the German Government 
had seriously recommended Grey's mediation proposal 
in Vienna. But whether fictitious or not, the fact 
yet remains that the German Government has never 
given any plausible explanation why this despatch is 
missing in all official publications. No statesman who 
feels he is in the right, and finds himself in such a 
difficult position as the German Imperial Chancellor 
then did, can have any motive for concealing such 
documents for years. For, at the very beginning of 
the war, the Imperial Chancellor was accused on all 
sides of not having worked in Vienna in the cause of 
moderation and mediation, and of thus having ren- 
dered the catastrope inevitable. Why did he not pub- 
lish documents which would prove the direct contrary, 
and at a time when no one could possibly doubt their 
genuineness ? 



PROBLEMS FOR GERMAN HISTORIANS 21 

The same remark is applicable, and in a far greater 
degree, to the second despatch that the Chancellor, 
for the first time, made known in his speech in Novem- 
ber 9th, 19 1 6. After twenty-seven months of war, he 
suddenly made known a despatch to his Vienna Min- 
ister, which, inter alia, states : "the political prestige of 
Austria-Hungary and the honour of its army, as well 
as its justifiable claims upon Serbia, might be suffi- 
ciently safeguarded by the occupation of Belgrade, or 
other strongholds. We must, therefore, urgently and 
most emphatically ask the Vienna Cabinet to consider 
if it would not be advisable to accept the mediation on 
the conditions offered. The responsibility for the con- 
sequences which otherwise are sure to ensue would be 
an exceedingly heavy one for Austria-Hungary and 
ourselves." Unfortunately, the Imperial Chancellor 
does not supply us with the exact date on which he 
sent this important despatch to Vienna. He only says : 
"I telegraphed 'then' to Vienna": Then! As if the 
most exact indication of the time was not of the ut- 
most importance. And all the more so, seeing that 
this telegram (like the last above mentioned) is no- 
where to be found in the budget of the despatches 
exchanged. Let anyone try to fit it in, and he will 
only discover that, try as he will, its contents are in 
sheer contradiction to other German documents that 
have preceded it. (See, for instance, the German 
White Book, exhibit 12, where the Imperial Chancellor 
expressly declares to his London Ambassador: "It 
is impossible for us to drag our ally in his dispute with 
Serbia before a European Court.") 

But still more vital than the question why these 
despatches were not published earlier, and why they 



22 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 

stand in such glaring contradiction to other German 
diplomatic Notes, is that further question: What re- 
ply did Austria-Hungary make to these despatches? 
We are still waiting in vain for this document. 

There are here only two possibilities: Either the 
Austrian Government did not trouble its head about 
these German recommendations at all, and that would 
be a gross insult to the allied German Cabinet ; or it 
honestly endeavoured to comply with them, and in 
this case there exists no reason for withholding any 
documents which would clearly prove that to be the 
case. But such documents are wanting.^ 

Consequently, the historical fact remains that the 
Austrian Government disregarded the advice given 
it from Berlin. If, then, despite the above considera- 
tions, it be for a moment assumed that the genuine- 
ness of those despatches has been proved, i.e., that the 
German Government did actually, in the sense alleged, 
exercise pressure upon Vienna, then we are in this 

*The way in which the Chancellor juggled with the facts is 
evidenced by this : that in his speech of November 9th, 1916, 
he dared to represent No. 51 of the Austrian Red Book (Note 
of Count Berchtold to the Austrian Ambassadors at London 
and Petrograd) as being a reply to the instructions he dis- 
patched to Vienna. But, from this No. 51, he quoted, wisely 
enough, only a portion, and left out the third paragraph alto- 
gether. From the third paragraph of this No. 51 it is, however, 
clear that No. 51 is only the Austrian reply (and a wholly insuffi- 
cient reply) to No. 84 of the English Blue Book (proposal for 
a Conference of four in London), and can in no wise be re- 
garded as a reply to, or compliance with, the instructions "then" 
given by Berlin to Vienna. (For this refers, as its contents 
show, to No. 88 of the English Blue Book: Proposal of the 
Powers for mediation after occupation of Serbian territory by 
Austria.) 



PROBLEMS FOR GERMAN HISTORIANS 23 

case confronted by the logical deduction that those 
despatches sent to our Ambassador at Vienna, and with 
which the German Imperial Chancellor sought to jus- 
tify himself, do, in fact, the more seriously incriminate 
both him and his allies. For since it is proved that 
Austria refused to entertain those proposals (vide also 
the above-cited semi-official article of the Austrian 
Government in the Pester Lloyd of May 27th, 1916), 
there results, first, clear evidence of the desire for 
war of the Austrian Government; and secondly, a dis- 
regard of the advice of the allied Berlin Cabinet, which 
was a direct insult to Germany. Suppose A. is al- 
lied with B. ; B. enters into a quarrel with C. and A. 
seriously advises him not to exaggerate matters, as 
he has no desire to make war on his account; and 
then B. casts all this good advice to the winds, because 
he has made up his mind beforehand *'to go to no 
Conference," even if C. has dropped or suspended his 
mobilisation. Is there, in this case, any obligation 
upon A. to come to the assistance of B. ? Has he not 
rather now the right to be indignant at B.'s obstinacy 
and desire for war and leave him to his own fate ? 

Either the German Imperial Chancellor did seriously 
advocate the acceptance of Grey's mediation proposals 
in Vienna, in which case, when Austria shut her ears, 
it was his moral duty to cut adrift from such a blood- 
thirsty ally; or, those despatches were (even though 
genuine) mere make-believe. 

We repeat: this Imperial Chancellor is a marvel 
in the world's history. At least we cannot recall an- 
other example of a statesman who, while striving to 
justify his actions, perpetually incriminated himself. 

In his famous speech of November 9th, 191 6, the 



24 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 

Imperial Chancellor Inveighed particularly against the 
then English Minister Grey and the latter's speech of 
October 23rd, 19 16. After having in the way above 
described proved Germany's innocence, it was a grate- 
ful task for him to refute Grey's assertion, accord- 
ing to which the premature announcement of the Ger- 
man mobilisation in the Lokal-Anseiger (Berlin, July 
30th, 19 14 was an *'Ems telegram," with which the 
German Government wished to force Russia to im- 
mediate mobilisation. This supposition of the Eng- 
lish Minister was not very happy, and absolutely 
Irrelevant as regards assigning the blame for the war. 
We readily believe Herr von Bethmann Hollweg that 
the German Government was no party to the pre- 
mature announcement in the Lokal-Anzeiger. He 
was, therefore, fully entitled to say "We need not fear 
any tribunal," and to produce a credible refutation of 
Grey's allegation. 

This portion of Grey's speech and of Bethmann 
Hollweg's reply was absolutely superfluous. There 
have never been In the history of the world so many 
and such obvious *'Ems telegrams" as during the 
period from July 23rd till August 5th, 1914; Lord 
Grey had really, therefore, no need to Invent another 
and to overlook the ones actually In existence. By 
an "Ems telegram," the people of Europe were wont 
to understand the manoeuvre which Bismarck invented 
In 1870, and which Is exhaustively dealt with In 
his "Reflections and Reminiscences." Its chief es- 
sentials were, by means of forged, mutilated, or even 
fictitious official documents, to Incite the opponent 
to war, and win the approval of the public at home 
for a war already planned. In order to be con- 



PROBLEMS FOR GERMAN HISTORIANS 25 

vinced of the staggering fact that, in the period 
July 23rd-August 5th, 191 4, at least a dozen of 
such *'Ems telegrams" were concocted and pub- 
lished, one need only take up any German or 
Austrian paper at random during those dark days. 
It was the aim of the German and Austrian Govern- 
ments, towards the end of July and the beginning of 
August, to persuade the people that a manifestly of- 
fensive war (also called preventive war) was a holy de- 
fensive war, and thus kindle that patriotic enthusiasm 
without which no modem State could wage war. This 
end was attained by numerous ''Ems telegrams." 

See, for instance, the "semi-official communique'' 
of the Vienna Press Bureau of July 28th, 1914 
(French Yellow Book No. 75 his), published in all the 
German and Austrian newspapers, which presented the 
Serbian reply, for popular consumption, in such a way 
as to convey that therein lay a war challenge to 
Austria and the necessity of rushing to arms for the 
defence of the menaced Fatherland. 

A similar "Ems telegram" lies before us in the 
publication of the Serbian reply in the columns of 
the Norddeiitsche Allgemeine Zeitung of July 29th, 
19 14. This announcement, although it was dated the 
25th, and, at latest, reached Berlin and Vienna early 
on the 26th, was only issued on July 29th. Moreover, 
it exhibited glosses, which are absolutely unallowable 
in the publication of such documents. This means, 
then, that the Serbian reply was only published in 
Germany after Austria had already declared war upon 
Serbia, and that the people were confronted with a 
fait accompli. And, in apprehension lest the Serbian 
reply should create a too favourable impression upon 



26 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 

the public, it was "mutilated" by "glosses," which 
served the obvious purpose of anticipating the judg- 
ment of the reader and awakening his belief in the 
villainy and dishonesty of the Serbian Government. 
Why these glosses? What other purpose did they 
serve than to disguise the submission of the Serbian 
Government, and to justify a declaration of war, which 
from an impartial reading of the Serbian reply could 
never for a moment have been deemed justifiable ? 

An "Ems telegram" of quite a different character 
is the following "Official Explanation of the French 
Action," which can be read in all German newspapers : 

"Berlin, August 3rd (Official Announcement) : 
hitherto German troops, acting under orders, have not 
crossed the French frontier. On the other hand, since 
yesterday, French forces have, without declaration of 
war, attacked our frontier posts. Although the French 
Government, only a few days ago, agreed to the keep- 
ing of a neutral zone of 10 kilometres, they have at 
various points crossed the German Frontier. French 
companies yesterday occupied German villages, bomb- 
ing aeroplanes made their appearance over Baden and 
Bavaria, violated Belgium's neutrality by crossing her 
territory, penetrated into the Rhine Province and at- 
tempted to wreck our railways. France has thus first 
made an attack upon us. The safety of the realm de- 
mands counter measures. The Emperor has issued the 
necessary orders. The German Ambassador in Paris 
has been notified to demand his passports." 

Here we have no longer to deal with a pure interpre- 
tation and mutilation of official documents, as in the 
two previous cases, but (as we positively know to-day) 
with a sheer invention. Every German of those days 



PROBLEMS FOR GERMAN HISTORIANS 27 

was accustomed blindly to believe the "official 
announcements" of his Government ; on reading in all 
the newspapers and learning from the mouth of the 
Imperial Chancellor (Reichstag sitting of August 4th) 
that 'Trance had actually attacked us," he rushed to 
arms, in holy indignation, for the defence of his Fath- 
erland. The object of this *'Ems telegram" had been 
brilliantly attained. But for the facts asserted in it 
the German Government does not only not produce a 
tittle of evidence, but has, on the contrary, even fur- 
nished a refutation of its own assertions (vide the 
above-cited notification from the Chief Magistrate of 
Nuremberg of April 3rd, 191 6). 

We, who without prejudice and passion only serve 
historical truth and have all the documentary evidence 
of those days at our disposal, cannot understand why 
the statesmen of the countries then leagued against 
Germany made subsidiary episodes, like the premature 
special edition of the Lokal-Anzeiger, a subject of long 
discussion, instead of drawing the attention of the 
German Imperial Chancellor to these and similar *'Ems 
telegrams." After twenty-seven months of war, peo- 
ple on both sides finally arrived at the conclusion that 
the conditions of peace must be made dependent upon 
the allocation of the blame for the war. Happily, both 
Herr von Bethmann Hollweg and the whole German 
Press associated themselves with this point of view and 
declared themselves ready to co-operate towards a 
reasonable answer anent this question of liability. 
Under these circumstances, there ought to have been 
but one question for the statesmen of the Quadruple 
Alliance to propound to the German Imperial Chan- 
cellor : with what tangible, legally provable and proven 



28 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 

facts can the German Government maintain that it 
was ^'actually attacked"? By what valid documents 
can it show that those "official announcements" of the 
German and Austrian Governments, which we consider 
to be "Ems telegrams," were, as a matter of fact, no 
"Ems telegrams" at all? If it could be indisputably 
shown to us that Germany was, in fact, "actually 
attacked" and is now waging a defensive war, then we 
are prepared to suit our conditions of peace to this 
fact, and to conclude a peace that will in future secure 
Germany from similar attacks. 

And if, on the other hand, Herr von Bethmann 
Hollweg "had to fear no tribunal" and was at the 
same time of opinion that the apportionment of the 
blame (which would have to be determined by the 
evidence of the twelve critical days) must be a con- 
dition preliminary to the opening of peace negotia- 
tions, why did he not anticipate such questions and 
insinuations? Why did he (just like his antagonists) 
discuss only the side and single issues of those eventful 
twelve days ? 

Offensive or defensive war ? That is here the ques- 
tion. It cannot be answered by general assertions, but 
only by historically provable or proven facts. Thus, 
either Herr von Bethmann Hollweg must furnish the 
evidence that those "official announcements" (and 
his speech in the Reichstag of August 4th) were no 
"Ems telegrams," but incontestably truthful presenta- 
tions of facts .... then, we should be in a position 
to examine further how far his statement (that Ger- 
many had been maliciously assailed) is correct. Or, 
supposing he does not adduce this actual evidence 
(and, unhappily, he has not yet done so), then it is 



PROBLEMS FOR GERMAN HISTORIANS 29 

clear that those "official announcements'* were pure fic- 
tions, which could only serve one purpose, viz., to rep- 
resent to the German people a palpable war of aggres- 
sion as a defensive war. But if this Is proved (and it 
is proved to-day), then everything the German Impe- 
rial Chancellor has told me about the Russian general 
mobilisation, of his endeavours to exercise pressure 
in Vienna in favour of peace, etc., etc., is invalidated 
and hardly deserves any further refutation. 



From the mass of diplomatic and generally historical 
testimony that lies before us to-day (as it did also then) 
there emerges the incontrovertible certainty that this 
terrible war was not fate and necessity, but design and 
will, and by no manner of means a holy war of defence 
on the part of Germany against foreign aggression. 

A careful study of the German literature of those 
days has, moreover, forced upon us the conviction that 
Germany waged a palpable war of conquest. We leave 
entirely aside the historical fact that Prussia has never 
fought a victorious campaign without acquisition in 
land or money. Although this is a peculiarity which 
Prussia shares with no other State, it is not adduced 
here by way of evidence. But if, as was the case in 
the World War, an "actually assailed" country, simul- 
taneously with its protestations that it had been 
grievously attacked, brings out enormous annexation 
projects, which find enthusiastic support among the 
people and the open support of its leading statesmen, 
that is, to some degree, a serious matter. Whoever, 
like the German philosophers and politicians in those 
days, speaks in the same breath of defence and con- 



30 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 

quest, is manifestly using the theory of defence only 
as a subterfuge. 

Scarcely had the first blows been delivered upon 
unhappy Belgium than the most influential persons in 
Germany began to demand its annexation. The first 
thirty months of the World War had, it is true, to a 
certain extent run in favour of Germany, but, for good 
reasons, the German Government had prohibited the 
discussion of her war aims. Firstly, she could not, by 
making known her projects of conquest, stamp her 
elaborately constructed fable of a war of defence as 
pure fiction; secondly, she realised fully that the war 
was not at an end, and that Germany, if the first at- 
tempt miscarried, would never be in a position to an- 
nex anything whatsoever. It was no use. The more 
the German specious successes increased, the louder 
became the clamour that the miserable Imperial Chan- 
cellor should allow the discussion of the war aims. 
And as the most elementary wisdom compelled him to 
silence, because the bear, whose skin the agitators were 
in their assurance of victory continually dividing, was 
as yet not killed, they accused and abused him in the 
vilest manner. It was both a ludicrous and a shameful 
spectacle that Germany then presented to the world. 

The German people thought it was waging a holy 
and defensive war against a ruthless attack by the 
*Tand Partition Syndicate" (so the Triple Entente 
was styled in Germany), and had to look on for two 
whole years (as long as the war conditions were fa- 
vourable for Germany) while new land partition syndi- 
cates were daily being formed in Germany. Some 
dreamed of a ''Greater Germany," extending from 
Antwerp to Bagdad ; others of the "emancipation" of 



PROBLEMS FOR GERMAN HISTORIANS 31 

the Flemings, Baits, Poles and Letts; others of the ap- 
propriation of rich coal and iron mines in the North of 
France, of the French colonies in North Africa, of a 
sea-controlling German world empire, and many other 
splendid things.^ Fortunately for Europe the events 
of the war finally checked their greedy appetite. For 
had their plans been realised, then, instead of the peace- 
ful Europe which we had known for fifty years, and 
which we are striving to secure for coming genera- 
tions with yet firmer guarantees, we should experience 
once again in Europe the same gigantic armaments, 
the same policy of violence, which, to the distress of the 
nations, has continued from 187 1 to 1914. For the 
surest way to bring about "unavoidable" wars is an- 
nexation against the will of the annexed. 



* As early as the summer of 1915 the six chief German Indus- 
trial Associations (the Farmers' League, the German Peasants* 
League, the Westphalian Peasants' Union, the Central League 
of German Industrials, the Manufacturers League, and the Im- 
perial German Middleclass League) demanded, in an address 
to the Imperial Chancellor, the annexation of Belgium, the 
North of France, the Baltic Provinces, etc., etc. The address 
of the German high school teachers made similar demands. A 
petition of March, 1916, to the Federal Council ("Richtlinien 
fiir Wege zum dauernden Frieden") demands the annexation 
of Belgium, the "acquisition of a favourable military frontier 
comprehending the for us indispensable mineral fields" lying 
towards France, "the forcing back of Russia as far as ever 
possible from territories not inhabited by the Great Russians," 
the "establishment of the largest possible continuous extent of 
colonial territory in Africa," etc., etc. A comprehensive survey 
of the German annexation demands is published by Payot & 
Co., Lausanne ("Das annexionistische Deutschland," compiled 
by S. Grumbach). The authentic material condensed into this 
volume is extraordinarily voluminous and enough to shame 
every democratically-minded German. 



32 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 

The schemes of conquest of the so-called Pan-Ger- 
manists of those earlier days were so monstrous that a 
Minister of Finance who should hit upon the idea of 
taxing the Pan-Germanist megalomania by levying, 
say, a shilling on every square yard of land those gen- 
tlemen desired to annex, could, by means of this an- 
nexation tax, cover all the German war expenses and 
make beggars of Rohrbach, Bassermann, Chamberlain, 
Reventlow, Harden and a hundred others. 

The German "victories'* of the first thirty months 
of the war were needed to lay clear before our eyes 
the extravagance of the German greed of territory. 
Certain books, which advocated the wildest annexation 
demands, ran into editions of 200,000 copies and more. 
Even numerous German Socialists, who had hitherto 
been regarded as level-headed, fell victims to this 
disease. People like Lensch, Kolb, Geek, Adelung, 
Quark, Landsberg, Siidekum, Heine, Hanlsch, and 
many other so-called Socialists, cynically spat upon 
the testaments of their great predecessors, — Marx and 
iBebel — and, like the crowd of Pan-Germanists, 
spoke of "frontier readjustments," "safeguards for 
our existence," "guarantees against future aggres- 
sion," etc., etc.^ At a time when the war had 
already entered upon a critical stage for Germany, 

*In this strain writes, for example, the deputy Hanisch (Vor- 
warts, September 6th, 1916) : "But as far as the much discussed 
annexations are concerned, I have for my own part never made 
a secret of the fact that, in the interest of the German people 
and especially of the working classes, I consider a considerable 
extension of our frontier lines towards the East, possibly as 
far as the Narew line, a highly desirable war aim." And, then, 
a few sentences further: "therefore I roundly state that. In my 
view, the peace aims of the Social Democratic Party will have 



PROBLEMS FOR GERMAN HISTORIANS 33 

royal personages, such as the King of Bavaria, in- 
fluential industrial and economic societies, leading 
newspapers and politicians, incessantly demanded, as 
an understood thing, conquests and an acquisition of 
power, in a manner which proves that the ridiculous 
and the barbaric were in those days regarded in Ger- 
many as the patriotic} 

To-day, w^hen we know the fortunately unfortunate 
issue of this war for Germany, the whole of this im- 
mense mass of literature does not merely throw a woe- 
ful light upon the idiocy and bombast of the then 
spokesmen of the German nation, but it is before all 
else, as already said, the clearest refutation these peo- 
ple have themselves given of the official pronouncement 
of a holy defensive war. Anyone who, confronted 
with this vast mass of literature, in which robbery of 
land and money is treated as a perfectly natural result 
of the *'holy defensive war forced upon us," can 
still for a moment entertain any doubts as to the 
true significance of this war must be scoffed at as a 
simpleton. 

There was, at the time, so far as we can perceive, 

to lie more or less in the same direction as those peace aims 
which the Imperial Chancellor laid down in his well-known 
speech of December 9th, 191 5, and later." Similar expressions 
of eminent Social Democratic leaders are to be found in the 
Sozialistische Monatshefte, in the Hamburger Echo, in the 
Chemnitzer Volksstimme, and other party organs. 

^Even when the war situation had become so hopeless that 
the Imperial Chancellor in his above-cited speech of November 
9th, 1916, had to state that he "had never declared the annexa- 
tion of Belgium to be our intention," the spokesmen of the 
Centre, the National Liberals, and Conservatives still persisted 
that Belgium, politically, militarily, and economically, should 
remain in German hands. 



34 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 

in the whole of Germany but one eminent man, 
Maximilian Harden, who had the courage openly to 
confess adherence to his old opinions, that is, he 
called the long-desired war of conquest by its right 
name, as soon as it had broken out. 

"Away with the miserable attempts to justify Ger- 
many's action. Finish with this vulgar abuse of our 
foes. 

"We did not embark upon the enormous risk of 
this war like irresponsible fools. We willed it, 
because we were obliged and bound to will it. May 
the Teuton devil throttle the whiners, whose prayer 
for pardon makes us ridiculous amid the marvels of 
great events. We do not stand, we do not place our- 
selves before the tribunal of Europe. Our might shall 
create a new right in Europe. Germany strikes. If 
it conquers new realms for its genius, the priesthood 
of all the gods shall belaud the good war. We do 
not wage the war in order to punish sinners, nor 
to free enthralled peoples and then bask in the con- 
sciousness of unselfish magnanimity. We wage it 
from the bed-rock of conviction, that Germany, after 
having completed its task, can and must demand 
further elbow room and further potentiality for de- 
velopment in the world. Spain and the Netherlands, 
Rome and Hapsburg, France and England have 
possessed, ruled and colonised vast tracts of the most 
fertile soil. Now the hour of German ascendancy 
has struck." {Zukunft, October 17th, 1914). 

The truth is, the diplomatic origin of this World 
War, the contradictions and forgeries about the 
"actual attack" that were fabricated and confessed to 
by the German Government itself, the voluminous 



PROBLEMS FOR GERMAN HISTORIANS 35 

literature demanding annexations, and the annexation 
craze which infected the ranks of the German So- 
ciaHsts, compel us to the admission, which, though sad- 
dening for us Germans, is yet incontrovertibly true, 
that no war of modern days has ever borne the stamp 
of a war of conquest more unmistakably than that 
which Germany, on August ist, 191 4, embarked upon 
against one half of the world. 



II 



OF DYNASTIES IN GENERAL AND THE GER- 
MAN IMPERIAL CONSTITUTION 
IN PARTICULAR 

How was it possible that the German Government 
could conceal from its people the true character of 
this war and, in the way we have delineated, instil 
into them the conviction that warlike possibilities 
were actualities, infringements of rights acts of self- 
defence, and purely fictitious attacks "actual" ones? 
With what right could it demand the sacrifice of the 
lives of its citizens, when it is historically proven 
that the real causes of the war, and the war aims, 
were different from those for which the German citi- 
zen was prepared to lay down his life? To propound 
this question (and it must be propounded) involves 
the solution of a problem which, remarkably enough, 
has not hitherto been solved in Germany. I say *'re- 
markably," because Germany is regarded as a civilised 
State of the first rank; and because, without a rea- 
sonable discussion and solution of this problem, it 
is really no civilised State at all. Since England, 
France, and Italy led the way in the solution of this 
problem, most of the other European States fol- 
lowed their example. Even the small, almost despised 
Balkan States recognised this as the most important 
of all political problems, and each, according to its 
national individuality, has furnished a solution. 

36 



OF DYNASTIES IN GENERAL 37 

This problem, practically unknown in Germany, 
or in any event excluded from any public discussion, 
can be comprehended in one word : Dynasty. 

In my book "Because I am a German,"^ I said 
in reference to the origin of wars : "War is never 
a 'logical consequence' or a 'necessary result'; war 
is a will. Not the will of a revengeful God, nor of 
any other supernatural power, but the will to power of 
individual men. . . . The exuberant will to power of 
the few individuals who still, by virtue of antiquated 
Constitutions, enjoy an absolute political power : that 
is the virus of war. That, and that alone, has the 
power to transform the latent war-madness existing 
in certain classes of the population into an acute war 
crisis." 

It is clear that dynasties are hereby intended. As 
there can be no religion without gods, no art without 
ideals, in like manner there can be no wars^ without 
dynasties. Dynasties are the gods of wars and the 
spirit of a warlike thought in the world. "Cherchez 
la femme," said Dumas relative to the investigation 
of the cause of crime. "Cherchez la dynastie!" one 
must exclaim to all those who are seeking the true 
causes of wars. 

The whole world instinctively feels that there is 
an intimate correlation between dynasty and war, but 

M Constable & Co., Ltd., London; E. P. Button & Co., New- 
York, p. 123.] 

^ The notion "war" is in this book intended to mean a bloody- 
conflict between whole nations. This notion of war naturally, 
therefore, presupposes the existence and the full employment 
of the general obligations for national defence. Civil and 
colonial wars do not come within the compass of our argu- 
ment. 



38 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 

hitherto this instinctive feeling in mankind has never 
found clear and practical expression. And for simple 
and readily intelligible reasons. For since dynasties 
are at once both lawgivers and judges in their own 
cause, and dispose, moreover, of powerful armies, 
all pacific, scientific, and philosophical investigations 
on this topic are only permitted so long as they do 
not run counter to the interests of the dynasties. But 
as the investigation of political truth is altogether 
against the interests of dynasties, this may well be 
the reason why the otherwise so versatile German 
scholars and politicians have until now avoided an 
unprejudiced approach to this problem. Particularly 
lamentable is, in this connection, the fact that most 
German "scientific'* pacifists in many, far too many, 
books have spoken about the causes of wars, without 
uttering a single word about dynasties. We shall 
recur later to this peculiarity. 

First, what is a dynasty? 

The word comes from the Greek and means power- 
wielder, ruler. In the Greek political system, those 
were called dynasts who had by an act of violence 
gained possession of the government. In modern 
speech, we understand by dynasties ruling families, 
who preside over the destinies of a country, whose 
sovereign right is vouched for by the gods of the 
Christian, heathen, or Mahomedan faith, as being 
hereditary and absolute; and, thus, can neither be 
impugned by human powers, nor in any way compared 
with other human institutions. 

The dynasties arose and are based upon the national 
necessity of defence and leadership. Everywhere in 
history they crop up, first as protectors, liberators, 



J 



OF DYNASTIES IN GENERAL 39 

or fortunate conquerors, then as the anointed of the 
Lord, and, finally, as tyrants and oppressors. The 
history of every dynasty begins with popular en- 
thusiasm and ends with popular revolt. It is the his- 
tory that the Brothers Grimm have so dramatically 
described in the legend of Frau Ilsebill: the ever- 
lasting story of growing arrogance which ends in a 
catastrophe. 

Among primitive peoples, who have no legal or 
political organisation, and who love personal liberty 
beyond all else, their leaders were mostly chosen only 
for the period of the war, and afterwards again lost 
their power. But when the primitive peoples came 
to settle down, and began to exhibit political and 
national cohesion, then their leaders, who had been 
victorious in war, retained their position in time of 
peace. They exercised, mostly in conjunction with 
the medicine man and the elders of the tribe, author- 
ity over their companions; and their ruling rights 
gradually usurped all spheres. When such leaders 
were not merely strong and successful as warriors, 
but also shrewd as lawgivers, and gifted with or- 
ganising faculties and generally ambitious, they 
gradually ousted the medicine man, made themselves 
sorcerers and priests, proclaimed themselves prophets 
of God, and exercised a despotic power, which was 
the more unlimited the more arrogantly they asserted 
themselves, the more absolutely they obtained the sym- 
pathies of the leading men of the tribe, and the more 
superstitious the race became. So Moses was not 
only the chief war lord of the Jews, but was at the 
same time a lawgiver who had intercourse with God 
Himself. 



40 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 

Their descent from and intercourse with the Divin- 
ity are the essential characteristics of every dynasty. 
Gods and kings are colleagues. The kings stand 
either, as was formerly the case among the Chinese, 
in direct kinship with the Divinity and call them- 
selves sons of Heaven, or they style themselves, as 
is the case to-day in Germany, *'by the grace of 
God" and exercise their functions as the chosen in- 
struments of Heaven (speech of William II., August 
25th, 1910). As is their descent, so also are their 
powers of a divine nature. Among the Incas, they 
caused the sun to rise; in the case of the Egyptians 
and Persians, they held sway over all the good and 
evil spirits of heaven and earth; among the Chinese, 
they controlled even the degree of bliss after death, 
and, among us Germans, the Lord of Hosts is the 
annihilator of our enemies (speech of William H., 
June 5th, 1916, at Bremerhaven). 

Somewhat unscientifically, but with psychological 
subtlety, Anatole France describes in his *Tenguin 
Island" the origin of kingship and the nation of sov- 
ereignty. An intelligent man disguised himself as a 
dragon, and, as such, terrified the inhabitants of the 
surrounding villages, stole their cattle at night, and 
exercised an uncanny reign of terror over the dis- 
trict. But as his dark, illegal existence began after 
a while to displease him, he hit upon the brilliant 
idea of regularising it. Accordingly he made his ac- 
complices among the people ventilate the idea that the 
dragon was a bewitched god which could only be de- 
stroyed, that is, set free, by a virgin. He then ar- 
ranged a theatrical display with the said virgin, who 
thereupon slays this dragon in the open and finally 



OF DYNASTIES IN GENERAL 41 

frees the country from the beast. The dragon here- 
upon adopted human form and declared itself a higher 
Being. In consequence, that which he formerly stole 
was henceforth brought him as tribute by the grate- 
ful inhabitants of the liberated district. Thus he 
became king, surrounded his majesty, which had been 
hallowed by a virgin, with the indispensable safe- 
guards, provided for his children by making his dig- 
nity hereditary, and ruled, beloved of all, until his 
blissful end. 

If we leave antiquity aside and confine ourselves 
to the Christian era, we can also set up for dynasties 
a "theory of declension," similar to that taught by 
Marx in the realm of economics. When the victory 
of Christendom and the migration of nations had 
shattered heathen civilisation into fragments, there 
ensued a long period of lawlessness and arbitrary rule 
in Europe. Every rich, strong and adventurous 
chieftain, patrician, prince of his Church, landowner 
or bandit leader, possessed the possibility of being 
able by force, cunning, marriage, or inheritance, to 
obtain for himself by violence the absolute lordship 
over a territory and its inhabitants; that is, to found 
a dynasty. The early centuries of the Christian era 
were dominated by the struggles of these numerous 
dynasties for the hegemony. Of course, in these 
struggles, the small man had to give way to the big, 
and many a proud emissary of God had to atone for 
his dream of power in the dungeons of a stronger 
emissary of God. Well into the eleventh century 
the royal dignity in Europe was, in consequence of 
the numerous competitors, who were to be found 
in every feudal castle, neither surrounded by special 



42 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 

protective laws, nor yet hereditary. The king was 
elected ; and, in many instances, this election required 
not merely the consent of the princes, the nobility, 
and the clergy, but of the people also. 

The first country in which the royal title became 
hereditary and absolute, and in which accordingly the 
lesser princes gradually declined in favour of the 
greater, was France. The Merovingians, by dint of 
fierce struggles against the small dynasties and the 
nobility, laid so securely the foundations of the king- 
ship, that their heirs, the Capets, became the first, 
in every sense the all-powerful, dynasty in Europe. 
Their originally beneficent activity (the unification of 
the nation, the laying of the first foundations of a 
system of organised administration, etc.) soon de- 
veloped into disaster for the country and found, in 
the French Revolution, its inglorious end. In the 
rest of Europe, as, for instance, in Italy and Ger- 
many, the division of the dynastic power remained. 
A thousand and one dynasties vied with each other 
for the pre-eminence. The endeavours of the Haps- 
burgs and the Hohenstaufens to found a world power 
suffered shipwreck on the rocks of resistance of the 
Papal and the minor German dynasties, as did the 
struggles for world dominion of the Papacy and the 
struggles for independent sovereignty of the minor 
dynasties on the resistance of the German Empire. 
But, after the Reformation, and particularly after 
the introduction of the universal German *Teace,'* we 
perceive both in Germany and Italy the gradual de- 
clension of the minor dynasties. 

In France, it is true, for the first time in modern 
history, the divinity and infallibility of dynasties be- 



OF DYNASTIES IN GENERAL 43 

came jeopardised by a revolt of the national con- 
science, but this revolution only prepared the way for 
the new dynastic star of first magnitude, which, with 
Napoleon's advent, arose in the European sky. Ac- 
cordingly, at the dawn of the nineteenth century, five 
powerful dynasties altogether held sway over the Eu- 
ropean Continent and its inhabitants: Bonaparte in 
France, Italy, etc., the Hohenzollerns in Prussia, the 
Hapsburgs in Austria-Hungary, the Romanoffs in 
Russia, and the Osmanlis in Turkey. The Hohen- 
zollerns had, since the battle of Fehrbellin (1675) 
shown themselves powerful, adventurous conquerors. 
They clearly understood how continually to add to 
their possessions, to equip them with a new culture 
and rule them with economy. Since 1701 they had 
become kings by the grace of God, although the then 
holder of all divine authority, the Pope, had with- 
held from them his blessing. With Frederick 11. the 
Hohenzollern dynasty had become a respected power 
in Germany and even in Europe. As early as 181 3 
the decline of the other German dynasties had pro- 
ceeded so far that the German races vehemently clam- 
oured for a centralisation of the supreme power 
under the leadership of the Hohenzollerns. The dy- 
nasty of the Hapsburgs opposed this German national 
desire, which, as we know, was only prepared and 
realised by the defeat of the House of Hapsburg in 
1866, and in 1870-71 by the crushing of the Bona- 
partes. 

To-day there are still three powerful dynasties in 
Europe which, despite all the revolutions, inventions, 
and progress of the last century, still wield nearly all 
the divine privileges and powers of the absolute dy- 



44 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 

nasties of antiquity. These are, first, the Hohenzol- 
lerns, who, in consequence of their briUiant victories 
and their first-class army, are, no doubt, at present 
the most powerful dynasty in Europe ; next, the Haps- 
burgs, who, by reason of their defeats of 1866 and 
their attitude in this World War, are still more or less 
dependent upon the Hohenzollerns ; and thirdly, the 
Romanoffs, at once Emperors and Popes, the 
wealthiest persons and the greatest landowners in the 
world. As a fourth, one might mention the Osmanlis. 
But their sovereignty has been so much diminished 
in the last century that they can be regarded as a 
dynasty and Great Power of the second class only. 

In order to obviate any misapprehension, I must 
emphasise here that wherever in this work ''dynasties'* 
are spoken of, only these three, or at most four, are 
intended: the Hohenzollerns, the Hapsburgers, the 
Romanoffs, and the Osmanlis. The remaining Euro- 
pean dynasties, as, for instance, that of Brunswick- 
Liineburg-Hanover, which rules over England, or that 
of Savoy, which holds sway over Italy, we exclude, in 
this book, from the denotation "dynasty," because, in 
one form or another, they stand under the control of 
popular parliaments — that is, they are no longer 
equipped with the same divine and absolute attributes 
as their four above-mentioned colleagues. Seeing that 
the dynasties ruling over England, Italy, Spain, 
Sweden, etc., no longer possess the divine right of 
deciding upon war and peace, it follows that the word 
''dynasty" can only here be applied to those Great 
Power Governments that stand under no popular con- 
trol and have only to be responsible to Almighty God 
for their actions. 



OF DYNASTIES IN GENERAL 45 

Again, I should wish here to emphasise expressly 
that, in this book, the word "dynasty" is not con- 
fined to single individuals and direct relations of the 
ruling houses. It is rather applicable to all those 
who, in conjunction with these "God-appointed" 
rulers, ordain the destinies of a people. Thus, wher- 
ever I employ the word "dynasty," an "oligarchy" or 
a "camarilla" can be equally substituted. As I have 
never lived at the Court of an absolute ruler, and 
cannot, therefore, know whether this or the other gov- 
ernmental act was ordained by an oligarchy (that is 
to say, to suit a privileged class) or by a camarilla 
(that is to say, by influential favourites in the neigh- 
bourhood of the throne), the expression "dynasty" 
appears to me to fit best the purpose of this investiga- 
tion in every case. 

For the persons of the rulers are, of course, of 
divine origin and fulfil the wishes of Providence upon 
earth, yet, all the same, they are not omnipotent and 
omnipresent as is the Deity. 

For instance, such a rare consummation of dynastic 
universality as William 11. could not be content merely 
to rule. William II. is, to be sure, at once Imperial 
Chancellor and Chief of the General Staff, Bishop of 
the State Church and clergyman in ofBce, a final au- 
thority in all matters of science and art, an expert 
in industry, trade, agriculture, education, sport, archi- 
tecture, etc., etc. ; he is present at every laying of a 
foundation stone, christening of a ship, dedication of 
a church, statue, or barrack; musical festivals, exhi- 
bitions, automobile and horse races are for him not 
merely recreations, but also opportunities for the de- 
livery of speeches displaying his expert knowledge of 



46 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 

the subject in question ; he is constantly arousing the 
unbounded admiration of his associates, because, just 
where he might naturally have been expected to appear 
merely as a layman, he reveals himself an expert au- 
thority and critic; yet, none the less, in a huge coun- 
try like Germany, he cannot overlook and arrange 
everything exactly in accordance with his views. Like 
all his colleagues by the grace of God, he therefore 
requires ministers, officials, advisers, courtiers, to 
whom he, wholly or partially, transfers his authority, 
and who administer the country in his name. 

In this way, around the sun of dynastic power, 
circles an aristocratic satellite class of wielders of 
arbitrary power, who, either in conjunction with the 
sovereign lord, or by intrigues and the pursuit of 
personal interests contrary to the will of the ruler, 
govern land and people according to their own fancy. 
"The patricians formed a class of a higher order; 
they were descended from the gods, and were alone 
capable of performing the religious ceremonies and 
observing the omens correctly, and, hence, were 
ordained by the grace of God to rule the masses."^ 
So it was in ancient Rome, according to Prof. Del- 
bruck's description, and so it is still to-day in modern 
Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Russia ; save and ex- 
cept that we do not in the modem Germany of these 
days speak any longer of patricians, but of Junkers. 

It certainly frequently happened (as lately in Ser- 
bia) that a dynasty, in this way, quietly reared up 

'Prof. Hans Delbriick: "Regierung und Volkswille" (Berlin, 
I9i3> P- 96). This description by Delbriick contains the precise 
definition of what I, in this book, mean by "dynasty." The 
reader should not overlook that. 



OF DYNASTIES IN GENERAL 47 

another side by side with itself, which, as soon as it 
felt itself strong enough, in its turn asserted its divine 
rights, ousted the first, and put itself in its place. 
The normal course of development was, however, as 
a rule, this : that the rulers had, in the stress of affairs, 
to abandon something of their power. Thus arose 
the very varied forms of ancient and modern po- 
litical systems; from the despotism of Asiatic States, 
in which the person of the sovereign is so hallowed 
that no mortal eye may gaze upon it, and where his 
representatives are the sole rulers in the land, down 
to the feudal monarchy, which has a parliamentary 
constitution and ministers appointed by the Crown. 
When the dynasties were not always happy in their 
warlike adventures and consequently lost in prestige, 
or when they, despite their divinity, showed them- 
selves too human, i.e., too egoistical, a conflict arose 
between dynasty and people (the latter, according to 
the characteristics of land and people, now imploring, 
then demanding, and finally in open revolt), and be- 
came a Mene Tekel for the dynasties. After the 
Greeks, who, in many matters, attained a degree of 
perfection unknown to us of these days, had given 
to the world the first examples of pure popular gov- 
ernment, we nowhere find the idea of popular govern- 
ment entirely disappear. It existed in both Athens 
and Rome in the beginnings of Christendom and dur- 
ing the peasant and religious wars of the Middle Ages, 
till finally at the French Revolution it animated a 
whole nation and, with spontaneous force, substituted 
the modern State principle of a sovereign nation, that 
Is, the government of the people by the people, for 
dynastic divinity and absokitism. Almost all Euro- 



48 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 

pean dynasties at those times rushed to arms against 
this attack on their divine privileges,^ but they were 
only so far successful in that their attacks upon the 
new secular-republican State ideal aided the birth 
of the new dynasty of the Bonapartes, the activity of 
which filled the beginning and the middle of last cen- 
tury with wars, victories and defeats, and, finally, re- 
sulted in the European dynasties (with the exception 
of Russia) being compelled to accept the principle of 
participation in government by the people. 

So after a thousand birth pangs, and against the 
will of the gods, the modern legal State arose upon 
earth, one possessing a constitution and conceding to 
the people, in one or other form, an influence upon 
the Government. But only in France, and earlier 
still in England, was this victory of the democratic 
idea a veritable one. In other countries, the dynasties 
overcame the revolutionary reaction, only ostensibly 
accommodated themselves to the new demands of a 
new epoch, and remained what they had hitherto 
been, divine, absolute and hereditary. To-day, as we 
have said, we have in Europe three or four dynasties, 
whose absolute powers, compared with the pre-revo- 

"Tlie well-known German historian, Heinrich von Sybel, cer- 
tainly considers that the wars of the French Revolution were 
no crusades on the part of the dynasties against the modern 
idea of popular sovereignty, but, on the contrary, propaganda- 
and conquest-wars of the then all-powerful Girondist party. 
But Herr von Sybel is like most other German historians in 
that, in consequence of having been appointed an acting Prus- 
sian Privy Councillor, he knew how to make out a case for the 
dynasties. That he and his official colleagues were not per- 
mitted to give any other account we can but regret, but cannot 
help. 



OF DYNASTIES IN GENERAL 49 

lutionary period, have changed at most in form, but 
not in actuality. 



That the Hohenzollern dynasty is to be classed 
among these will be indignantly denied by most of 
my countrymen. If you dare tell an average German 
that the Hohenzollern dynasty to-day rules Germany 
almost as absolutely as, for example, Louis XIV. 
in his day did France, then if he is polite he will 
calmly smile in a condescending way and, from the 
height of his political satisfaction, give you to under- 
stand that you would do better not to discuss mat- 
ters of which you are so utterly ignorant. First, for 
example, in our case, the King is not absolute, but 
constitutional — that means that his arbitrariness is 
held in check by Parliament, House of Lords, Federal 
Council and Imperial Diet. Secondly, in the opinion 
of our average German, pure parliamentary govern- 
ment, such as France, England, Italy, etc., possess, is 
a "matter long since settled," since it only leads to 
corruption and faction; it is just because Germany 
does not possess this sort of parliamentarism that it 
has been enabled to develop itself into the most pro- 
gressive of all civiHsed countries. And, finally, that 
sort of system does not fit in everywhere; that which 
all civilised nations regard as the basis of their po- 
litical systems does not suit the peculiarity of German 
civilisation. 

In this fashion, our average German will prove to 
you, with a thousand good reasons, that our country 
has the most ideal of Constitutions, the most united 
policy, the grandest ideal of civilisation, and many 



so THE COMING DEMOCRACY 

other things, which other nations so much begrudge 
us that we must declare war upon them. 

But if, in an attack of pardonable malice, you go 
further and tell your average German that Germany, 
constitutionally regarded, is no nation at all, but is 
only a dynasty, which accordingly means that the 
German Fatherland does not belong to the German 
people, then, if he has been hitherto polite, he will 
begin to be rude and wrathful. Have not we Ger- 
mans the finest freedom of the press, of speech, meet- 
ing, coalition and religion in the whole wide world? 
Where is there another State in existence that has 
democratised education in a way such as we have? 
Where is there a better organised national army, 
where a more efficient school system or a more equi- 
table system of taxation to be found? Have we not, 
in the realm of science, commerce, social legislation, 
public sanitation, and many other things, become the 
pioneers of the world? What have all these German 
achievements to do with the form of the German 
government? Nothing whatsoever; they exist and 
develop in the sight of all in complete independence 
of the dynastic government. At length, this defensive 
speech of our average German will become so 'elo- 
quent that he himself, without intending it, will stand 
before you as a living proof of the fact that modern 
Germany actually finds its embodiment in a dynasty. 
As often as I have discussed this same theme with 
my countrymen I have excited their contradiction and 
wrath. You can talk calmly with a Russian, a Turk, 
or an Asiatic about his dynasty, but hardly ever with 
a German. If he is not altogether speechless with 
amazement that one can talk about a dynasty, as 



OF DYNASTIES IN GENERAL 51 

about other things, then he generally becomes 
frightened. 

This trait goes through the whole German people. 
Those constitutional questions which for a hundred 
years past have occupied all other European civilised 
nations and convulsed them to their depths have never 
been really popular in Germany. Our constitutional 
struggles were, in point of fact, always decided before 
they properly began, and the special privileges of 
God-appointed dynasties have never been seriously 
questioned. From Privy Councillor down to artisan, 
from Countess to chambermaid, everyone in Germany 
either knows nothing of the existence of a dynastic 
problem, or is silent on the subject. There are cer- 
tainly hundreds of thousands of Germans who would 
gladly welcome drastic reforms; and there are mil- 
lions of socialistically inclined German labourers who 
instinctively feel the dynasty to be hostile to them; 
yet they only reluctantly discuss it, because they fear 
the Use majeste paragraphs. But there are in Ger- 
many hardly a hundred, all told, who see the dynasty 
as it really is. And among those hundred there are 
scarcely a dozen serious democrats who have fully 
realised the dynastic side of this World War. Even 
those who only yesterday were declaring themselves 
opponents of the dynasty, for instance, the German 
Social Democrats, hurried in the hour of danger to 
ask pardon and to prove to the world that their former 
anti-dynastic attitude was only "put on." 

Let us, next, in order to form a picture of the com- 
prehensive authoritative powers of the German dy- 
nasty, make a brief survey of the German Constitu- 
tion. 



52 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 

The law concerning the Constitution of the German 
Empire bears date April i6th, 1871. According to it 
the German Empire forms an "eternal league." The 
wielders of the Imperial power are the federated 
princes and their instrument, the Federal Council. 
The Federal Council is composed of the plenipoten- 
tiaries of the twenty-two German princes and of the 
Senates of the three Hanseatic cities. It is, in short, 
a sort of collective Sovereign. Its powers are, how- 
ever, more of a theoretical than practical nature. The 
German Emperor, as President of the Council, is, in 
regard to it, entirely independent. He remains Em- 
peror by heredity. And, as against the German fed- 
erated princes, the Federal Council, and the German 
people, he is free from every legal responsibility. The 
chief Imperial powers, above all the military, were not 
delegated to him ; he possesses them directly by virtue 
of the Constitution. The Federal Council is nothing 
but a deliberative body; the execution of its resolu- 
tions is the affair of the German Emperor. 

Prussia, whose King bears the title of ''German 
Emperor," is president of the "eternal league." By 
Article 6 of the Imperial Constitution, Prussia dis- 
poses in the Federal Council, out of 58 votes (the 
three Alsace-Lorraine votes have only an "advisory 
co-operation"), of 17. To what degree Prussia dom- 
inates the Federal Council appears from Article 78 
of the Imperial Constitution: "Changes in the Con- 
stitution must be made by way of legislation. They 
are regarded as rejected when, in the Federal Coun- 
cil, 14 votes are given against them." Seeing that 
Prussia, as was said, disposes of 17 votes in this 
assembly, it follows that no constitutional change can 



OF DYNASTIES IN GENERAL 53 

take place without her consent. And as, on the other 
hand, any important reform in poHtical life is un- 
thinkable without a constitutional change, we can at 
once realise how resolutely the president of the league 
has brought all the threads of the political life of 
the nation into his hands. This Article No. 78 is, 
moreover, the clearest demonstration of our above- 
mentioned theory of the decline of the small dynasties 
to the advantage of the great, for it is an act of 
abdication of the minor German princes into the hands 
of the Prussian King and German Emperor. 

Altogether, the legal status of the German Imperial 
Monarchy is fixed neither by the Federal Council and 
Imperial Diet nor by the Imperial laws, but solely 
by the Prussian land laws. Constitutionally, then, the 
German Imperial Monarchy can by no manner of 
means be viewed as a fundamental German institu- 
tion, but merely as an appendage to and extension of 
the Prussian kingship and Prussian political power. 
For instance, it is a remarkable fact that the costs 
of the Imperial dignity are defrayed by the King of 
Prussia. The Emperor has no claim upon the Im- 
perial Exchequer for the grant of his Civil List; the 
Imperial budget only annually places a certain amount 
of funds at the Emperor's disposal. 

By Article 11, the German Emperor represents the 
Empire internationally ; he has the right to declare war 
and conclude peace, to enter into alliances and treaties, 
to accredit and appoint envoys. As far, then, as for- 
eign intercourse is concerned, the German Empire is 
a purely monarchical-absolutist State. This Article 
II, which consigns the conduct of the German for- 
eign policy to the sovereign decision of the German 



54 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 

Emperor, is the key to the history of Germany of 
the past forty years. It is, moreover, the key to the 
World War. Whoever, as champion of this war, dis- 
cusses the origin of the present catastrophe without 
this Article ii is as cowardly as a surgeon who 
shrinks from what would be a successful operation 
only because he does not wish to incommode the pa- 
tient. The fact that, among a thousand German 
writers who speak on the subject of the war, scarcely 
one mentions Article 1 1 of the German Imperial Con- 
stitution, is only a proof that our "'great time'* has, 
indeed, found but a puny race. 

An absolutist complement of Article ii is Article 
68 of the German Imperial Constitution : "The Em- 
peror can, when public security within the federal ter- 
ritory is threatened, declare any portion of it in a 
state of war.*' The pronouncement and putting into 
effect of such a state of war is provided for by the 
Prussian law of June 4th, 1851. This Article con- 
cedes to the German Emperor the absolute right, at 
any moment when it appears to him to be necessary, 
to extinguish the civil authorities, the liberty of the 
Press, speech, meeting, union, and even travel, and 
entrust the military authorities with the protection of 
the whole political life of the nation. In other words. 
Article 68 confers upon the German Emperor the sov- 
ereign right to invalidate all the other articles of the 
German Imperial Constitution for any time he pleases. 
Article 68 expresses the constitutional possibility of 
ruling the German State without a Constitution. This 
state of siege or state of war (called poetically "Burg- 
frieden") has prevailed in Germany since July 31st, 
1914. The Imperial Chancellor did, it is true, at the 



OF DYNASTIES IN GENERAL 55 

beginning of the war, give a formal assurance that the 
state of siege would not extend beyond the period of 
mobilisation, but no one can compel him to adhere to 
this promise; for here, as already said, everything 
is subservient to the sovereign pleasure of the German 
Emperor. It is evident in what close correlation 
Article 68 stands to Article 11. And, therefore, this 
ordinance of the German Imperial Constitution stands 
in direct connection with the outbreak of the World 
War. 

Article 18 (Imperial departments and officials) 
makes the German Emperor head of the whole Im- 
perial administration. He appoints the Imperial of- 
ficials, has them sworn in, and, in case of need, ordains 
their dismissal. 

Article 19 nominates the Emperor executor against 
members of the league who do not fulfil their con- 
stitutional federal obligations. "The execution can 
be extended to the sequestration of the land in ques- 
tion and its sovereign power." The German Emperor 
is thus absolute master in the house of each of his 
minor German colleagues. 

The legislative bodies of the Empire are the Fed- 
eral Council and the Imperial Diet (Reichstag). The 
Federal Council is, as we have seen, not a Parliament, 
but the theoretical expression of the sovereignty of 
the federated German princes; its deliberations are 
secret and are not under any public control. Laws 
formulated by the Reichstag are either accepted or 
rejected by the ''Bundesrat" (Federal Council). The 
German Emperor himself possesses no right of sanc- 
tion or veto; this means, therefore, that he can, in 
theory, be forced to rule by laws which appear to him 



56 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 

to be intolerable. But as the Bundesrat is in point 
of fact scarcely anything more than a gathering of 
nominees of the German Emperor, who would never 
venture to be of a different opinion from their Presi- 
dent and executor, such a case could not arise. Articles 
19 and 78 suffice in every case for the suppression 
of any possible tendency to opposition. 

The Imperial Chancellor, appointed by the Em- 
peror, and at once the representative of the Emperor 
in the Bundesrat and the embodiment of Imperial 
authority in the country, presides at the sittings of the 
Bundesrat. Both In his selection and dismissal the 
Emperor has an entirely free hand. Again, the Im- 
perial Chancellor is only a servant of the Emperor. 
The Imperial Chancellor is, accordingly, a stranger 
to the German people, inasmuch as he stands in no 
direct constitutional relation to them whatever. He 
Is appointed, not elected. That the ordinances and 
other contracts of the German Emperor require the 
counter-signature of the Chancellor has a purely 
formal value, for the Imperial Chancellor is only the 
executor of Imperial orders and wishes. If the Im- 
perial Chancellor were elected by the Parliament and 
stood before the Emperor as representative of the 
popular will, then he could, if necessity demanded, 
oppose the Imperial will; for he would feel himself 
responsible to the people and its deputies and would 
have to base his policy upon a parliamentary majority. 
But, as it is, the position of the Imperial Chancellor 
and his counter-signature are only a secularisation of 
the divinity of the dynasty. As the person of the 
Emperor is God-appointed and above controversy, 
while, on the other hand, exercising a decisive influ- 



OF DYNASTIES IN GENERAL 57 

ence in politics, it requires a secular representative. So 
the German Imperial Chancellor is, for the country, 
only the symbol of the Emperor; when German poli- 
ticians and newspapers erroneously treat him as the 
responsible leader of German affairs of State, they do 
so only out of respect for the person of the real di- 
rector of German destinies. Whoever criticises the 
Chancellor actually criticises the Emperor. 

Responsible Imperial Ministers are unknown to the 
German Constitution. The Imperial Chancellor is 
not the German but the Prussian Minister for Foreign 
Affairs. The various administrative departments of 
the Empire have, as their chiefs, Secretaries of State 
who act merely as representatives of the Imperial 
Chancellor. 

In these circumstances, naturally, the Imperial Ger- 
man Constitution does not contain any law estab- 
lishing the responsibility of Ministers or Secretaries 
of State. The opinion of the Reichstag does not in- 
fluence the Imperial Chancellor and his secretaries, 
the opinion of the Emperor is everything. As against 
the Imperial Chancellor and his secretaries, the Reichs- 
tag finds itself in the position of a man who every 
moment expects to be warned by his landlord that he 
is really living in a hired house. The Reichstag clearly 
possesses, under these circumstances, no right to 
censure the instruments of the Government. In prac- 
tice, the German Empire has but one responsible Min- 
ister. Yet his responsibility is, as regards the people, 
purely theoretical; as a fact, he is only responsible 
to the Emperor; that means that he is, in fact, as 
irresponsible as the monarch himself, only that, in con- 
. sequence of his earthly parentage, he condescends to 



58 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 

discuss the politics of his lord with the popular repre- 
sentatives. The responsible post in the German Em- 
pire is, therefore, not, as in other civilised States, oc- 
cupied by a responsible statesman, but by a nominated 
official. 

Up to Article 19 the German Imperial Constitution 
was, in fact, merely a summary of the absolute powers 
of the German Emperor. One could, in fact, cancel 
the first nineteen articles of the German Imperial 
Constitution and replace them by a single sentence: 
"The German Emperor is the God-appointed absolute 
lord of Germany," and the practical result would be 
the same. 

With Article 20 begins a limitation of the Imperial 
absolutism by the Reichstag. This Reichstag, founded 
in 1867 by Bismarck primarily for the North German 
Confederation, became, after the foundation of the 
German Empire, the corporate representation of the 
German people. As it is elected by universal, direct 
suffrage, with secret ballot, it is such a democratic in- 
stitution that Bismarck at the end of his life heartily 
lamented his great liberality and seriously contem- 
plated ''retrieving" the greatest mistake in his life, the 
creation of universal equal suffrage,^ that is to say, 
again suppressing the Reichstag. 

All our statesmen have lived in perpetual appre- 
hension that they have been too liberal; they have 
almost always robbed us again of what they had 
given us a moment before. Scarcely had Bismarck 
by creating the Reichstag perpetrated the most liberal 
act that we in Prussia have experienced since Baron 
vom Stein, when he with his Socialist law committed 
. ^Vide Delbruck, "Regierung und Volkswille," pp. 61-65. , 



OF DYNASTIES IN GENERAL 59 

the greatest conceivable violation of the new German 
civil rights, which he had himself initiated, and 
scarcely had this Socialist law been repealed, when 
our Government brought in a so-called revolutionary 
bill, which was a repetition of the Socialist law, and 
from which we escaped only by a miracle. 

From the very outset, the Reichstag had no sover- 
eign but solely a constantly menaced and circum- 
scribed existence. In other words, it never was re- 
garded by our Government as a constitutional gov- 
ernmental necessity, to check and modify the absolute 
regime, but as a support and popularising resource 
of the Government. *'The soldier and the army, and 
not parliamentary majorities and resolutions, have 
welded together the German Empire. My trust I place 
in my army," said William II. on April i8th, 1891, 
in Berlin; and on October i8th, 1894, he repeated: 
"The only pillar upon which our Empire rests was 
its army. And this is true to-day/' German po- 
litical authorities are, of course, of like opinion. "In 
Germany," says Professor Delbriick in a transport of 
pride in the respect of the Germans for their dynasty, 
"popular representation arose, because the Government 
summoned it and placed it side by side with itself." 
And Professor Lamprecht adds^ : "The intention was 
to win by this means the support of the multitude of 
enthusiasts for German unity, on behalf of a Prus- 
sianised central administration." For Bismarck, the 
democratic franchise of the Reichstag was no modern 
principle of government, but merely a sort of con- 
venient referendum towards the foundation of the 
German Empire; vulgarly expressed: the democratic 

*Karl Lamprecht, "Deutsche Geschichte," Vol. II., p. 215. 



6o THE COMING DEMOCRACY] 

honey with which the democratic Southern German 
States were caught for the German idea of unity 
under Prussian hegemony. As soon as the franchise 
had played its part, it was, as being an unwelcome 
limitation of the dynastic power, again slowly ren- 
dered innocuous (Socialist law, educational law, pro- 
longation of the electoral period, the so-called septen- 
nate, non-distribution of electoral divisions, attempts 
at restricting liberty of speech, repeated dissolutions, 
threats of abolition, etc., etc.). Bismarck was a mas- 
ter in such matters. His Electoral Law of May 31st, 
1869, and the electoral regulation of 1871, announce 
that every German is an elector from his twenty-fifth 
year onwards, and that, on the average, one deputy 
should fall to every 100,000 inhabitants. And, in 
fact, the German Empire was then divided into elec- 
toral constituencies including 100,000 souls in each; 
this yielded the number of 382 deputies, which (after 
the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine) was increased to 
397. Now Article 20 of the Imperial Constitution 
states: "Until the legal regulation, which is reserved 
in par. 5 of the Electoral Law of May 31st, 1869," 
but there is a modest addition, in a note to Article 20 : 
"The legal regulation has not yet been effected." That 
means that the German Empire of to-day, containing, 
as it does, 66 million inhabitants, instead of having 
660 deputies, counts but 397, as in the year 1871, 
when it had barely 40 million. That means, again, 
that the 100,000 souls have, in many cases, in con- 
sequence of the growth of cities and industrial cen- 
tres, become 500,000 (Berlin, for instance, elects, with 
a population of over two milUons, only six deputies), 
whilst, in other cases, in consequence of emigration. 



OF DYNASTIES IN GENERAL 61 

and similar phenomena, the 100,000 have been re- 
duced to 50,000 and less, and yet return their deputy. 
Whence results the remarkable fact that the less in- 
telligent country districts have, compared with the en- 
lightened metropolis, been ludicrously favoured. 

Since, then, the vote of one Lower Pomeranian or 
Upper Bavarian peasant is equivalent to the votes of 
ten progressively minded Germans of the urban pop- 
ulation, we cannot be surprised that our Government, 
by the aid of this unconstitutional distribution of elec- 
toral districts, can always count upon a Conserva- 
tive and Clerical majority in the Reichstag. Without 
this happy majority, the Reichstag would, probably, 
have long ceased to exist, for it is, as already stated, 
by its very nature not a sovereign but only a subordi- 
nate factor of government. If, at any time, the Gov- 
ernment loses its majority in the Reichstag, it either 
dissolves the latter (the Emperor only requires for 
this purpose the assent of the Bundesrat, of which 
he is assured beforehand), or simply ignores it. Pro- 
fessor Delbriick would have us beHeve that Prince von 
Billow had, in 1908, to retire from the Government be- 
cause he could not obtain a majority for his ''Inheri- 
tance tax,"^ but we are aware that he was not obliged 
to go, but himself wished to go On December 4th, 
1913, the Imperial Chancellor von Bethmann Hollweg 
received, as a result of the Zabern debate, with its 293 
against 54 votes, the plainest possible intimation to 
preside no longer over the destinies of the German 
nation. Even in States like Serbia and Bulgaria 
(even, perchance, in modern China) a Minister so 
sharply reprimanded by the popular representative 
* Delbriick, "Regierung und Volkswille," p. 60. 



62 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 

body would have to retire. In Germany, nothing of the 
sort. This Imperial Chancellor, who manifestly did 
not rule in accordance with, but contrary to, Ger- 
man public opinion, was the same who, eight months 
subsequently, declared war, in the name of the Ger- 
man Empire, upon Russia, Belgium, and France. 

Of all rights pos-sessed by the Reichstag, the voting 
of the Budget and the taxes is, beyond doubt, the 
most important. In so far as the Reichstag, by 
Article 69 of the Constitution, controls the expenses 
of the Government and either grants or rejects its 
proposals, it locks the door against any unlimited 
financial arbitrariness on the part of the absolute 
regime; this beautiful theory of fiscal control is, how- 
ever, most unfortunately disregarded in practice 
owing to a loophole. There is, to begin with. Article 
62, which separates the military budget from other 
imperial finances, and thus practically withdraws it 
from any parliamentary control. Then there is fur- 
ther the practice of introducing the Budget and dis- 
cussing it in the Reichstag itself, which by Budget 
law (particularly in military votes) properly only pos- 
sesses a right of voting the supply.^ The problem of 
State financial control by popular parliaments cer- 
tainly requires (mainly in consequence of the arma- 

*Thus, for instance, the military expedition to China (1900), 
the cost of which amounted to £7,500,000, was resolved upon 
and carried out entirely without consulting or obtaining the 
approval of the Reichstag. After everything had been arranged, 
the Reichstag was calmly invited to give its subsequent sanc- 
tion to the steps taken. When it wished to complain of this 
violation of the Constitution, the "responsible" Chancellor, von 
Hohenlohe, was suddenly dismissed, and his place taken by 
Herr von Biilow, who, of course, knew nothing about the mat- 
ter. 



OF DYNASTIES IN GENERAL 63 

ments policy) considerable readjustment in all States, 
but in Germany more than elsewhere; for the reason 
that the Reichstag does not, in principle, possess any 
sovereignty. 

The Reichstag has, again, the right to initiate laws 
and to present petitions to the Bundesrat, i.e., the 
Chancellor. But, as the German Government, in vir- 
tue of its inaccessibility and infallibility, unfortunately 
makes a rule of not participating in the discussions 
of proposals emanating from the Reichstag, here the 
theory is again more satisfactory than the practice. 
Likewise, petitions submitted by the Reichstag are, 
for the most part, ignored by the Government. It 
was not until the World War was fully launched that 
it began, here and there, to make some modification 
in these feudal customs. 

According to the Imperial Constitution, the Reichs- 
tag has no right of interpellation. It is true that it 
arrogated to itself this right and that the Government 
tacitly conceded it. But, in accordance with the per- 
fectly correct theory, that without responsibility of 
ministers even the right of interpellation is superflu- 
ous, the responsible-irresponsible men reply to the 
questions of the deputies (that is, if they ever trouble 
to reply) only as persons who need not do so. 

From this it is clear, in the first place, that uni- 
versal suffrage in Prusso-Germany is not a fact, but 
merely a pious fraud. The Reichstag is nothing more 
than a debating society, and a wilfully bungled imi- 
tation of other Parliaments; semblance and not reality. 
Continually muzzled and bullied by the dynasty, it 
could never develop into a real Parliament. Prince 
von Billow tells us, it is true, that "PoHtical life in 



64 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 

a modern monarchy, as created by our Constitution, 
entails co-operation between the Crown and the peo- 
ple,"^ but we are no longer impressed by these flowers 
of speech. What do we want with a "co-operation," 
in which the representatives of the people are not 
treated like equally privileged collaborators, but are 
forced to play the role of inferiors? What use to us 
is a right to co-operate in the framing of laws, when 
we have no right to watch over their execution, to 
expose their deficiencies and to protest against their 
infringement? 

Prince von Billow further instructs us that it is not 
so much a matter of constitutional reform, but rather 
that we "are so lacking in political judgment and 
political training." That is to say, Herr von Biilow 
assures us once again (more politely, be it said, than 
Hegel and Bismarck in their day but none the less 
plainly) that we are still too ignorant for the exercise 
of new political rights. Even Prince von Biilow 
does not forsake the good old Prussian style. He, 
also, treats us as a man whose money one first steals 
and then comforts him by saying that he did not 
know how to take care of it, and whom, at last, when 
nothing further is to be done, he roundly abuses, say- 
ing that money, after all, has not the value that the 
silly world attaches to it. Herr von Biilow honestly 
assures us: "It is an old mistake to want to gauge 
the concern of the nation in political affairs solely 
by the rights granted to the representatives of the 
people."^ You tell us nothing fresh, Serene High- 
ness ! pray, obey, pay taxes, or : God, King and Father- 

* Prince von Biilow, "Imperial Germany," Cassell & Co., Ltd., 
London, p. 313. 



OF DYNASTIES IN GENERAL 65 

land. That is, in the view of an old German demo- 
crat, better suited to us Germans than political rights 
of which we know nothing. But what galls is not 
so much the assertion that, blockheads as we are, we 
do not understand the value of money, but the demo- 
cratic lie with which our dynasty describes its money 
wealth as a "co-operation of Crown and people." Be- 
lieve me, your Serene Highness! this hypocrisy is 
worse than the very absolutism it conceals. 

For, in truth, Bismarck never dreamt of a serious 
"co-operation between Crown and people." For him, 
the sole point was to leave the God-appointed dynasty 
its old rights, and at the same time give the new 
German Empire the semblance of a modern political 
system. Germany could not and would not enter the 
councils of the European nations without a concession 
to the modern ideas of the nineteenth century. But, 
although the buildings of the Reichstag may look more 
splendid and imposing than the edifice of the "Cham- 
bre des Deputes" on the banks of the Seine, yet there 
resides therein not the will of the people, but the will 
of the dynasty. The German Government needs the 
Reichstag as an advertisement and emblem of its mod- 
ernity. For the purpose of ruling, it has as little 
need of it as a tradesman has of the opinion of his 
employes as to the working of his business. 

Moreover, there exists between Government and 
Reichstag in Germany not merely a constitutional but 
also a strictly patriarchal order of precedence. Only 
the nobility, endowed with divine insight, is entitled, 
in Prusso-Germany, to fill the most important offices 
and to solve the most difificult political problems. Con- 
sequently all leading governmental administrative and 



66 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 

military posts are filled by members of the nobility.^ 
If an exception is occasionally made, the civilian ad- 
vanced to be Minister or General is, as a rule, at 
once *'raised" to the rank of nobility. A German 
deputy can, under such circumstances, hardly ever 
become Minister; and, on the other hand, a former 
Minister, after his dismissal, can scarcely ever be- 
come again a deputy; he would thereby desecrate the 
rank already conferred upon him, and render himself 
unfit for Court and governmental circles. Since, con- 
sequently, not one German deputy has ever actually 
taken part in Government business, it follows that 
expert critics of the Government are altogether lack- 
ing in the Reichstag. In other Parliaments there are 
at least a dozen members who have previously been 
Ministers and are, hence, in a position to exercise a 
sound criticism upon their successors. In the Reichs- 
tag, such a case is unthinkable ; thus the deputies know 
only the theory but not the practice of governing; the 
story of the man who does not understand the value 
of money is, it is plain, likewise the story of our 
popular representatives.^ 

This is in keeping with the conception that our 
Reichstag deputies have (and must have) of the dig- 
nity of popular representation. A French or English 
and a German deputy are about as far apart as the 
proprietor of a business house from his employes. 

^ Cf. here, footnote p. 46. 

^ While I write this, news arrives from Russia that there a 
Vice-President of the Imperial Duma (Protopopoff) has been 
appointed Minister of the Interior. A similar case has not 
occurred in the forty-four years' life of the German Reichstag. 
If it be remembered that Russia has only possessed a Constitu- 
tion since 1905, one may conclude that it has developed its par- 
liamentary regime more quickly than Prusso-Germany. 



OF DYNASTIES IN GENERAL 67 

Where the one acts independently, the other scarcely 
dare intrude a modest objection; where the one is 
animated by the feehng that he is looking after the 
interests of the people, the other is only oppressed 
by his helplessness, and is forced to bargaining and 
so-called *'horse-dealing," in order to obtain the 
smallest concessions from the Government. A clas- 
sical example is the passing of the first great naval 
Bill, which Capri vi received at the hands of (!) the 
Poles; by making liberal promises in the matter of 
Germany's brutal policy towards the Poles he won their 
support for a cause which was utterly repugnant to 
them. 

The feeling that they only distantly control the Ger- 
man Government, instead of leading it, deprives our 
deputies of that proud feeling of responsibility which 
national representatives in other lands display. It 
can only happen in Germany that the President of 
the Reichstag should say in a public sitting: "The 
Emperor understood his time ; he said : T live in 
the days of publicity and free speech, and I will not 
be a so-called constitutional monarch, who reigns and 
does not rule.' I am convinced that it would not be 
agreeable to our glorious Emperor if he were asked 
to accept such a role. . . . Gentlemen, this ought 
to fill us with admiration, and we ought to thank 
Providence that we have in these times such an Em- 
peror; this should stimulate us, to the best of our 
ability, and, so far as our conviction allows it, to 
anticipate and further the great intentions of our 
Emperor."^ 

^ Speech of the President of the Reichstag, Count von Balles- 
trem, January 27th, 1900. 



68 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 

Such Byzantine utterances cannot be publicly im- 
pugned. As soon as a deputy makes a sign of criti- 
cising the person of the Emperor, he is at once called 
to order. When the deputy Liebknecht (senior) re- 
mained seated when cheers were called for the Em- 
peror, a motion was made by the Government to prose- 
cute him for Use majeste; the motion was rejected, 
though by a bare majority. 

How matters generally stand with the liberty of 
speech and competence of the Reichstag is to be seen 
from a book, "Unser Kaiser und Sein Volk,'* which 
was published in Germany and caused a considerable 
sensation.^ A passage in it runs : "The President of 
the German Reichstag, 'gasping' in humility and 
obedience at the foot of the throne, has found it to 
be advisable, in order to shield the very assailable 
utterances of the Emperor from the criticism of Par- 
liament, only to permit the discussion of such speeches 
as are published in the Reichsanzeiger. Since these 
tactics passed into law, the official journal cautiously 
avoids taking note of any of the Emperor's polemical 
speeches. It pretends, with a clumsy naivete, that 
speeches of the monarch have never been delivered, 
although the official telegraph bureau distributes them 
in thousands of copies to the smallest provincial 
papers." 

That, since then, little change has been made in the 
Byzantine habits of the President of the Reichstag is 

* Published by Paul Waetzel (Leipzig, 1906), this book "von 
Einem Schwarzseher" is the despairing cry of a German patriot. 
The "Schwarzseher" is not a Social Democrat, but earnestly 
protests against the "personal regime" because it is continually 
pouring water on the mills of that social democracy which 
knows no fatherland. 



OF DYNASTIES IN GENERAL 69 

shown us by the present "Hberal" President Kampf, 
who telegraphed to the German Emperor on the oc- 
casion of the second anniversary of the declaration 
of war, "May the blessing of Heaven continue to 
be with your Majesty, our whole Fatherland, and 
our faithful allies," thus obsequiously placing the 
well-being of the Emperor before that of his country. 

If we reflect that the institution of the Reichstag 
was an act of grace, and its subsequent continuation 
only due to toleration on the part of our dynasty, 
we can understand why a flavour of servility and 
•Byzantinism has always clung to it, of which it is 
itself quite unconscious. The constitutional impotence 
of the Reichstag, which is lamentable apart from this, 
is thus displayed in its most glaring light and makes 
our German Parliament a laughing stock for every 
serious democrat. 

If, in spite of all these constitutional and self- 
inflicted evils, our intellectuals and politicians clutch 
at and hold fast to the illusion of a democratic Ger- 
man popular Government and "working community,'* 
then that may demonstrate to the world that we Ger- 
mans so instinctively adore the democratic conquests 
of the nineteenth century that we gladly imagine that 
we possess some of them, and cannot endure it when 
someone by the light of facts tries to dash this fair 
illusion to fragments. 



Ill 

THE BASIS OF THE DYNASTIC POWER 

Germany accordingly possesses neither a parlia- 
mentary nor a really constitutional, but, at best, an 
autocratic system of government, adorned with a 
democratic fagade. If there sat in the Reichstag a 
majority of far-seeing straightforward democrats, 
then they certainly could limit certain of the ruling 
rights of the German Emperor by Imperial laws, but 
never his God-given monarchical rights. As by the 
decree of God and of His representatives on earth 
such a Reichstag has never been vouchsafed tq us 
(and never could be vouchsafed), so in Germany 
there are only liberal institutions without a liberal 
spirit, popular rights without popular government. 
Ministers without responsibility, deputies without 
plenary powers; and, on the other side, unassailable 
rights of the Crown, the widest scope for the im- 
position of dynastic arbitrary will, supervision and 
domination by the King of Prussia over the Federal 
princes and the Federal Council, and Articles 5 and 
37 of the Imperial Constitution, by virtue of which 
Prussia's vote in legislation touching the military sys- 
tem, the Imperial Navy, Customs and indirect taxa- 
tion everywhere is preponderant in the Bundesrat, 
when it is cast for the "perpetuation of the existing 

70 



BASIS OF DYNASTIC POWER 71 

condition of things/' We have, then, a political sys- 
tem, the political basis and spirit of which so clashed 
with the demands and — in other countries — actualities 
of modern days, that it was compelled to adopt the 
civilised institutions of these modern times at all 
events as a trimming and a phrase. 

That Prussia watches jealously in Germany not 
only over "the maintenance of the existing order of 
things," but also over that of ''feudal conditions," 
is shown with compelling clearness by the relation 
of our dynasty to the army. "Where lies, after alL . 
the true power? It lies in arms. The question byX 
which to decide the inner character of a State is, 
accordingly, always. Whom does the army obey?"^ 

This question, as Professor Delbriick rightly affirms, 
is the most vital of all political questions, and perhaps 
that is why it is so rarely discussed in Germany. 
The army is, in fact, the basis and the most indispen- 
sable bulwark of a dynasty. Every dynasty has been 
brought into being by means of an army, can only 
by the aid of an army raise itself to power and pres- 
tige, and could not endure without a military pro- 
tective force. "As the living forces of Parliament 
reside in the parties, of whom there is not a word to 
be found in the Constitution, so does the essence of 
a monarchy consist not in the functions that the 
Constitution allocates to it, but in the forces that took 
origin, long before any legal declarations, in the re- v 
mote past; namely, the relations of the dynasty to the f^ 
army. ^ 

This extremely personal and, in all its aspects, 

^Delbriick, "Regierung und Volkswille," p. 133. 
^Ibid., p. 141. 



72 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 

somewhat selfish relation, in which the army stands to 
the dynasty, is in the modern world, and especially 
in Germany, not only disregarded, but, as far as pos- 
sible, disguised from the people. 

If, for instance, you ask a German with an average 
political education whether Germany has a "national 
army," the chances are a thousand to one that he will 
not only answer this question with an unhesitating 
affirmative, but also be seriously indignant that you 
should have thought of asking it. Most Germans do 
not entertain the slightest doubt not only that we have 
the best but the most national army in the world. Is 
not every healthy 'German of full age liable to mili- 
tary service? Can there be a more national army 
than one maintained by taxes levied upon the whole 
population and composed of all the citizens of the 
nation without distinction? Does not, therefore, the 
German army form a nation in arms in the grandest 
sense of the word? 

The fact that in the course of the past hundred 
years a thorough revolution has been effected in the 
domain of the military system, which not only com- 
prises universal military service, but also the right of 
the citizens to control the organisation and employ- 
ment of the army — our German either does not know 
at all, or he does not wish to know it. He confines 
the notion "national army" to universal military serv- 
ice, and, out of respect to his dynasty, takes good care 
not to extend it to the command, the spirit, and the 
organisation of the army. 

Before the great French Revolution all armies were 
only the instruments of dynastic interests. Of course, 
we find national armies in bygone days among the 



BASIS OF DYNASTIC POWER 73 

Greeks and Romans — that is, soldiers who served not 
a dynasty, but their country. But with the decay of 
these States the idea of national defence of country 
became completely lost. In the Middle Ages there 
was no idea of fatherland, and thus no idea of the 
defence of country; the armies were the avowed play- 
things and instruments of the princes. That is, they 
were composed of mercenaries and adventurers, stood 
in no relation to the people, and obeyed only the 
behests of their princely possessors. The most per- 
fect pattern of this standing dynastic army was cre- 
ated by the Prussian King, Frederick William I. His 
army of the "tall fellows" was a purely personal cre- 
ation without any national character. All the nations 
of the world were represented in it. Frederick Wil- 
liam I. would have been very angry, had anyone at- 
tempted to criticise the composition of his army. He 
stood in relation to his army as an artist to his work. 
He never could understand that he could not enlist 
a "tall fellow" because he happened to be a French- 
man or Englishman, and, as such, could not fight with 
zeal and love for Prussia. 

This army, which Frederick II. took over from his 
father, did not go to battle out of love for a father- 
land (this idea died, as we have said, with the Greeks), 
but out of a sense of duty and because it was paid 
for its services by its lord and master. Prussia's 
military ascendancy over its then enemies resided in 
the iron discipline of these royal hirelings. It was a 
superiority in drill and method, having no concern 
with any popular or national idea.^ 

* Prince von Bulow in his book, "Imperial Germany" (Cas- 
sell), pp. 133-4, says: "From the very first, Brandenburg-Prus- 



74 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 

The French Revolution begat two things which 
impressed their stamp upon the military system of 
modern days : love of country, and the resulting na- 
tional military organisation. The triumphant Revo- 
lution declared the people to be, in every sense, sov- 
ereign. The dynastic army that had fought out of 
a sense of duty and for pay was replaced by the na- 
tional army, which fought out of devotion to coun- 
try. The soldier stands no longer in a mercenary 
relation to his leader, but is sworn to uphold the 
Constitution of his country. Not fealty to a mon- 
arch, but love of country, becomes henceforth the 
impelling force and ideal of an army. The soldier 
of the modern national army became, accordingly, 
the armed citizen of his land, in the defence of which 
he is bound to have an interest, because he possesses 
an effective share in his country's government. 

Just as Frederick II. found in the pattern army of 
his father a superior instrument for the prosecution 
of his dynastic campaigns, so now did Napoleon I. find 
in this popular army begotten of the Revolution, and 
founded upon entirely new principles, an engine of 
war superior to all the armies launched against him. 
Prussian superiority in drill and sense of duty was 
of no avail against the new moral ascendancy of the 
soldier fighting with religious ardour for his country. 
And it was only when Stein, Scharnhorst, and 

sia's military power was founded on the two great supporting 
forces of national life in the State: the love of home and 
country and the conception of State Power"; but he himself 
partly contradicts this assertion (pp. 140-1) when he says that 
it was due to "the master mind of Scharnhorst" that "In the 
war of liberation, the Prussian Army became the nation in 
arms." 



BASIS OF DYNASTIC POWER 75 

Gneisenau had organised for Prussia also the first 
national army on the French pattern that the victory 
of Prussia over Napoleon was rendered possible. 

Napoleon I. was the first who abused the new prin- 
ciple of a national army which had been born of 
the French Revolution. Just as the dynastic armies 
of feudal days were all, more or less, drilled for attack 
and conquest, it was intended that the new national 
army should only be animated by the proud idea of 
pure national defence. The Constitution of 1791, 
par. VI., leaves no doubt on this point. *'The French 
nation expressly declares that it renounces any idea 
of waging wars with the intent of making conquests, 
and will never employ its power against the liberty 
of another people.'* 

The National Convention, when it had driven away 
the King, and openly revolted against all divine dy- 
nastic rights, was simultaneously attacked on five 
fronts. Valmy and Jemappes were the victories of 
the new national idea over the dynastic world of the 
Middle Ages. On the eve of the battle of Valmy, 
Goethe exclaimed prophetically: ''From here and 
from to-day a new era opens, and you can say that 
you were present at its birth." 

Napoleon retained the universal levy (for it pro- 
cured him, as we have said, an enormous superiority 
over his antagonists), but he was the first to betray 
the intrinsic purpose of the national army, for, in 
his arrogance, he proceeded from national defence 
to the dynastic war of conquest of feudal times. His 
army had, in form, remained national, but, in regard 
to its employment, the soldiers of Jena, Austerlitz, 



7.6 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 

and Friedland only obeyed the arbitrary will of their 
ruler. 

After Napoleon's fall, France returned more or less 
openly to the principles of the dynastic army. For 
even if the army of Napoleon III. was no longer 
composed of foreigners and mercenaries, it yet con- 
sisted of soldiers of seven years' service, and the 
universal military service had, owing to all manner 
of limitations, purchases of exemption, etc., been prac- 
tically abolished. Napoleon Ill's campaigns served 
so successfully his dynastic interests that they brought 
about the same result as did the wars of his great 
predecessor: the entry of the enemy into Paris, to- 
gether with an enormous territorial and pecuniary loss 
and the fall of the dynasty. 

To return to Prussia : the victories of Frederick II. 
had been the brilliant achievement of dynastic armies. 
The defeats, from Valmy to Austerlitz, had furnished 
proof that the dynastic principle was not adapted to 
a modern army. Prussia found herself faced with the 
necessity of organising for herself a national army, 
and in the well-known proclamation, *'To My Peo- 
ple," the Prussian King, Frederick William TIL, prom- 
ised that fundamental reform without which a na- 
tional army is impossible : the co-operation of the peo- 
ple in the government of the country. It is patent, 
and the French Revolution had dinned it audibly 
enough into the ears of all the dynasties, that the 
soldier can only possess a fatherland if he is called 
upon to participate in its government. How could he 
be ready to die for a country in which he has only 
obligations and no rights? 

The royal promise of a democratic Constitution was 



BASIS OF DYNASTIC POWER 77 

reiterated by the Prussian Minister, von Hardenberg, 
at the Vienna Congress of 181 5; moreover, it was 
formally assured to the Prussian people by the law 
of May 22nd, 181 5, "concerning a representative Con- 
stitution." Yet not only was this promise never kept, 
and this law never put into force, but the grateful 
dynasty went so far as to see that any person who 
reminded King Frederick William III. or his suc- 
cessor of its ever having been given was cruelly per- 
secuted as a demagogue and traitor. Just as all the 
endeavours of William von Humboldt at the Vienna 
Congress for the attainment of a united and liberal 
Constitution for Germany were wrecked by the op- 
position of Austrian diplomacy, so later, all his re- 
peated efforts in this direction were wrecked by that 
of the King of Prussia. In 181 9 this very incon- 
venient would-be reformer fell into disgrace. Only 
the little State of Saxe- Weimar, then under Goethe's 
influence, kept the promise it had given of a liberal 
Constitution. 

In Prussia everything remained as of old. That is 
to say, Prussia had, it is true, modernised its army, 
the Prussian nation had, thanks to this modernisa- 
tion, saved the throne for its dynasty, but had after 
all, by so doing, only increased its obligations. From 
this time forth we Prussians had, indeed, a national 
army, in the sense of universal military service, but 
as far as the control, equipment, and employment of 
this army were concerned, we had, as before, only 
the right of not interfering with the King. From the 
fresh obligations that the Prussian citizen had taken 
upon himself the Prussian dynasty merely reaped new 
rights for itself. 



78 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 

Professor Delbriick^ tells us that, when the old 
Roman kings had trained their peasantry to efficiency 
in war, there came as the "inevitable consequence" 
of this popular war organisation a democratic ele- 
ment into the hitherto absolutist regime. Yes! when 
the monarchy was too obstinate in resisting the democ- 
ratisation of the political system, the latter was simply 
abolished by the people, who had been forced to mili- 
tary service, and replaced by the consular system. 
Nietzsche was wrong: history is not an eternal re- 
currence. At all events, the Prussian King, when he 
forced his peasants and citizens to universal military 
service, had, fortunately for himself, no Roman peas- 
ants to deal with. What Professor Delbriick styles an 
"inevitable consequence" of the popular war organisa- 
tion may possibly be applicable to France and per- 
haps even to modem China. For Prussia all this 
remained a promise which was often repeated but 
never kept. Professor Delbriick may say what he 
likes. What in the case of the Romans, the Greeks, 
the French, the Swiss, and, latterly, even in that of 
the Chinese, led to democracy, i.e., the institution of 
universal military service, led in Prusso-Germany, on 
the contrary, to a reinforcement of dynastic absolut- 
ism. For in Prussia there began, after the introduc- 
tion of universal military service and the victories 
over Napoleon which it made possible, instead of a 
democratic era, its exact contrary — that terrible re- 
action which, beginning with Metternich, celebrated 
its highest achievement in the violent imposition of 
the autocratic Prussian Constitution of 1850 and, 

^ Delbriick, "Regierung und Volkswille," p. 100. 



BASIS OF DYNASTIC POWER 79 

finally, under Bismarck, took on the legal forms of 
the Socialist law, etc. 

Yes! the Romans were better off than we are. It 
is certainly a fact that Frederick William IV., in 
1848, again renewed the solemn promise and vow to 
make his army thenceforth take the oath to the Con- 
stitution of the country. But this promise was again 
not kept. The Parliament which resulted from the 
Revolution of 1848 was forcibly dissolved in Novem- 
ber of the same year under the pretext that "it had 
exceeded its authority" (?), and Prussia was com- 
pelled to accept that feudal Constitution by which it 
is still governed. In days when even the Chinese have 
emancipated themselves from dynastic ideas, the 
Prusso-German soldiers, as in bygone days, swear 
their oath to the colours not upon the Constitution >4 
of their country, but to the King and Emperor, as/ 
their War Lord. They swear, according to Article 
64 of the German Imperial Constitution, *'to render 
unconditional obedience to the orders of the Em- 
peror." And, in order to put the matter beyond doubt, 
par. 108 of the Prussian Constitution expressly adds: 
"a, swearing-in of the army upon the Constitution of 
the country does not take place." 

The idea that the introduction of universal mili- 
tary service must involve the democratic right of the 
people to have a voice in its employment, and thus 
end the era of offensive wars, is so self-evident that 
it was always treated by most German authors and 
politicians as practically a matter of course. Gustav 
Freytag, for instance, in 1870, demonstrated with 
great complacency that it was Prussia's duty to bring 
civilisation to France in the form of universal military 



8o THE COMING DEMOCRACY 

service. "With this highest and noblest form of war- 
service the possibiHty of insolent v^ars of conquest 
and of an insane military vanity, those repulsive mala- 
dies of the French, is inevitably extinguished." And 
he emphatically asserts that "universal military serv- 
ice makes a nation not merely redoubtable in v\/ar, but 
also peaceable in peace."^ 

The same idea is to-day expounded by those Ger- 
man authors who have undertaken to prove Germany's 
innocence in this war. Professor Ernst Troeltsch 
says, for example, "But, above all, this universal 
arming of the people brings about the important con- 
sequence that an effectual war can only be waged 
with the actual consent and enthusiasm of the people, 
and must, accordingly, be always a war of defence/'^ 

A statement of this sort, examined by the light of 
the German Constitution and the facts mentioned in 
the first chapter of this book, strikes one as simply 
ludicrous. Gustav Freytag could not know, of course, 
in 1870 what use would one day be made of uni- 
versal military service in Germany; but Professor 
Troeltsch, who does certainly know our Constitution 
and the true facts as to the outbreak of the World 
War, should know how easily, in the country of the 
"Ems telegram" and the Treitschke conception of 
constitutional law, "the consent and enthusiasm of the 
people" can be secured under false pretences. Wher- 
ever, as in Germany, universal military service is 
not accompanied by the right of the people to an 
active share in the government, it becomes not only 

* Gustav Freytag, "Der Kronprinz und die deutsche Kaiser- 
krone," 8th ed., Leipzig, 1889, p. 43. 

=* "Deutschland und der Weltkrieg," Berlin, 1915, p. ^2. 



BASIS OF DYNASTIC POWER 81 

no check upon offensive wars, but, on the contrary,V 
an encouragement to them. 

The fact that universal mihtary service v^ithout pop- 
ular sovereignty is sure to encourage offensive wars 
even Professor Delbriick, who has himself just nar- 
rated to us the prophetic story of the Roman peas- 
ants, was obliged to concede indirectly. With a na'ive 
pride in the pretorian organisation of the German 
army, he ventures to inform us^ that the Prussian 
officers-corps is even to-day animated by the spirit 
of the ancient Germans, who fought not for their 
country, but for their prince, and never troubled their 
heads about the aim and object of a war, or the po- 
litical ideas of their chief, but were merely pledged 
to him personally by their oath of fealty. 'The King 
is, still to-day, the head of his retinue; he is the 
comrade of his officers, and to him they look up as 
their War Lord, and such is the foundation of our 
political system. In the Prussian Constitution it is 
merely stated that the King is the Commander-in- 
Chief of the army, and this is stated also in the 
Imperial Constitution.*' 

Yes ! thus it is actually written, and thus it is ; the 
German officers are the retinue of the King; they are 
pledged by their oath to do him personal service, and 
they trouble not a jot about the political ideas of 
their prince. The German Emperor possesses an army, 
and those who compose and defray the cost of this 
army, namely, the German citizens, have no voice 
whatever in the organisation and employment of this 
army — ^not even the Imperial Chancellor, not even the 
Minister of War. Under the German constitution 
^Delbruck, "Regierung und Volkswille," p. 137. 



y^ 



82 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 

there is no legal connection whatsoever between the 
army and the people. The German army does not 
exist for the sake of the country, but for the sake of 
the Emperor ; for "a swearing-in upon the Constitution 
of the country does not take place." In peace, as in 
war, the German Emperor is the personal and absolute 
governor of his army and navy. Nothing has been 
altered in Prussia in this respect for the last two 
hundred years. There are only two essential points 
of difference between William 11. and the creator 
of the Prussian military power, Frederick William I. ; 
firstly, William II. no longer needs to send recruiting 
sergeants into other countries to impress "tall fellows" 
at a high rate of pay; his soldiers are granted him 
by the Reichstag and paid by the people; and when 
this Reichstag objects to the military demands it 
is straight away dissolved.^ Secondly, the German 
soldiers of to-day no longer fight, like the "tall fel- 
lows" did, grudgingly and for money; their bravery 
no longer has to be kept up to the mark by means 
of the cudgel. No! the modern soldiers are animated 
by that love of country which was born of the French 
Revolution, and the moral advantages of which have 
been turned to use by the Prussian dynasty, without 
any corresponding recompense. Otherwise there is, as 
we have said, no difference between then and now. 
For then, as now, the army was only subservient to 
the royal will ; then, as now, the appointment, advance- 
ment, punishment, or cashiering of officers was left 
solely to the personal and arbitrary decision of the 

^E.g., on May 6th, 1893, on which occasion William II. de- 
clared openly that he would "crush the opposition," which, in 
fact, he did, for the Reichstag very promptly voted all the 
soldiers he had demanded. 



BASIS OF DYNASTIC POWER 83 

King. In those days, as in these, the Prussian officer 
did not trouble his head about the poHtical aims of 
his prince; he fought, 'like the good old Germans,'' not 
for his country, but only for his War Lord. To-day, 
as then, the King is the first officer in the land, struts 
about in the uniform of his troops, devotes his main 
energies to his army, and concedes it the first position 
in the life of the State. It is true that he does not, 
as Frederick William I. did, arrange the marriages of 
his officers by a peremptory decree, and that he does 
not perform sentinel duty in person at Potsdam, but 
he forces his officers to observe special ideas of 
honour, protects them against any civilian attacks, 
prescribes for them marriages suitable to their rank, 
and grants them at his Court privileges that the most 
famous university professor cannot enjoy unless he 
happens to be an officer of the Reserve. To-day, as 
then, the spirit of the army is the same : sense of duty, 
blind obedience, absolute fealty to the lord of the land. 
As we have pointed out, the only things that have 
been altered since those bygone days are the composi- 
tion of and the cost of maintenance of the army, 
which, in consequence of the liability of citizens both 
to serve in its ranks and pay the taxes, are no longer 
a private concern of the King but the affair of the 
nation at large. Ever^^thing else (including the brutal- 
ities which form part of the education of the Prussian 
soldier) has remained, in principle, undisturbed, and 
the idea of defence of country is, after all, only a 
tacit assumption on the part of patriotic citizens. 

:^ ^ * * * 

I can hear the indignant remonstrances of my Ger- 
man readers, and I am prepared to hear the shouts of 



84 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 

the ninety-three signatories of the famous appeal to 
the civilised world: 'It is not true! It is not true!" 

But it is true I In these calamitous days it is doubly 
true, and it needs to be proclaimed to the whole world ; 
the Prussian army is feudal, not national; dynastic, 
not democratic. It is only in the imagination of the 
German taxpayer, only in the credulity of the German 
people, that there exists a national army, employed 
for national defence. The tradition of Prussia, the 
form of its constitution, the spirit which rules in it, 
and the absolutism of the German Emperor, based 
upon Article ii of the German Imperial Constitution, 
stamp this army as being pre-eminently a royal and 
Imperial bodyguard — that is, an instrument for the 
safeguarding of the dynasty. 

If anyone still has any doubts on this subject, let 
him read the proclamations and speeches of William 
II. Immediately on ascending the throne, on July 
15th, 1888, he addressed a proclamation to his army, 
in which occur the words: "So we belong together, 
I and my army, so we were born together, and so will 
we indissolubly hold fast to one another, come, as 
God wills, peace or storm." In William II.'s speeches, 
wherever they relate to the army, we find the possessive 
pronoun of the first person : my army, my guard, 7ny 
engineers, my officers, my soldiers, my fleet, etc., etc. 
In this way he insists, on every opportunity, that the 
chief quality of the German soldier must be uncon- 
ditional, blind, and unfaltering obedience. And that 
not only in time of war, but also in internal emer- 
gencies. William II. feels so intensely that he is the 
personal owner of the German army that on every 
occasion of the swearing-in of recruits he perpetually 



BASIS OF DYNASTIC POWER 85 

reiterates : "You have sworn me the oath of alle- 
giance"; and on November 23rd, 1891, he declared to 
the newly sworn recruits: ''More than ever before 
unbelief and dissatisfaction lift their heads in the \r 
Fatherland, and the occasion may arise when you r^ 
will have to shoot down or bayonet your own brothers 
and relations. Then seal your allegiance with the 
sacrifice of your heart's blood!" Again, at Breslau, 
on December 2nd, 1896, he says: "The more people 
shelter themselves behind catchwords and party con- 
siderations, the more firmly and securely do I count 
upon my army, and the more confidently do I hope 
that my army, either without or within my realms, will 
wait upon my wishes a^id my behests." "You have 
the honour to belong to my guard and to stand in 
and about my residence and my capital. You are 
called upon, in the first place, to protect me against 
internal and external foes." Thus William II. ad- 
dressed the newly sworn recruits at Berlin on Novem- 
ber 1 6th, 1893. And, on June 15th, 1898, in the 
Lustgarten at Potsdam : "I assumed the Crown with 
a heavy heart; my capacity was everywhere doubted, 
and everywhere I was wrongly judged. Only one * 
had confidence in me, only one believed in me, and A 
that was the army; and, with its support, and trust- 
ing in our old God, I undertook my responsible ofifice, 
knowing full well that the army is the mainstay of my 
country and the chief pillar of the Prussian throne, to 
which God in His wisdom has summoned me." 

Anyone who is acquainted with the internal develop- 
ment of afTairs during the reign of William II. will 
also know that the Kaiser's thirst for personal pos- 
session and power does not merely extend to the army 



86 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 

as a whole, but has also thrust the General Staff and 
the Ministry of War into a subordinate position. Just 
as William II. was always his own Imperial Chancel- 
lor, so as an ardent soldier was he even more pro- 
nouncedly his own Chief of the General Staff. 

*'A far more modest role even than that of the 
Chancellor in relation to William II. is that of the man 
who occupies the responsible post of Chief of the 
General Staff of the Army. It is characteristic of the 
startling importance that our Emperor attaches to 
purely external considerations that a Moltke was sum- 
moned to the post as soon as one was available. A 
man like the 'great man of silence'^ William II. could 
just as little have endured at his side for any length 
of time as first military adviser, as he could endure 
the Chancellorship of Bismarck. But he wanted to 
have a Moltke." ^ 

And so in this field William II. had such an ab- 
solute sense of personal property in his army that he 
conferred its chief command on any one, according 
to his fancy, though the person he selected, as in 
Moltke's case, was manifestly incompetent, and though 
he had the opinion of all competent Generals against 
him. 

Anyone, therefore, who is not satisfied with the evi- 
dence afforded by the German and Prussian Consti- 
tutions cannot fail to be convinced by the speeches and 
acts of William II. that we have not a national but 
a dynastic army, which is entirely subservient to the 
private judgment of the sovereign ruler, and regarded 

^i.e., Moltke, of whom it was said that he was silent in seven 
languages. 

^"Unser Kaiser und Sein Volk," von einem Schwarzseher, 
Leipzig, 1906, p. 10. 



BASIS OF DYNASTIC POWER 87 

by him as the "chief pillar of the Prussian throne." 
Let anyone point out to me one single passage in 
the Emperor's speeches in which William II. has placed 
the defence of our country before that of his person, 
his house, and his personal power! Let anyone cite 
me the speech of a German Minister where the ques- 
tion of the right of the people to have a voice in mili- 
tary matters is treated with anything but contempt. 
Such a speech will be sought in vain. Instead, you 
will find at every turn expressions such as : "The 
German people must deem it an honour to wear the 
Emperor's uniform and protect the Emperor's house." 
"With God for King and country !" This watchword, 
emanating from Frederick William III., and, since 
1 87 1, converted into "with God for Emperor and Em- 
pire," expresses clearly and unmistakably what Wil- 
liam 11. has emphasised over and over again, that in 
Germany the Emperor and King come first, and the 
Fatherland afterwards. 

The fact that such a state of things should exist 
in the modern world is, as we have said, so distress- 
ing to a German that he either pretends not to notice 
it, or else denies it. Ever and again the German news- 
papers speak of "our brave greycoats," "our redoubt- 
able troops," etc. ; that is, they try to take it as a mat- 
ter of course that the German army is the concern of 
the German people. Moreover, there are large num- 
bers of Social Democrats who declare quite seriously 
that the German army is the people and the people 
the German army. 

But, unfortunately, viewed by the light of the Con- 
stitution and of facts, all this is only pious humbug, 
which may possibly be uttered in ignorance and good 



88 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 

faith, but by its incredible naivete is only a fresh 
proof of the fact that we Germans are wont to invest 
anything incredible in our politics with the lying sem- 
blance of the normal democratic. Here, more than 
anywhere else, the naked truth, in all its medisevalism, 
is utterly intolerable to us. 

The pious legend of the German popular army does 
not become a fact because it is constantly referred to 
by distinguished German writers. For example, the 
late German Imperial Chancellor, von Biilow, assures 
us quite seriously: *'the army to-day is what history 
has made it; the vigorous expression of the unity of 
Empire, State, and people." ^ And he adds, with 
great complacency, "so it is also in France, the re- 
publican State and the French nation are blended to- 
gether in the army.'' Seeing that Herr von Biilow 
studiously avoids speaking about the constitutional 
structure of this army and only praises its superb quali- 
ties and excellent conduct in the course of history, 
he has no difficulty in assuring us that "the officers 
and men both in the North and the South feel them- 
selves before all else members of the German army, 
subjects of the German nation in arms." Indirectly, 
indeed, his ebullitions show that this so-called "na- 
tion in arms" is, in fact, nothing more nor less than 
a monarchical army, which lives "apart from all in- 
ternal politics, from particularism and parties gen- 
erally," but he endeavours, in the same breath, to make 
the reader understand that the German army is, like 
the French, the strong expression of the national will 
and character. We are sorry, Your Highness; the 

* Prince Bernhard von Biilow, "Imperial Germany," p. 148. 
(London: Cassell & Co.) 



BASIS OF DYNASTIC POWER 89 

times are really too grave for such conjuring tricks! 
In the first place, the question is not what the Ger- 
man officers and men feci themselves to be, but what 
they are under the constitution. And, as a matter of 
fact, our constitution absolutely forbids and renders 
impossible any blending of the Army and the people 
in Germany. The fact that the officers and men swear 
allegiance expressly to the person of the King instead 
of to the welfare of the nation creates an impassable 
gulf between the Army and the people. The two exist 
side by side, without interfusion and without any legal 
interdependence. Our very constitution — or rather 
the hankering of the dynasty for power which finds 
expression in our constitution — establishes the Army 
as a State within the State, as an inviolable dynastic 
institution, placed high above the citizen and his 
morality. If anyone still has any doubts on this head, 
he may learn from the Kaiser's speeches that in Ger- 
many the Army and the people are rigorously sundered 
by the clearly and repeatedly expressed intention of 
the Kaiser that the Army should be employed at his 
pleasure against "the enemy within our frontiers." 
And, in the second place, Herr von Biilow is pleased 
to deceive both himself and us. For the German of- 
ficers do not by any means "feel'' themselves what he 
pretends. Professor Delbriick emphasises with uncon- 
cealed pride, in his book "Regierung und Volkswille," 
the wide difference between the German and the French 
Armies: "Now let us suppose this (the French sys- 
tem of parliamentary control of the Army, without 
which no national army is really possible) transferred 
to Prusso-Germany. Let us assume a control of the 
Army by parliament, and select anyone you please 



90 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 

from the House of Deputies or the Reichstag and 
let him be our Minister of War. Anyone who has 
the least acquaintance with our officers and generals 
knows that this is an impossibility, knows that our 
Army would need to have experienced a Sedan in the 
French sense before it would submit to such a state 
of things." 

Yet Prince von Biilow is perfectly well acquainted 
with Article 64 of the German and paragraph 108 of 
the Prussian constitution; he is acquainted also with 
the numerous speeches of William 11. relative to the 
Army; he knows the spirit of our Officers Corps, and 
he knows that Delbriick's description (written a year 
before the war) is entirely in accordance with facts. 
It is true that he enjoys the reputation of seeing things 
in the rosiest light, and we can understand that in 
the midst of the stress of this World War he should 
more than ever feel the need of insisting on the rosy 
aspect of things, but, none the less, the problem is 
so momentous a one for the future of Germany that 
we are compelled to answer him with the most em- 
phatic contradiction : No, Your Highness ! The Ger- 
man Army is not "the vigorous expression of the unity 
of Empire, State and people"; it is the expression, 
guaranteed by the constitution and by tradition, of 
the thirst for power of the German dynasty. It is 
what the soldier-king, Frederick William I., made it, 
and what it has been plainly and repeatedly declared 
to be by the soldier-emperor, William 11. : the chief 
support of the Prussian throne. 

That is the German Army. Anyone who ventures 
to compare the French Army with this Army, organ- 
ised entirely upon dynastic principles, and to speak of 



BASIS OF DYNASTIC POWER 91 

this as a "national army," must incur the suspicion of 
deliberate falsification. 

But it is the same with our army as with our Reichs- 
tag. Democratic notions have, nowadays, attained 
such an ascendancy over public opinion, and are felt 
by every rational man as being so self-understood, 
that we Germans quite instinctively try to represent 
as democratic things that are two centuries behind 
democracy. Hence it comes that Biilow and other 
representatives of German culture, including also the 
majority of our Social Democrats, ever and anon talk 
about a "nation in arms," a "popular army," and other 
democratic triumphs, which only live and have their 
being in the imagination of ignorant or wilfully blind 
patriots, and which, consciously or unconsciously, de- 
ceive the German people as to the real aspect of af- 
fairs. For the true facts in all their mediasvalism are 
so disgraceful that no one dares admit them in Ger- 
many. 

It is without parallel in the world's history that a 
dynasty contrived, not merely to retain in the modern 
world all its absolute feudal powers, but also to take 
advantage of modern progress (universal military ser- 
vice and universal taxation) to enhance them still 
further, without, in return, giving the serving and pay- 
ing portion of the nation a democratic equivalent. 
This marvellous achievement of dynastic government 
could only occur in a State such as Prusso-Germany, 
in which thousands of servile and learned sophists 
were ever ready in pompous speeches to represent to 
the people their dearest wishes as accomplished facts. 

It is surely not presumptuous if to-day, confronted 
with the World War, we at last exclaim "Enough!" 



92 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 

Let the German people be honestly told how matters 
stand. Tell them that, constitutionally, they are not 
fighting for their country, but for their Emperor. Ex- 
plain to them that, by their Constitution, they have 
no right to inquire into the why and the wherefore of 
the war, and that the true meaning of the word Burg- 
frieden must be sought in the attempt to disguise the 
dynastic policy of power. 

Then we shall see what the German people, who do 
not know (but at most guess) this state of affairs, 
really think : Whether they will, perchance, with Pro- 
fessor Delbriick, find their ideal in fighting, "like the 
Germans of old,'* not for country, but for the chief- 
tain, without knowledge of his political aims, and only 
attached to him blindly by the oath of allegiance; or 
whether the German people will continue to be be- 
fooled by the rhetoric of Billow and Scheidemann, 
and to believe that we possess a "popular and a na- 
tional army." 

What Professor Delbriick in 191 3 arrogantly 
scoffed at as an impossibility, namely, that the Ger- 
man Army should some day experience such a Sedan 
as that which democratised the French Army, is more- 
over imminent, and it will bring about the same result 
as in France. It is the fate of nations and of the 
rulers of nations that they only learn in war that they 
have learnt nothing from war. Professor Delbriick 
and the other worshippers of the German Empire did 
not suspect what, if they had been a little more modest, 
they might have learnt from the world's history, 
namely, that the same spirit in which they declaim so 
arrogantly against the French military system was also 
the spirit which conjured up the World War and 



BASIS OF DYNASTIC POWER 93 

helped to prepare that Sedan which inspires them with 
so much uncalled for sympathy for France and her 
army. 

Yes! the German people will learn this bitter les- 
son from the World War. Henceforth, to the ques- 
tion "Whom does the army obey ?" it will reply, *The 
German people." 



IV 



THE PRINCIPLES OF GERMAN POLICY: 

ALSO A HISTORY OF THE EVENTS 

LEADING UP TO THE WORLD WAR 

Manifestations of German Militarism 

Whenever the Reichstag in a serious controversy 
attempted to raise its voice, it was either ignored, or 
roundly told that a police sergeant with twelve men 
would suffice to dissolve it, or it was actually dissolved. 

Our Reichstag has been at infinite pains to make 
something of itself. And in spite of its unconstitu- 
tional composition, as already described, it would have 
become a good, domestic, progressive Reichstag, had 
this only been allowed. But was this ever allowed? 
It protested, in 1878, against the disgraceful Socialist 
law ; it was dissolved, and the Socialist law for twelve 
years exposed Germany to the scorn of the world. 

In 1887 it had the audacity to propound the ques- 
tion: Imperial or parliamentary army? and voted the 
effective force of the army for three instead of seven 
years ; it was dissolved, and never again attempted to 
talk about a parliamentary control of the army. 

Again, in 1893, ^t ventured to protest against the 

94 



PRINCIPLES OF GERMAN POLICY 95 

constant increase of armaments ; it was once more dis- 
solved, and henceforth was obliged to vote not only 
the land armaments, but also the whole new naval 
programme of William II. 

In 1907 it raised its voice against the colonial- and 
world-policy; it was again dissolved, and (despite the 
augmented numbers of the opposition votes) the dy- 
nasty again carried the day. 

More than once it vigorously protested against the 
ill-usage of the soldiers; their ill-treatment was re- 
gretted, but not suppressed, for it is part and parcel 
of the iron discipline of the Prussian military system. 
It protested (in May, 19 12) against the duelling ob- 
ligation of the officers ; but although an Imperial Order 
in Council (January ist, 1897) had done the same, a 
fresh Order in Council, in defiance of Parliament, 
confirmed what the Imperial Chancellor had already 
in person told it, that an officer who was not at any 
time prepared pistol in hand to defend his honour 
(which was a special honour) could remain an officer 
no longer. 

In the affair of the Daily Telegraph, the Reichstag 
had emphatically protested against such an interven- 
tion of the Emperor as sensational and dangerous to 
the safety of the State (November, 1908)^; but Herr 

"^On October 29th, 1908, the Daily Telegraph published some 
remarks of the German Emperor regarding his relations with 
England, William 11. expressed therein his dissatisfaction that 
the English did not credit his peaceful assurances. "Lies and 
deception are foreign to my nature. My actions speak for 
themselves. You have paid heed not to my actions, but to those 
who misrepresent and misinterpret them." The Kaiser de- 
clared that it would be difficult for him to maintain a friendly 
relation, because the feeling of the German people was exceed- 
ingly hostile to England; that he was, to his regret, in the 



96 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 

von Billow, who had dared to convey to the monarch 
the modest wishes of the popular representative body, 
had to go at the first available opportunity, and Wil- 
liam II., in his Konigsberg speech (August 25th, 
1 9 10), once again asserted that the royal power "had 
been granted to him alone by the grace of God and 
not by Parliaments, popular assemblies, and popular 
resolutions." With greater distinctness than this no 
modern sovereign has ever rejected the principle of 
popular co-operation in government. It is not estab- 
lished whether it was Louis XIV. or Elizabeth of 
England who uttered the famous phrase "Uetat, c'est 
moi" ; but it cannot be gainsaid that at the beginning 
of the twentieth century William 11. repeatedly and 
emphatically made this notion, "I am the State," the 
keynote of his public utterances. 

Poor Reichstag! Over and over again it initiated 
proposals for an act establishing the responsibility of 
the Imperial Chancellor; but the GoTcrnment treated 
all such endeavours with contempt. Many and many 
a time it tried to alter its standing orders and, for 

minority, as it were, among his own people; that he had shown 
during the Boer War what peaceful sentiments he nourished 
towards England, when he refused to receive the mission from 
the Boers and to associate himself with the proposed inter- 
vention of France and Russia, and even worked out a plan of 
campaign for the overthrow of the Boers, and sent it to the 
Queen. (William II. forgot to mention the famous telegram 
to Kriiger, and explained his desire for a powerful navy as 
due merely to the necessity of protecting Germany's world- 
wide trade.) These statements William II, allowed to be pub- 
lished without any previous consultation with his Chancellor. 
It turned out that the Imperial Chancellor had, as a matter 
of fact, approved the publication of this Imperial utterance, 
but that, wonderful to relate, he was wholly ignorant of its 
substance. 



PRINCIPLES OF GERMAN POLICY 97 

example, oblige the Chancellor to reply to questions 
within a specified time; the Government always re- 
mained deaf to these entreaties. Often did the Reichs- -. 
tag demand rewards for the heroes of the war of y 
1870-71, but the Government had already distributed^N 
a portion of the five milliards of francs it received 
from France between Moltke and his General Staff, 
and nothing remained over for the soldiers who had 
fought and bled. 

And, finally, the Reichstag, in December, 19 13, in- 
dignantly protested that the military authorities should 
brutally overrule the civilian authorities in a Consti- 
tutional State, and that a mere lieutenant should have 
superior rights to those of a German civil authority. 
Poor Reichstag! The vote of censure passed by the 
Reichstag was not only absolutely ignored by the dy- 
nasty, and the Imperial Chancellor, who had under- 
taken the impossible task of proving a glaring wrong 
to be right, remained still more firmly established in 
office, but, in addition, the Zabern criminals were dec- 
orated and congratulated, and the German people were 
once again given to understand that in Germany only 
one will prevails, and that is the will of the dynasty. 

So we find, in the whole course of the Reichstag's 
history, only a long, dismal chain of oppressions, dis- 
solutions and unwilling submission of the popular will 
to the thirst for power of the dynasty. It was only 
in subordinate matters that the Reichstag was allowed 
a free hand. Yes! when Biilow, in consequence of 
the rejection of the probate duty, retired from the 
conduct of State affairs, we were filled with delight, 
and pictured ourselves as living in a parliamentary 
model State. The delight was of brief duration. 



98 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 

Billow's place was taken by a man who soon put an 
end to the "liberal era," declared Social Reform to be 
completed, and in every respect revived the old regime. 

The simple German has fared with his Reichstag 
much as did "Hans in luck" of the fairy tale, when he 
exchanged his lump of gold for a horse, and then the 
horse for a cow, the cow for a donkey, and so on, 
until he had nothing left, but still comforted himself 
with the reflection that he was the richest and luckiest 
man in the world. Similarly, the promises made to the 
German people after the war of 1870-71 may be com- 
pared with a veritable lump of gold of democratic 
rights and privileges. But Bismarck, and still more 
the "new course" of William IL, forced our popular 
Assembly to make one exchange after the other. 
When the simple German, on the occasion of the well- 
known Zabern affair, was able to some extent to strike 
the balance of his democratic rights and liberties, he 
found that all that was left of his lump of gold was 
a lordly building, before which stand a column of 
Victory and a gigantic Bismarck in bronze, to wit, a 
glittering Nothing, surrounded by military symbols 
and serving purely military ends and objects. But 
comfort was forthcoming from his intellectual su- 
periors ; they proved to him over and over again that 
he had no use for gold, that he was, nevertheless, the 
wealthiest and luckiest of Europeans, since, as Herr 
von Billow says, "the degree of popular participation 
in State affairs is not to be measured merely by the 
sum of the rights accorded to the popular assembly." 

And the simple fellow was comforted. Could he be 
aught else? To him, as Herr von Biilow so politely 
put it, "political talent was denied." He convinced 



PRINCIPLES OF GERMAN POLICY 99 

himself, again to quote von Biilow, that *'we are not 
a poHtical people.'' So he buried his disgust and 
vexation with politics in philosophy and social science. 
And here, where, so long as he only stuck to theories, 
he was free from dynastic interference, he became the 
most revolutionary being in the world. 

No one ever planned such brutal revolutions on 
paper as Kautsky and the other devotees of the social 
economy of Marx. No one was so energetic in re- 
valuing all values, or so merciless in philosophising 
against the good God with a hammer as Nietzsche 
and his disciples. And while the German riddle was 
presenting itself to us with a more threatening aspect 
every day, Haeckel, Ostwald, and Eucken, with bold 
intellectual flights, solved the riddle of the universe, 
severed friendship with the gods above, and built up 
a monistic theory of civilisation the audacity of which 
was only exceeded, if at all, by the revolutionary 
phrases of the social-democratic orators. Then there 
were the radical theories concerning free love and the 
education of children, and all the daring reforms in 
literature and art, in the theatre, the school, and the 
association ! 

It seemed as if revolution were ready to blaze up 
at every turn and corner. A cloud of dissatisfaction 
brooded over Germany, and to observant foreigners 
it seemed as though the flashes of lightning were pro- 
claiming the approach of a new Germany. 

But alas ! This same simple German, who had just 
overthrown all the gods, who had criticised without 
mercy the whole ordering of civilian society and law, 
and had constructed the most ideal freedom in the 
upper air, became as red as a schoolboy if a policeman 



loo THE COMING DEMOCRACY 

at the next corner of the street looked at him more 
suspiciously than usual; his revolutionary theories 
evaporated completely at sight of an officer's uniform, 
and all his beautiful ideals of freedom fluttered away, 
as if they had been criminal fancies, as soon as a Gov- 
ernment organ showed the slightest tendency to disap- 
prove of them. An impassable something separated 
the idea of liberty from the liberating act. Revolu- 
tionary views and reactionary realities! Of what 
avail to the German citizen was disrespect for the gods 
in heaven, if the gods of the earth forcibly demanded 
his respect at every turn? 

Herr von Biilow was right; we are not a political 
people! Nowhere, not even in Freemason lodges, not 
even in the trade unions, dare we discuss politics. The 
statutes of every respectable association contain the 
rule that political (and religious) discussions are pro- 
hibited. Where three Germans talked politics, the 
walls had ears. Questions such as : Republic or Mon- 
archy? Whom does the army obey? Who decides 
upon war and peace, and our future development as 
a nation? — questions of life and death, and right and 
liberty, which can be traced through the political his- 
tory of all civilised peoples and gave the dynasties of 
Athens and Rome more trouble than all their ex- 
ternal foes put together, may, among us, only be de- 
bated and answered in a purely monarchical sense. 
There was a deluge of prohibitions of meetings, Press 
prosecutions, and charges of Use majeste whenever 
anything smacked of "Revolution" and "liberty"; and 
anyone who tried to write a word of truth on political 
matters was in danger of imprisonment. 

We are certainly not a political nation. We lacked 



PRINCIPLES OF GERMAN POLICY loi 

a political ideal. Seeing that in the nineteenth cen- 
tury political ideals are necessarily democratic, our 
dynasty, to save trouble, forbade us to concern our- 
selves with politics, declaring that we were too stupid 
for them. It instinctively felt that, in a free contest 
of opinions, it could not hold its own in these days, 
and so it allowed us all possible liberties, except the 
one which is the key to all of them — political liberty. 

This is the explanation of the peculiarity Herr von 
Billow has constantly taxed us with — that we have 
remained an unpolitical people, and this procures for 
us also the satisfaction of being unanimously praised^ 
by our professors as a ''monarchically-minded people." (\ 

The simple German instinctively felt that a danger 
and a reaction were concealed in the political events 
of the past forty years, but he could not and dared 
not realise the secret opposition which necessarily arose 
in a feudal military State like Prusso-Germany be- 
tween dynastic rights and privileges and nineteenth- 
century notions of civil law. Hence, the German peo- 
ple never comprehended the more deeply rooted causes 
of the arbitrary acts which constantly offended their 
sense of justice in German home politics. The mon- 
strous fact that, wherever the prestige of the dynasty 
or the privileges of the officer or official were con- 
cerned, the whole theory of right under civil law was 
simply put on one side and replaced by a military- 
dynastic theory of right, was, as far as possible, con- 
cealed from him. The simple German allowed him- 
self to be perpetually assured by his superiors that 
our Government was the most progressive of all 
Governments, that everything took place in accord- 
ance with a well-thought-out plan, and that the 



102 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 

national welfare was always the end in view. 

I On ascending the throne, the Emperor first ad- 

"Ns^ dressed his army, then his navy, and only then "My 

' people," just as though the people was there for the 

army's sake, and not the army for the sake of the 

people. But the simple German regarded this as merely 

a tradition, which was no doubt intended to be more 

friendly towards the people than it appeared. 

Did not a cobbler don an officer's uniform, and by 
aid of this costume, which renders a person in Ger- 
many all powerful, rob the town-chest of a burgo- 
master and arrest both him and his secretary? The 
simple German only saw the comic side of this episode, 
and did not reflect what an alarming proof of the 
militarised mentality of the German civil authorities 
this Kopenick affair really was. 
i^ William II. declared to his soldiers: "You wear 
the Emperor's coat, therefore you are raised above 
other men!" (Kiel, December 3rd, 1894.) Here again 
the simple German only regarded this as a chance 
phrase, which, though it annoyed him, could not rob 
him of his joy in the proud German army. 

That the Emperor always appeared in public 
dressed as a soldier and never spoke to the citizens of 
the nineteenth century in mufti, that the Prussian Min- 
ister of War and other State officials also showed 
themselves in the popular assembly in uniform, and 
that even the President of the Reichstag strutted about 
in the uniform of a lieutenant of the Reserve when- 
ever he was permitted to appear in his Majesty's train 
— all this had no deep significance for the simple Ger- 
man. These things made no impression on him; he 



PRINCIPLES OF GERMAN POLICY 103 

regarded them as a custom, and could not imagine 
them otherwise. 

Although at all the official receptions, parades, and 
banquets the military always took precedence of civil- 
ians; although the Imperial acts of grace referred only 
to military persons; although the Berlin Court was 
such a glitter of uniforms that the late English Min- 
ister of War, Haldane, felt abashed amid all this 
brilliancy, and modestly declined the Imperial invita- 
tion to the manoeuvres; although, from these and a 
hundred other customs axid events, it became clearer 
and clearer that the officer in Germany takes the first 
place, while the citizen is, as it were, regarded only 
as an adjunct to the military, still the honest German 
failed to realise the true import of these facts. On 
the one hand, a rational co-operation in politics was 
denied and abused to him, and, on the other, he had 
been so much drilled, both by education and habit, 
into a military conception of the State that he hon- 
estly believed the whole system to be part and parcel 
of the organisation of a modern constitutional State. 
Yes, he perceived in all this merely evidence of a higher 
culture. His views were, as we have said, influenced 
by people who, like Herr von Bialow, honestly assured 
him: "The voice of our national conscience tells us 
what German militarism really is : the best thing we 
have achieved in the course of our national develop- 
ment as a State and a people" ;^ or, again, by chemists, 
who, unfortunately for Germany, have a passion for 
generalities, for instance, Professor Ostwald, who, 
from the height of his scientific knowledge, preaches 

^Prince von Biilow, "Imperial Germany," p. 147. (London: 
Cassell & Co.) 



104 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 

-^L that German militarism "actually represents the high- 

. I est degree of civilisation yet developed."^ 

There is certainly no objection to be made to the 
simple German and his betters regarding as both nor- 
mal and civilising what all other modern States regard 
as contempt of the people and political slavery. If 
the political development of the German people had 
arrived at a point where the army was regarded not as 
the servant, but as the master of the nation, this was 
to be lamented (as a proof that we, out of servility to 
our dynasty, are about a hundred years behind the 
times), but was at the same time perfectly compre- 
hensible. We Germans have had the belief forced 
upon us that the Hohenzollerns, thanks to their mili- 
tary genius, saved the united Germany ; we were told 
so much about the unfavourable position of Germany 
and the resulting devastations of the Thirty Years' 
War, about the deplorable disunion of the German 
races, and other things of the sort, that we were, 
finally, led to believe that the drill-master was our 
only salvation. 

Hence, we must define German militarism as an 
historical product, and realise that the German people 
had gradually become militarised, not only in their or- 
ganisation, but in their whole outlook and philosophy. 
We might, therefore, in agreement with the repre- 
sentatives of German culture, laud German militarism 
as the basis of German culture, and prove that, far 
from being a menace to, it is actually a safeguard of 
the peace of the world. Unfortunately, however, the p 
principles which govern a State's home policy also 

^Prof. Wilh. Ostwald, "Monistische Sonntagspredigten" 
XMonistic Sunday addresses), December ist, 1914. 



PRINCIPLES OF GERMAN POLICY 105 

govern its foreign policy. And, unfortunately, conduct 
which at home only vexes or pleases the private citizen, 
when extended beyond the frontiers becomes a source 
of vexation or pleasure to other nations. 

And since Germany's foreign policy is far less sub- 
ject to national control even than her home policy, the 
same principle which at home only produces a comedy 
like the Kopenick incident or a tragedy like the Zabern 
affair may become a danger to the whole world. If 
even a man like Biilow has to admit that : "The his- 
tory of our home policy, with the exception of a few 
bright spots, is to the time of the World War a history 
of political mistakes," ^ one may imagine the nature of 
a foreign policy governed by the same principles. 

For whereas in home policy the dynasty was still 
frequently obliged to disguise the answer to the 
question " Whom does the army obey ? " with all 
kinds of democratic phrases, there was no such restraint 
upon its arbitrary will in the case of foreign policy. 
Moreover, in the realm of foreign policy, the dynasties 
have at their disposal a perfectly irresponsible secret 
diplomacy, which on the ground of higher interests 
of State renders account to no one of its proceedings. 
Even in a democratic State like France, this secret 
diplomacy concludes treaties and alliances over the 
head of the Parliament. How much more must this 
be the case in a State like Germany, where, as we have 
seen, the dynasty, in virtue of Article 11 of the Consti- 
tution, pronounces the supreme decision in everything. 

It is well-known that the foreign policy of all States 
has hitherto been guided solely by military considera- 

^ Prince von Biilow, "Imperial Germany," p. 158. (London : 
Cassell & Co.) 



io6 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 

tions. Humanity is still waiting for the genius who 
shall compel Governments to apply the same standard 
of civic justice and morality to their foreign policy as 
they (apart from exceptions) already apply to their 
home policy. Hitherto, in the realm of international 
politics, everything has been a question of military 
strength. Without intending to insult the diplomats, 
they might be described as anarchists in kid gloves, 
who, in their conversation, with the utmost amiability 
and discretion, make constant allusion to their pro- 
vision of bombs, in order to give more emphasis to 
their demands. Hence the attitude of a State, its 
demands and its threats are regulated according to 
the armed might which it has behind it as a last resource 
for proving the justice of its conduct. The only excep- 
tions to this sublime rule are the small States like 
Switzerland, Holland, Belgium, etc., which support 
their foreign policy not so much by armed strength as 
by exploiting the rivalries of the Great Powers. 

Thus, in reference to foreign policy, armies are no 
longer considered as passive instruments for the de- 
fence of the country ; in the hands of the diplomats they 
become threats and standards of right and wrong. 

Down to the French Revolution it was an under- 
stood thing that the Almighty had only created 
nations for the sake of kings. Still, the dynasties of 
feudal days were so considerate that they only enforced 
their policy by means of soldiers, whom they hired, 
much as an African explorer hires his escort. Hence, 
the fact that the foreign policy of those times 
openly and honestly served only the interests of the 
dynasties, and that dynasties waged war upon each 
other at will and upon the most trifling pretexts, 



PRINCIPLES OF GERMAN POLICY 107 

without the slightest regard to the welfare of their 
peoples, is perfectly intelligible. For they employed 
for the purpose, as already stated, only such soldiers 
as voluntarily undertook the task. Love of country, 
defence of country, blessings of civilisation, etc., were, 
in those days, not dreamt of. Politics and *'their 
continuation by other means," that is to say, by war, 
was not a national question but a private concern of 
the dynasty. When Soubise was defeated at Rossbach 
the Paris populace hardly concealed their jubilation 
that the braggarts of Versailles had got a rebuff. 
When, in 1792, Prussia and Austria marched upon 
France, the Prusso-Austrian peoples hardly troubled 
their heads about it; no one regarded the defeats at 
Valmy and Jemappes as a national disaster; and 
Goethe's ^'Campaign in France" treats this campaign 
as a purely dynastic episode, and one looks in vain, 
in his description of it, for any patriotic sentiment. 

This epoch of absolute lordship, and of undisguised 
camarilla politics, when war was openly regarded not 
as a crime against nations, but merely as an adventure 
for illustrious personages, led to the great French 
Revolution, which gave it the death-blow. 

That birth certificate of modern society, the declara- 
tion of human and civic rights formulated by the 
French Revolution, states, in Article 3, "the principle 
of all sovereignty essentially rests in the nation; 
and no corporation, no individual, can express any 
authority which has not originated from it." With 
these words the people themselves undertook the shap- 
ing of their destiny; the armed force was, henceforth, 
based upon universal military service, and was inspired 
by the sacred idea of defence of country. The modern 



io8 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 

Fatherland, that is to say, the constitutional State 
striving towards ever-increasing justice and liberty, 
had come into being. 

It is patent that foreign politics v^ere thus, at one 
stroke, revolutionised. The political organisation, 
army, administration and government of the new form 
of State were bound, for the future, to place their 
services at the disposal of the common weal. 

These new and excellent ideas were, to be sure, 
overthrown in France, at any rate in practice. The 
National Convention conquered the left bank of the 
Rhine and Napoleon I. waged war against all Europe. 
All the same, this fundamental readjustment of 
the aspirations and aims of foreign policy became, 
in theory, a model for all States. Dynasties were 
compelled to bow to the common weal. From a 
purely dynastic affair, the policy of the State and 
all that appertained thereto (especially the military 
system) became nationalised. Henceforth, if a dynasty 
wished to engage in war, it had first to prove to its 
subjects that its aim was not to increase by this means 
its own power and exchequer, but to promote the 
welfare of the people at large. 

But in this, as in everything, the dynasties only 
unwillingly and apparently yielded to the new de- 
mands. The same France which had proclaimed to 
the world those magnificent ideas reverted openly in 
its foreign policy (in spite of the fact that these same 
principles had again been insisted upon in the Revolu- 
tion of 1848) to the dynastic point of view. With the 
Crimean War and the Mexican campaign. Napoleon 
III. annihilated the last remnants of the Holy Alliance 
and raised the Bonaparte dynasty to the zenith of its 



PRINCIPLES OF GERMAN POLICY 109 

power. France, to be sure, became once again '7a 
grande nation" and the most redoubtable military 
Power in Europe, but the French people had to pay 
for this patriotic satisfaction (just as the German 
people had after 1871) with the loss of all those politi- 
cal liberties that they had painfully won in the course 
of three revolutions. Like causes produce like effects. 
The France of 1850-1870 was a precursor of the 
Germany of 1871-1914; detested and feared by 
other nations, condemned by the whole world as 
arrogant, vain, and thirsty for war, the Second Empire 
was, in its home policy, reactionary through and through. 
It is an historical law (alas! disregarded) that every 
increase of dynastic power must be paid for by 
the people with a corresponding diminution of their 
rights and privileges, and, at the same time, regarded 
by neighbouring countries as a danger and menace of 
war. Napoleon III. wrote several books (just as 
William II. made a host of speeches), in which he 
vigorously endeavoured to prove that his foreign policy 
was only subservient to the weal of the French nation. 
Yet dynastic weal and popular weal are poles 
asunder, just as are capital and labour. They can 
only be reconciled by pious phrases and lies. 
Napoleon's wife destroyed the effect of the whole of 
his literary work with a single sentence : "C'est ma 
guerre !" she exclaimed with great complacency on the 
outbreak of the Franco-German War. Possibly the 
long ennui of Court festivities prompted this desire for 
other distractions; in any case, this expression shows 
clearly that the assertion of human rights and the 
democratic aspirations of the nineteenth century 
had made no impression on this exalted personage. 



no THE COMING DEMOCRACY 

In the eyes of a dynasty nations have only the 
right to serve "higher interests," that is to say, to 
gather laurels for their rulers on the bloodstained 
fields of battle. 

After the death of Frederick II. foreign politics 
were little discussed in Prusso-Germany. The Wars 
of Liberation, the ensuing Vienna Congress, and 
the Holy Alliance won for Prussia once more some 
respect in Europe. Yet how little Prussia's forei^ 
policy was dictated by considerations for the public 
weal was immediately after displayed to the nation 
by Frederick William III. in that terrible reaction 
which followed the Wars of Liberation and only 
terminated in 1848. After the brief, bright interval of 
1848 Bismarck entered upon Metternich's inheritance. 

Bismarck's speeches and letters, his ''Reflections and 
Reminiscences," are full of proofs that he, as he 
acknowledged, regarded himself only as the ''servant of 
his lord." He was very skilful in proving to the Ger- 
man people that dynastic weal is tantamount to public 
weal. We were wrong in believing him. For Bis- 
marck, though in his youth imbued with republican 
ideas, was the absolute negation of all those democratic 
ideals which had already been more or less put into 
practice in the politics of Western Europe, and without 
which a popular form of government had become in- 
conceivable. 

Bismarck's foreign policy, which was directed first 
against the Hapsburgs, then against the Bonapartes, 
resulted, when he had triumphed all along the line, in 
a united German Empire with a constitution which, 
as we have said, placed all the power in the hands of 
the German Emperor and stamped it henceforward not 



PRINCIPLES OF GERMAN POLICY in 

as a liberal-progressive, but as an autocratic State 
with a democratic veneer. 

It may be asserted that Bismarck's foreign policy 
was advantageous to Germany. In fact, almost all 
German historians and politicians agree that the 
victories of 1864, 1866, and 1870-71 brought the 
nation that moral prestige which enabled it to develop 
its commercial and technical capacity and to become a 
State with a world-wide trade of the first rank. 

But there appertain to the common weal not merely 
material but ideal blessings, of which the greatest 
and most essential is political liberty. Moreover, if 
we place Germany's material progress since 1870 to 
the credit of the Bismarck wars, we must reflect that 
France also has, during the same period, achieved 
a similar result. The astounding economic develop- 
ment of Germany during the past forty years 
must then be attributable to other causes than Bis- 
marck's foreign policy. Otherwise the vanquished and 
ruined France would not be able to show a like 
phenomenon. 

This is not the place to furnish evidence that 
victorious wars can never be the cause of material 
national prosperity. But, speaking generally, we may 
say that if Bismarck had welded the German races 
into national unity without any war, the national 
prosperity of Germany would, thanks to the genius of 
the German merchant and technologist, have developed 
just as brilliantly as, and certainly more safely than, 
it did through Bismarck's annexation and armament 
policy, which brought us forty years of unrest, 
oppressive taxation, and finally this World War. 

The war of 1870-71 was, like the present war, 



112 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 

ushered in with hollow bombast. Then, as to-day, 
much was talked about progress, liberty, and unity. 
But, as so often before, pompous words only veiled 
private interests. The German nation hoped to achieve 
through the war not only its unity, but its political 
emancipation, but it soon discovered that the only 
result of the war was to raise the rank of its dynasty. 
The battles of Worth and Weissenburg had hardly 
been fought when the Crown Prince Frederick 
asked : "And what is to be the position of the 
King of Prussia after this war?" and he himself 
furnished the reply: "He must become Emperor!" 
But why should he become Emperor ? Gustav Freytag^ 
explained to his prince the dangers of Imperialism: 
the glamour of Majesty, of Court life, uniforms, etc., 
would displace the simplebluecoatof theHohenzollerns. 
The self-importance of the princes would increase the 
self-importance of the nobles. Not merely the bureau- 
cracy and the army, but also the people at large would 
gradually be infected with a snobbish and servile spirit 
and the highest military commands conferred upon 
persons on account of their birth, and no longer on 
account of their proved efficiency. The strong, demo- 
cratic undercurrent of the time would pass unheeded. 
And how did the Crown Prince, in the face of these 
just objections (they read to-day like prophecies), 
none the less establish his claim to the Imperial crown ? 
Listen! "When I was in Paris with my father in 

* Gustav Freytag, "Der Kronprinz und die Deutsche Kaiser- 
krone" [Leipzig, 1889, 8th ed.], p. 21 et seq.: Freytag accom- 
panied the Crown Prince during the campaign in France, and 
he tells us in his preface to this work that "the august gentle- 
man very kindly assured the author that he had understood his 
friendly intention." 



PRINCIPLES OF GERMAN POLICY 113 

1867 during the French Exhibition, the Emperor 
Napoleon sent word that, seeing that the Emperor 
of Russia had announced his visit, he wished to learn 
from the King how he desired the question of the 
precedence of the distinguished guests to be arranged, 
and he would do everything in accordance with the 
King's wishes. Thereupon my father replied : *The 
Emperor, of course, has precedence. No Hohenzollern 
ought to say that, it ought not to be true of a Hohen- 
zollern,' he concluded, fiercely." And this man, who 
was imagined to be entirely occupied with his plans of 
campaign, had, in the midst of the stress of war, noth- 
ing more important to do than to sit down and dictate 
a memorandum to Count Bismarck, in which he urged 
energetically the conferring of the Imperial title upon 
the Hohenzollerns. 

This, then, was the main issue. Before the all- 
important question, whether the Czar of Russia should 
in future take precedence of the Hohenzollerns, all 
other reflections and democratic tendencies of the 
century were scattered like chaff! No longer to rank 
below the Czar of Russia; that, in the mind of the 
Crown Prince, was the pre-eminent question. It was 
in order that "this should be no longer true of a 
Hohenzollern" that the German nation had gone to 
war. 

What a glaring light this casts upon the secret causes 
leading up to war! Freytag's gossip "out of school" 
only confirms what history tells us on every page, that 
behind the fair talk of public weal and liberty there 
are generally concealed the most terribly trivial 
dynastic interests. Bismarck, in his "Reflections and 
Reminiscences," tries to represent himself as having 



114 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 

first devised the "imperial plan," and carried it through 
single-handed against a world of opposition, but this 
was not the case. The Hohenzollerns were less modest 
than Bismarck's respect and the servility of German 
professors would have us believe. The Diary^ of the 
Crown Prince, his memorandum to Bismarck composed 
at the beginning of the war, Gustav Freytag's notes 
and other documents, sufficiently demonstrate that 
the idea of a German Emperor by divine right had 
ever been a secret ambition of the Hohenzollerns. 
They had rejected the Imperial crown of the German 
Democracy in 1848, because their good God, their 
martial fame, and a victorious army appeared to 
promise them more stable guarantees than the demo- 
cratic basis of popular political liberty. 

It is clear then that the assertion that the Franco- 
Prussian war was undertaken in the cause of the public 
welfare and of liberty is one of the many pious frauds 
to be met with everywhere in Germany, when one talks 
to the people. It is not merely contradicted by the 
subsequent forty years of German home politics, but 
also, directly after the war, received a staggering 
refutation in the remarkable fact that the leading men 
of Prussia had unhesitatingly, and materially, enriched 
themselves by the war. Immediately after the con- 
clusion of peace a so-called Donation Bill was presented 
to the Reichstag. Moltke received for his glorious 
part in the campaign a gift of £45,000; and many of 

^When, at the end of the 'eighties, Prof. Geffken published 
these Diaries, Bismarck was so incensed that he sent an imme- 
diate report to the Emperor, took proceedings against Geffken, 
and had him arrested. But the genuineness of the Diaries could 
not be questioned, and in January, 1889, Geffken had to be 
released from custody. 



PRINCIPLES OF GERMAN POLICY 115 

the other Generals £15,000 or more. Bismarck re- 
ceived the Sachsenwald Estate. And so forth. For 
the soldiers, who had actually shed their blood in order 
to win from France, for the dynasty, the Imperial 
crown, five milliards of francs, Alsace-Lorraine, and 
universal prestige, there was nothing left. Again in 
1910 a reward for the soldiers of 1870 was refused 
by the Government. 

The Aristotelian theory, that war, like hunting 
and agriculture, belongs to the natural sources of 
livelihood (while trade and banking are unnatural), 
was, despite all modern ideas, brutally confirmed by 
Prussia in the midst of the nineteenth century. The 
dynasty of the Hohenzollerns had not only, owing to 
its victories, risen suddenly from a small Power 
into the rank of the first European military Power, it 
had also become materially wealthier, having acquired 
Schleswig-Holstein, Hesse-Nassau, Hanover, Alsace- 
Lorraine, five milliards, as well as statesmen and 
staff officers ^ who made war a personal source of 
income; to boot, the finest army in the world, a 
down-trodden people, and a Constitution that only 
masked and did not curb dynastic omnipotence; 
that was the harvest of Bismarck's policy. These, 
as every impartial critic will allow, were purely 
dynastic gains, which were very soon to develop into 
distressing losses for the people. One of the few 
German democrats of those days who did not allow 
themselves to be led astray by the loquacious humbug 
of sycophants and orators, namely, the scientist, Karl 
Vogt, wrote as early as 1870 the prophetic words ^i 

^ Vide note to p. 46. 

" Karl Vogt, "Politische Briefe an Fr. Kolb," p. 18, Bid, 1870. 



il6 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 

"In my opinion there is nothing whatever behind the 
whole Bismarck-Moltke machinery save the desire to 
perpetuate in Germany the iron mlHtary regime, and 
by a marvellous organisation to keep the whole of 
Germany *in strict Prussian discipline/ in obedience 
to its hereditary ruler and in humble subservience to 
that Providence which is represented on earth by the 
Government." 

This criticism by an influential German has been 
completely confirmed by Germany's development 
during the past forty years. Prussia became the model 
and the ruler, and made of Germany a modern Sparta, 
admired by many, feared by most, and sincerely 
loved by none. Step by step it pursued its iron way, 
from the formation of the Triple Alliance to its naval, 
colonial, and world-policy, from the threat to France 
in 1875 to Tangier, Agadir, and Serajevo, with ever- 
increasing armaments, with more and more boastful 
journalists, with more and more servile professors, 
and more and more undemocratic Social Democrats. 
A new nation, a strong nation, but also, alas ! a nation 
which, as a result of political serfdom, unalleviated by 
any democratic experience, had remained blind to the 
dangers of despotism; a nation devoted to peaceful la- 
bour and organisation, arbitrarily cut off from politics, 
which, in its need for gratitude, unthinkingly attrib- 
uted the marvellous development of German com- 
merce and wealth to the results of Bismarck's policy. 
Prevented by force from attaining political maturity, 
it rejoiced in its material development, and at last 
regarded the "strict Prussian discipline" as God-sent 
pre-eminence in culture. 



PRINCIPLES OF GERMAN POLICY 117 

William II. and the World Peace 

When William II. ascended the throne, he already- 
enjoyed the reputation of being a prince of warlike 
disposition. [Most of the Hohenzollern princes have 
a similar reputation, from the Emperor William I., 
who in 1848 was named by the people the "Grapeshot 
prince'' ("Kartatschenprinz"), down to the present 
Crown Prince of the German Empire, who with his 
talk of ''brisk and joyful war/' and so forth, was the 
despair of every earnest pacifist.] 

William II. quickly showed that he was better than 
his reputation. In his Speech on the occasion of his 
accession, on June 25th, 1888, he said: "In foreign 
politics I am resolved to keep the peace with everyone, 
as far as in me lies. My devotion to the German army 
and my position in relation to it will never lead me 
into the temptation of depriving my country of the 
blessings of peace, unless the necessity of going to war 
be imposed on us by an attack on the Empire or its 
allies. Our army shall safeguard our peace, and if 
peace should none the less be broken, regain it with 
honour. This it will not fail to achieve, owing to the 
strength afforded it by the last Army Bill, which you 
passed imanimously. It is far from my ideas to utilise 
this power for offensive purposes. Germany needs no 
further martial glory, nor any conquests whatsoever, 
now that it has, finally, conquered its right to exist 
as a united and independent State." 

This speech was joyfully welcomed by the German 
people and sympathetically approved in foreign 
countries. To be sure, the subsequent utterances of 
the monarch very soon aroused the disapproval and 



ii8 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 

indignation of the people, notably, that notorious 
speech on the occasion of swearing in the recruits at 
Potsdam (November 23rd, 1891), in which, with an 
unmistakable allusion to social democracy, he enjoined 
upon his soldiers to shoot down father and mother at 
his orders should necessity arise; but our nation is, 
like all nations, optimistic. The imperial speeches at 
Hamburg and at the opening of the Kiel Canal (June 
1 8th and 21st, 1895), which were again clear manifes- 
tations of the Emperor's love of peace, were enthusi- 
astically received throughout Germany. 

As a result of the great talent for speech-making of 
William II., a whole book could be filled with the 
speeches he has delivered during his long reign in which 
he again and again emphasised his desire for peace. 
Particularly notable in this respect are his speeches 
at Aix-la-Chapelle on June 19th, 1902, in which he 
emphasised the spiritual nature of the German world- 
empire, and that delivered at Bremen on March 22nd, 
1905. 

But what concerns us democrats and pacifists is 
not whether a dynasty desires peace (that we demand 
of it in this modern world as a matter of course), but 
how it proposes to secure peace and whether its actions 
are in agreement with its words. In the above-men- 
tioned speech on his accession, William II. is already 
speaking of "our army" which is to maintain the 
peace for us. On October 5th, 1899, we find William 
II. saying to the Prince of Wales : "Germany possesses 
an army corresponding to its needs; and, if the 
British nation has a fleet corresponding to its needs, 
this will be regarded by the whole of Europe as an 
important factor in the maintenance of peace." In 



PRINCIPLES OF GERMAN POLICY 119 

his Bremen speech of 1905 he certainly stated that we 
''never aspire to an empty world dominion," yet he 
added, "with every new battleship that leaves the 
yards we have one more guarantee of peace on earth," 
and *'that we can stand, hand on sword, shield lying 
before us on the ground, and exclaim: Tament let 
come what will come." The Emperor's idea that peace 
could only be sustained by strong and ever stronger 
armies was still more clearly expressed in his Konigs- 
berg speech of August 25th, 1910, in which he said: 
" ... so we will be always on the alert, above all 
keeping our armour without a flaw, in view of the 
tremendous progress our neighbouring Powers have 
made. For our peace rests entirely upon our arma- 
ment." 

And like an echo it is repeated in the book "Deutsch- 
land in Waff en" ("Germany in Arms"), to which the 
Crown Prince contributed a preface, that "The sword 
will, until the end of all things, ever remain the decisive 
factor." 

Upon what then, in the Emperor's mind, does the 
security of the world's peace rest? Upon armies, 
battleships, preparations for war, that is to say, upon 
a constant increase of war material, of militarism, and 
of the fear which these inspire? The German Emper- 
or's love of peace cannot be better illustrated than by 
a consideration of the following facts : 

The whole policy of William II. towards France 
was permeated by a certain graciousness. The 
holding of the international conference for the protec- 
tion of labour at Berlin (1890) aroused in France, 
which had just overcome the Boulangist danger, uni- 
versal approbation, and William II. was proclaimed as 



120 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 

the "Protector of the peace of Europe." Jules Simon, 
whom the Emperor WilHam 11. honoured with his 
special friendship, published in 1894 in the Revue de 
Paris his impressions of the Berlin Court, obtained 
after long residence in that city. They amount to 
an enthusiastic appreciation of the young monarch, 
which gained for the latter many friends in France. 
Among other matters, Jules Simon narrates the 
following observation which William II. made to him 
relative to a possible collision between Germany and 
France: "Therefore, I regard the man who should 
try to drive Germany and France into a war as 
both a fool and a criminal." Whenever France was 
shocked by any disaster (the assassination of Carnot, 
the death of Jules Simon, the fire at the Paris Charity 
bazaar, the loss of the Bourgogne, the mine explosion 
of Courriere, etc., etc.), the German Emperor was 
always ready with his telegrams of sympathy, which 
were intended to improve the strained Franco-German 
relations, but were regarded by the French people as a 
proof of the Emperor's sympathy and desire for peace. 
The Emperor, on the death of the valiant defender of 
St. Privat, Marshal Canrobert, even went so far as to 
express his deep sympathy with the family. In this 
manner he wished to prove to the French that he was 
chivalrously and peaceably inclined. 

Now compare this demonstration with the fact that 
William IL, neither on the decease of the great pacifist, 
Bertha von Suttner, nor on any other occasion, 
addressed a word of encouragement to those pacifists 
whose purpose it was to secure peace, not by military 
intimidation, but by the methods of civil law, that is 
to say, by the development of international law. He 



PRINCIPLES OF GERMAN POLICY 121 

had such an admiration for the hero of St. Privat 
that he made his death the occasion for a declaration 
of his peaceable intentions. For the gifted woman who 
had championed the new ideal of justice and peace he 
had, despite the fact that she sprang from a highly 
aristocratic Austrian family, not a word. 

It may now be asserted that the Emperor's love 
of peace was genuine, with the proviso that it was 
diametrically opposed to the demands of modern 
humanity, and was so ill-suited to the times in which 
we live that it was bound, in the long run, to jeopardise 
the peace of the world. 

The Hague Conference and its Consequences 
This present catastrophe had been long foretold. 
People like Tolstoy and Iwan Bloch in Russia; 
Frederic Passy, d'Estournelles de Constant, and Jean 
Jaures in France; Bertha von Suttner, A. H. Fried, 
and Bebel in Germany ; Herbert Spencer and Norman 
Angell in England, etc., etc., had again and again 
declared that Europe was in an unstable condition; 
that the armaments, which were ostensibly intended 
to secure peace, as a matter of fact undermined 
peace, and that the time was at hand when civilised 
Europe must finally emancipate itself from these 
barbaric peace-guarantees by forcible methods, and 
through the development of international law, force 
its way to a peace based upon the principles of civil 
law. This modern pacifist idea, which was expounded 
by Grotius, the Dutchman, and the French abbot de 
Saint Pierre, and raised by Kant, the German, to a 
legal science, had gradually, in spite of wars and 
imperial speeches, found enormous support in the 



122 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 

world, and to the delight and surprise of the universe 
was, in 1898, presented to civilised humanity for 
practical discussion by a dynasty. 

The Czar of All the Russias, Nicolas II., on August 
24th, 1898, invited the Governments of all the States 
to an International Congress, in order to discuss 
the possibilities of general disarmament and arbitra- 
tion. This action is so much in conflict with the 
main thesis of this book, that I am bound to mention 
it as a laudable exception to the general rule. It 
was, in fact, neither the French Republic nor the 
English democracy that offered this glad hope to the 
world, but a dynasty by divine right, which was, by 
reason of its whole tradition, regarded as being the 
most reactionary in Europe, and from which we 
might least of all have expected such a step. I need 
hardly say that we democrats and pacifists have a 
deep abhorrence of the banishments to Siberia, the 
pogroms and gallows of Russian policy. We are the 
first to be horrified at the sufferings of the Russian 
people, and to place them to the account of the Russian 
dynasty. Yet all this cannot prevent us from recog- 
nising in Nicolas 11. a man who, sympathising with the 
ideas of Tolstoy and Bloch, clearly perceiving the state 
of the world, honestly endeavoured,^ despite all 
dynastic traditions, to establish peace on some other 
basis than invincible armaments, sharpened swords, 
and dry powder. 

^The incorrigible professor of "history," Schiemann, whose 
oracular sayings are repeated by the whole German national 
Press, demonstrates, of course from the height of his "science," 
that the Czar summoned this Conference only out of fear of 
England {vide "Ein Verleumder," Berlin, 1915, p. 9 et seq.). 
I propose that in the future treaty of peace an international 



PRINCIPLES OF GERMAN POLICY 123 

The Czar's proposal was hailed with great enthu- 
siasm by the civilised world, and not least by Germany, 
but not by the German Government. What? Was 
there to be any other basis of peace than armies and 
battleships ready for immediate action? Prussia's 
whole tradition and political conceptions were doomed 
if such were the case. Hence, our dynasty regarded the 
Czar's proposals as so absurd that, from the first day 
it made no disguise of its attitude. Scarcely two 
weeks had elapsed from the Czar's manifesto when, 
on September 7th, 1898, William XL declared at Oyn- 
hausen : "Believe me, peace will never be better safe- 
guarded than by a perfectly organised and prepared 
German army. . . . God grant that it may always 
be possible for us to preserve the world's peace with 
this sharp and well-kept arm." This was a categorical 
rejection of the Czar's ideas. The German Press was 
so much the more compelled to recognise it as such 
in that, the following December, a new Army Bill 
was introduced in the new Reichstag. As a reply to 
the Czar's proposal, the German Government demanded 
a vote of about 2y miUions more for the equipment of 
the army. There is an almost comic contradiction 
in the fact that in the Imperial Speech at the opening 
of the Reichstag (on December 6th, 1898) the "press- 
ing necessity" of this increase in the new army budget 

agreement shall be contained to this effect: "Whosoever, as 
public political writer or speaker, in questions of foreign pol- 
itics, knowingly and demonstrably perverts the truth shall, in 
the name of Peace, be punished with. . . ." By this means one 
would checkmate the mischief-making and deliberate instigators 
of war, and, in the interests of peace, free Europe from a danger 
which, under the cloak of learning, is a disgrace to civilised 
humanity. 



124 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 

is emphasised, and ( following it) "the warm sympathy" 
with which William II. greets "the noble suggestion of 
my dear friend — His Majesty the Czar of Russia — 
for the meeting of an International Conference.'* 

Acting on the hints conveyed by the Imperial 
speech at Oynhausen, the German Press commenced 
to treat the idea of disarmament and arbitration as 
childish utopianism, or a cunning trap for Germany. 
When, in spite of all these attempts to frustrate it, 
the Conference proposed by the Czar nevertheless 
took place in May, 1899, the German delegates were 
instructed by th.eir Imperial Government to wreck the 
whole magnificent plan. These delegates, who, be it 
remembered, did not represent at The Hague the views 
and wishes of the German people, but, as the personal 
nominees of the German Emperor, only those of the 
German dynasty, were Count Miinster, the German 
Ambassador at Paris, the Munich professor, Baron 
von Stengel, Privy Councillor Dr. Zorn, professor at 
Konigsberg, Colonel Gross von Schwarzhoff, and 
Captain von Siegel of the Imperial Navy. 

The very selection of these delegates was equivalent 
to a mockery of the idea of disarmament, for, only a 
few weeks previously. Professor Stengel had published 
a violent pamphlet against the Czar's proposal. 

The attitude of the German delegates aroused the 
indignation of the other members of the Conference. 

At the fifth sitting of the Commission (June 26thj 
1899) Colonel von Schwarzhoff replied to the Russian 
proposal that the Powers should pledge themselves 
not to increase their armies for the present, and then 
enter into an agreement not to increase for a definite 



PRINCIPLES OF GERMAN POLICY 125 

period the existing strength of their armies, in these 
terms : 

'The German nation is not oppressed by the burden 
of armament and taxation; it is not sHding down- 
wards on a steep path; it is not advancing towards 
ruin and exhaustion. On the contrary; both public 
and private wealth are increasing, the general wealth, 
the standard of life is rising year by year." And then 
he shelters himself behind technical questions, main- 
tains that there is a great difference between a domestic 
law voting the army for five years and a binding 
international convention, etc., and, finally, ends by 
declaring categorically that he cannot accept the 
proposal. 

In the question of obligatory arbitration, Pro- 
fessor Zorn stated his views in the seventh meeting 
of the third Commission (July 20th, 1899) as follows : 
"to take this momentous step without sufficient 
experience seems to me dangerous and likely to lead 
to dissension rather than to harmony. I think that 
the German nation is not alone in regarding the 
question from this point of view." And, that there 
should be no mistake, he adds. "Had the article 
(touching obligatory arbitration) had a formal juristic 
character, it would have been unacceptable to me. 
In this case, I should have been in complete accord 
with the objections raised by the representatives of 
the Balkan States. As it stands, it has no formal 
juristic character whatever, it only contains a recom- 
mendation of a purely moral nature. In other 
words : I refuse obligatory arbitration, but I willingly 
accept optional arbitration, because it does not bind 
us to anything." 



126 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 

Professor Zorn further advanced in the commission 
of inquiry that the German Government could 
only deliver its opinion as to the organisation of a 
permanent Court of Arbitration after having had 
previous experience of a temporary one. Zorn, in 
obedience to his instructions, refused to be talked 
round, and again declared that, for the present, he 
could only agree to a "temporary" permanent Court 
of Arbitration.^ 

It was Professor Zorn also who resolutely insisted 
on the removal of the word ''Tribunal" and demanded 
the title "Cour permanente d'arbitrage," instead of 
the original "Tribunal permanent d'arbitrage." We 
see here the same spirit at work as that which, fifteen 
years later, prompted the writing of the arrogant 
words: "It is impossible for us to drag our ally, 
in its dispute with Serbia, before a European court" 
(German White Book, Exhibit 12). The actions of 

^In the course of the World War, Professor Zorn, in a con- 
troversy with the French senator, d'Estournelles de Constant, 
and the Swiss professor, O. Nippold, has been forced to confess 
that the attitude of the German representatives at The Hague 
left something to be desired (vide Nos. 1134, 1171, and 1278 of 
the Neue Ziircher Zeitung, 1916). Professor Zorn, who is still 
in an official position, cannot, of course, admit that the asser- 
tion of d'Estournelles de Constant and Nippold (that the repre- 
sentatives of the German Government had, in obedience to in- 
structions, thwarted the endeavours of the Conference) is in all 
points correct, and can be substantiated by numerous documents. 
Yet his assurances to the contrary lack the note of sincerity. 
Moreover, with all due respect to Professor Zorn's scientific 
knowledge, we must strongly question his impartiality. Pro- 
fessor Zorn is not a free agent. Anyone who is capable of 
writing such an article as he published in the Woche ("Un- 
serm Kaiser," January 23rd, 1915) — a specimen of the most 
absolute submission and servility — has forfeited the right to 
have a voice in the republic of Letters. ' 



PRINCIPLES OF GERMAN POLICY 127 

God-ordained dynasties are not subject to the juris- 
diction of ordinary mortals. 

It is impossible here to enter into all the details of 
the negotiations. But I cannot forbear to cite a few 
passages from a book^ by the President of the Amer- 
ican delegation to The Hague. These passages have 
the value of historical documents. Mr. Andrew White 
writes on May 24th : 

'^Meeting Count Miinster, who, after M. de Staal, 
is very generally considered the most important per- 
sonage here, we discussed the subject of arbitration. 
To my great regret, I found him entirely opposed 
to it, or at least to any well-developed plan. He 
did not say that he would oppose a moderate 
plan for voluntary arbitration, but he insisted that 
arbitration must be injurious to Germany; that 
Germany is prepared for war as no other country 
is or can be; that she can mobilise her army in ten 
days; and that neither France, Russia, nor any other 
Power can do this. Arbitration, he said, would simply 
give rival Powers time to put themselves in readiness, 
and would therefore be a great disadvantage to 
Germany.'' 

Again, under date June 12th: 

*'More surprising was the conversation of Count 
Miinster. Bearing in mind that the Emperor William, 
during his long talk with me just before I left Berlin, 
in referring to the approaching Peace Congress, had 
said that he was sending Count Miinster because what 

* Andrew D. White, "My Autobiography." White was at that 
time American Ambassador in Berlin, and, as can be gathered 
from his book, a personal friend of William II. and was well 
acquainted with and a sincere admirer of Germany. 



128 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 

the Conference would most need would be 'common 
sense,' and because, in his opinion, Count Miinster 
had 'lots of it,' some of the Count's utterances 
astonished me. He now came out, as he did the day 
before in his talk with me, utterly against arbitration, 
declaring it a 'humbug,' and that we had no right to 
consider it, since it was not mentioned in the first 
proposals from Russia, etc. 

"It is clear that, with all his fine qualities — and he 
is really a splendid specimen of an old-fashioned 
German nobleman devoted to the diplomatic service 
of his country — he is saturated with the ideas of fifty 
years ago." 

Again, June 13th, he writes: 

''This morning come more disquieting statements 
regarding Germany. There seems to longer any doubt 
that the German Emperor is opposing arbitration 
and, indeed, the whole work of the Conference, and 
that he will insist on his main allies, Austria and Italy, 
going with him. ... I had learned from a high 
Imperial official, before I left Berlin, that the Emperor 
considered arbitration as derogatory to his sovereignty, 
and I was also well aware, from his conversation, that 
he was by no means in love with the Conference idea; 
but, in view of his speech at Wiesbaden, and the peti- 
tions which had come in to him from Bavaria, I had 
hoped that he had experienced a 'change of heart.' 

"Possibly he might have changed his opinion 
had not Count Miinster been here, reporting to him 
constantly against every step taken by the Conference. 
. . . There is no telling what stumbling blocks Ger- 
many and her allies may put in our way; and, of 
course, the whole result, without their final agreement, 



PRINCIPLES OF GERMAN POLICY 129 

will seem to the world a failure and, perhaps, a ^farce.* 

'The immediate results will be that the Russian 
Emperor will become an idol of the 'plain people' 
throughout the world, the German Emperor will be 
bitterly hated, and the Socialists, who form the most 
dreaded party on the Continent of Europe, will be 
furnished with a thoroughly effective weapon against 
their rulers. 

"Some days ago I said to a leading diplomatist 
here : 'The Ministers of the German Emperor ought 
to tell him that, should he oppose arbitration, there 
will be concentrated upon him an amount of hatred 
which no Minister ought to allow a sovereign to incur.' 
To this he answered : 'That is true ; but there is 
not a Minister in Germany who dares tell him/ " 

June 15th: 

"I then spoke very earnestly to him — more so than 
ever before — about the present condition of affairs. I 
told him that the counsellors in whom the Emperor 
trusted — such men as himself and the principal 
advisers of His Majesty — ought never to allow their 
young sovereign to be exposed to the mass of hatred, 
obloquy, and opposition which would converge upon 
him from all nations in case he became known to the 
whole world as the sovereign who had broken down 
the Conference and brought to naught the plan of 
arbitration. I took the liberty of telling him what 
the Emperor said about the Count himself — namely, 
that what the Conference was most likely to need was 
good common sense, and that he was sending Count 
Miinster because he possessed that. This seemed to 
please him, and I then went on to say that he of all 
men ought to prevent, by all means, placing the young 



130 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 

Emperor in such a position. I dwelt on the gifts and 
graces of the young sovereign, ' expressed my feehng 
of admiration for his noble ambitions, for his abilities, 
for the statesmanship he had recently shown, for his 
grasp of public affairs, and for his way of conciliating 
all classes, and then dwelt on the pity of making such 
a monarch an object of hatred in all parts of the 
world. 

"He seemed impressed by this, but said the calling 
of the Conference was simply a political trick — the 
most despicable trick ever practised. It was done, he 
said, mainly to embarrass Germany, to glorify the 
young Russian Emperor, and to put Germany and na- 
tions which Russia dislikes into a false position. To 
this I answered, *If this be the case, why not trump the 
Russian trick? or, as the poker players say, "go one 
better," take them at their word, support a good 
tribunal of arbitration more efficient even than the 
Russians have dared to propose; let your sovereign 
throw himself heartily into the movement and become 
a recognised leader and power here ; we will all support 
him, and to him will come the credit of it.' " 

June 1 6th: 

"This morning Count Miinster called and seemed 
much excited by the fact that he had received a des- 
patch from Berlin in which the German Government — 
which, of course, means the Emperor — had strongly 
and finally declared against anything like an arbitra- 
tion tribunal. He was clearly disconcerted by this too 
literal acceptance of his own earlier views. . . . 

"Later Count Miinster told me that he had decided 
to send Professor Zom to Berlin at once in order to 



PRINCIPLES OF GERMAN POLICY 131 

lay the whole matter before the Foreign Office and 
induce the authorities to modify the instructions. I 
approved this course strongly, whereupon he suggested 
that I should do something to the same purpose, and 
this finally ended in the agreement that Holls should go 
with Zom." 

Mr. White wrote a long private note to Herr von 
Biilow (then a persona grata with William II.), ex- 
plaining the intricacies of the case and imploring him 
to bring the Emperor to reason : "I present them to you 
as man to man, not only in the interest of good rela- 
tions between Germany and the United States, but of 
interests common to all the great nations of the earth — 
of their common interest in giving something like 
satisfaction to a desire so earnest and widespread as 
that which has been shown in all parts of the world for 
arbitration." 

All in vain. 

On June 21st Mr. White had to make the following 
entry in his diary : 

"Billow has sent to the Emperor my long private 
letter to himself, urgently urging the acceptance by 
Germany of our plan of arbitration. Prince Hohenlohe 
seems to have entered most cordially into our ideas, 
giving Holls a card which would admit him to the 
Emperor, and telegraphing a request that His Majesty 
see him. But the Emperor was still upon his yacht at 
sea, and Holls could stay no longer. Biilow is trying 
to make an appointment for him to meet the Emperor 
at the close of the week.'* 

The battle was lost. White, on July 29th, made the 
following ironical entry in reference to the solemn final 
sitting of The Hague Conference : 



132 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 

''Count Miinster, the presiding delegate from 
Germany, replied in French, and apparently extempo- 
raneously. It must have been pain and grief to him, 
for he was obliged to speak respectfully in the first 
place of the Conference, which for some weeks he had 
affected to despise; and, secondly, of arbitration and 
the other measures proposed, which he had denounced 
as humbug; and, finally, he had to speak respectfully 
of M. de Staal, to whom he had steadily shown de- 
cided dislike. He did the whole thing quite well, all 
things considered." 

No progressively inclined German reader can fail 
to read these sketches by a (''neutral") high-minded 
American without a pang. They afford a glimpse 
behind the scenes of the workings of the world's 
history. Whilst a comedy of good will is being played 
upon the stage, behind it the powers of progress are 
desperately striving against the forces of darkness. As 
disarmament is impossible in face of the dynastic 
power, the dynastic conception is victorious all along 
the line. The first Hague Conference firstly renounced 
the idea of disarmament, and, secondly, that of obliga- 
tory arbitration. Its whole result remained a possible 
arbitration tribunal which in practice is worthless. 

The German delegates, in conformity with their 
instructions, and owing to their petty bureaucratic 
objections, rendered a question of vital import for the 
world at large null and void, and as a reward for this 
meritorious work Count Miinster received the title of 
"Prince" from the Emperor. 

Given the choice between mediaevalism and modern- 
ism, that is to say, between brute force and the modern 



PRINCIPLES OF GERMAN POLICY 133 

civilised conception of peace guarantees, the dynasty, 
here again in accordance with the Imperial Constitu- 
tion, declared itself for "the maintenance of existing 
conditions." How could it be otherwise? For the 
first time in the world's history The Hague Confer- 
ences endeavoured to create that "League of Nations" 
demanded by Kant as a "fundamental condition" of 
eternal peace. But Kant clearly stated : "the civil 
constitution of every State must be republican!" In 
fact, the conception of peace by rightful methods 
can only be realised when all States have a more or 
less republican form of government. This self-evident 
condition of international understanding has hitherto 
(for obvious reasons) not been insisted on by any 
leading representative of the science of pacifism, but 
it is logically contained in the whole idea. For the 
chief aim of The Hague Conferences was, after all, 
the final extirpation of the divine right of dynasties 
to dictate war and peace. 

We do not know how Nicholas II., in a given case, 
would have responded to this fundamental demand 
expressed by Kant. But we have seen, from the 
conduct of the German delegates at The Hague, that 
William II. strongly disapproved of it. William II. 
has never recognised the right of national assemblies. 
And even supposing that, in the interests of the world's 
peace, he had been prepared, for his own part, to 
renounce a portion of his sovereignty — that is to say, 
in questions of foreign policy to admit the co-operation 
and control of the Reichstag — would he have been able 
to do so? He was, in fact, bound hand and foot by 
that Camarilla which, in the absence of a controlling 



134 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 

national assembly, always surrounds the person of 
an absolute ruler. Wherever, as in Prusso-Germany, 
the responsible advisers and popular representatives 
are reduced to mere ciphers, the reins of power pass 
into the hands of the irresponsible. 

The omnipotence of those irresponsible advisers, 
founded on Article 1 1 of the German Imperial Consti- 
tution, the impotence of the German popular assembly, 
and the absolute belief of William II. in his divine 
mission; these, as everywhere else, were the decisive 
factors in ''our'* attitude at The Hague. Hand in glove 
with the Turk, we had demonstrated to the world that 
we were that European nation which, in defiance of all 
democratic tendencies, obstinately held to our "shining 
armour" and our "faultless equipment;" that is to 
say, were prepared to pit our military might against 
the noblest aspirations of civilised humanity. A man 
of a world-wide reputation, like Mommsen, could scoff 
at The Hague Conferences as being a "printer's 
error" in the world's history, and gain the applause 
of the Government Press. The National Liberal 
leader, Bassermann, told the Reichstag that "a more 
pacific review of the situation" would only ensue when 
The Hague Conferences were "happily vanquished.'* 
No less ironic and contemptuous were the expressions 
of the Prussian Minister of War of that time.^ All 
persons of reputation and influence in Germany con- 
sidered themselves, with a few exceptions, bound to 
follow the Government's lead and to represent The 

* Vide, A. H. Fried, "Handbuch der Friedensbewegung," vol. 2, 
p. 174. 



PRINCIPLES OF GERMAN POLICY 135 

Hague Conferences as utopianism or a cunning device 
on the part of Germany's enemies.^ 

Thus Germany, in the midst of a world filled with 
new aspirations and hopes, deliberately isolated herself. 
Instead of here taking the lead (as would have been 
only becoming in the Fatherland of Kant), and thus 
making herself a link between Western and Eastern 
civilisation, our dynasty insisted that in the future, 
as hitherto, the Rhine, and not the Vistula, should be 
the frontier between democracy and autocracy. In 
sure reliance upon its military invincibility, our 
Government, with an allusion to the geographical 
position of Germany, declared for the perpetuation 
of a policy which, just by reason of this geographical 
position, was the most dangerous for Germany that 
could be conceived of. 

For what was the result of The Hague Conferences? 
An unconquerable mistrust of Germany by all other 
States and, as a consequence of this, their natural 
desire for union and protection. Thus it was our 
dynasty that itself created the menace of which it 
to-day so bitterly complains. 

Republican France was not linked to imperial 
Russia by any ties. The former was the birthplace 
of the rights of civilisation and humanity, the land of 
liberty and of popular government; the latter a still 

* Moreover, the German Press and the German White Book 
relative to The Hague Conferences v^ere forced to falsify the 
account of the negotiations at The Hague; otherv^^ise, the 
German reader might not have understood the brutally unac- 
commodating attitude of the German delegates (c/. Schiicking, 
"Die Organisation der Welt." Alfr. Kroner, Leipzig, 1909, p. 
605, and O. Nippold, "Die zweite Haager Friedenskonferenz." 
Duncker und Humblot, Leipzig, vol. 2, p. 201). 



136 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 

semi-barbaric police- and official-ridden State, devoid 
of constitution and culture, the most crying contrast 
to France. It was Bismarck who, in spite of the 
formation of the Triple Alliance, contrived for two 
whole decades to maintain the so-called "insurance 
policy" with Russia. William II. embarked upon a 
new course, which first revealed itself in the dismissal 
of the Russophil Chancellor. Hardly two years had 
elapsed, when the Romanoffs, who had always been 
the allies of the Hohenzollerns, became the allies of 
republican France. This unnatural alliance, as we 
must repeat again and again to those who bemoan 
the "encirclement of Germany,'^ only took place ten 
years after the formation of the Triple Alliance. Until 
about 1900 it had remained more or less undefined. 
But when Germany had laid its cards on the table at 
The Hague, it took such a positive form that France, 
now feeling its increased security, was enabled to 
realise a long-desired popular reform, and in 1905 in- 
troduced the two-years' military service. 

But the lesson of The Hague influenced England's 
policy to a still greater degree. Nothing could seem- 
ingly have brought the English and the French to- 
gether. They were separated by quarrels dating cen- 
turies back. Both Louis XIV.'s colonial aspirations 
and those of Napoleon I. had been ruthlessly annihi- 
lated by the English. They had, in league with Prus- 
sia, overthrown the aspiration for world-empire of the 
Capets as they had that of the Great Corsican. The 
Boer War and the humiliation of Fashoda had, to- 
wards the close of the nineteenth century, so aggra- 
vated the Anglo-French antagonism that numerous 
distinguished French politicians had declared : "With 



PRINCIPLES OF GERMAN POLICY 137 

Germany against perfidious Albion!" Professor 
Oncken^ even tells us that France and Russia, "when 
the Boer War was at its height . . . addressed a pro- 
posal to the German Government to join with them 
in forcibly bringing the war to a conclusion, and 
thus save the Boers and humble England to the dust." 
Now it was doubtless a fact that William II. re- 
fused this Franco-Russian suggestion in order, as 
Professor Oncken says, "not to come into conflict 
with a naval Power like England." But Oncken, 
alas! does not inform us why William II. did not at 
least utilise this splendid chance of ameliorating Ger- 
many's relations both with France and Russia, and 
of aggravating England's dangerous "splendid isola- 
tion," at any rate morally, by relieving the Franco- 
German tension. 

Here, as always, William 11. followed his own 
plans. He had long before this, by his sudden initia- 
tion of a very ambitious naval and colonial poHcy, 
converted the centuries-old sympathy of England for 
Prussia into silent mistrust. This mistrust turned to 
indignation when, on January 3rd, 1896, William II. 
dispatched that notorious telegram to the President of 
the South African Republic, congratulating him on 
having "annihilated the armed forces that had broken 
the peace and invaded his country, and preserved its 
independence against attacks from without." Wil- 
liam II. certainly endeavoured to make good this pub- 
lic insult by conferring the Order of the Black Eagle 
upon Lord Roberts, and making his troops, in Sep- 
tember, 1897, cheer Queen Victoria, etc. But when 
at Stettin (September 23rd, 1898) he uttered the 

^ "Deutschland und der Weltkrieg," p. 478. 



138 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 

phrase that subsequently became a winged word In 
Germany, "Our future lies on the water !" then, even 
the dullest Englishman understood that the "new 
course" was a zigzag one, the aim of which was hid- 
den from the ordinary mortal, but that it was in any 
event a course hostile to England. 

Yet in vain England looked around for friends. 
The Russians in East Asia and Persia, the French in 
Morocco and Egypt, were against her. The sym- 
pathies of the entire world were then on the side of 
the little Boer nation, struggling so heroically for its 
independence. No one wanted to have anything to 
do with the Englishman. Ever since Napoleon's days 
he had been decried as a selfish, brutal shopkeeper, 
and his oversea policy brought him into conflict with 
the whole world. Then came the first Hague Con- 
ference. What ten years of English friendliness to- 
wards France could not effect was achieved in a few 
months by the attitude of the German Government 
at The Hague Conference, namely, the Anglo-French 
rapprochement, and, at the same time, the consolida- 
tion of the Franco-Russian Alliance. 

The whole perspective was changed in a moment. 
Yesterday isolated and hated, to-day England pos- 
sessed two powerful friends: "We" had, almost by 
force, driven them into her arms. Yesterday in a po- 
sition to gain Franco-Russian sympathies, or at any 
rate to keep the old English sympathies, Germany to- 
day found herself suddenly isolated, mistrusted and 

feared by the whole world. 

***** 

The German dynasty did not perceive in this threat- 
ening aspect of things the fruits of her military co- 



PRINCIPLES OF GERMAN POLICY 139 

ercive policy. The Power that possesses the strongest 
army in the world is infallible. When, in 1907, the 
second Hague Conference was called, in order, in spite 
of the first plain refusal of the German Government, 
to continue nevertheless the difficult task of securing 
a democratic guarantee of peace, the opportunity was 
not made use of by William II. in order to conciliate 
and to disarm the democratic coalition of Europe 
against him (it would have been such an easy and 
graceful task) ; but he continued in his old paths. He 
did not, to be sure, again dispatch the same uncouth 
delegates to The Hague, but, on this occasion, men 
with better manners and better intentions; but he 
would not recede a single inch from his conception of 
peace as based upon force of arms.^ 

As in 1899, so also in 1907, Germany was again the 
sole Great Power that formally rejected the institution 
of compulsory arbitration, and so nullified the chief 
task of the second Hague Conference. Baron Mar- 
shall von Bieberstein, president of the German dele- 
gation, in the fourth sitting of the first Commission 
(October 5th, 1907), in reply to the proposals to com- 

^ Even before its opening, the second Hague Conference was 
treated in the Reichstag with mockery and derision (sittings 
of April 23rd, 24th, and 30th, 1907). The Prussian Minister 
for War, von Einem, jeered: "The Governments will, in any 
case, put forward still further demands." The anti-Semitic 
Liebermann von Sonnenberg remarked contemptuously : "This 
whole peace movement is only a matter for old women and 
degenerates. We place our trust in God and our superlative 
army. . . . We have still our mailed fist — let them only come." 
The Agrarian, Oldenburg von Januschau, said: "If we Con- 
servatives had our way, we should send the Minister of War 
to The Hague" (applause from the Conservative benches), 
etc., etc. 



HO THE COMING DEMOCRACY 

pel the nations to submit to arbitration by means of 
permanent arbitration treaties (world-treaty), stated 
that he had first to regret that a certain unanimity 
prevailed in the assembly for making arbitration ob- 
ligatory; he was sorry to be in the minority; but he 
could not agree to the system of a compulsory world 
arbitration treaty. Germany had since 1899 made 
satisfactory application of the optional arbitration 
which had been established at that date, and had al- 
ready concluded two treaties of this character. She 
would continue in the future to adhere to this **in- 
dividual system," that is to say, to conclude only such 
arbitration treaties as she desired. But Germany would 
not be coerced into concluding such treaties with all 
the nations of the world. Such compulsion would 
have an irritating rather than a calming effect upon 
the world-situation. One must not always be snatch- 
ing at moral effects and momentary successes; it be- 
hoved one to seek rather after practical results, etc., 
etc. Equally emphatic was Privy Councillor Kriege, 
when he declared before the Commission of Exam- 
ination on August 6th, 1907: Germany could accept 
none of the proposals put forward for making ad- 
justment of disputes by arbitration universally com- 
pulsory. Just as for a hundred years past in Ger- 
man internal politics, it was repeatedly asserted by 
the German delegates at The Hague in 1899 and 1907 
that the question was not yet ripe; they must not be 
precipitate; experience must first be collected; too 
hasty action might effect the exact opposite of what 
was intended, etc. In the eyes of dynasties, nations 
are never sufficiently mature to decide their own 
destinies. 



PRINCIPLES OF GERMAN POLICY 141 

Owing to this attitude of the German delegates, the 
second Hague Conference could make but little altera- 
tion in the resolutions of the first. In fact, it only 
supplemented them in respect of a few minor points 
(for instance, the institution of a legal procedure). 

It is noteworthy that even the representative of an 
Asiatic despotism like Persia declared that the advan- 
tages of a world arbitration treaty were so great, and 
the guarantees it offered to the whole world so con- 
siderable, that it was the duty of the Conference to 
remove the comparatively insignificant obstacles. 

All in vain! 

When the final vote was given on this proposal, 
thirty-two States were in its favour, nine against it, 
and three (among them Italy) refrained from voting. 
Those against the proposal were Germany, Austria- 
Hungary, Turkey (upon principle), Rumania (out of 
friendship for Germany), Bulgaria, Greece, Monte- 
negro (because they were at that time already pre- 
paring their war of liberation against Turkey), and 
finally (for purely formal reasons) Switzerland and 
Belgium. Seeing that such Conferences do not act 
like Parliaments, that is to say, the majority does not 
impose its will upon the minority, but can only pass 
a resolution upon the basis of unanimity, "the great 
central problem of the whole Conference" (as Pro- 
fessor Zorn himself styled compulsory arbitration) 
was again left unsolved. 

The aim of the German dynasty, therefore, was 
here, as everywhere else in their foreign policy, to dis- 
credit the whole principle of international law. The 
same mentality that approves annexation against the 
will of the annexed, and, in foreign policy, system- 



142 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 

atically ignores the popular will, was also bent, in a 
diplomatic discussion of this principle of international 
law, on securing its absolute rejection. 

Touching the result of this second Hague Confer- 
ence, Professor O. Nippold very clearly states:^ *'It 
appears to me that the German Imperial Government 
should, from a diplomatic point of view, have ar- 
rived at an entirely opposite conclusion. . . . For the 
impression which 'the irreconcilable opposition' of the 
German Delegation was bound to make upon the other 
States was a factor impossible to underestimate. 
... It is clear, at any rate, that the German Delega- 
tion, In the case in question, was opposed by general 
opinion at The Hague, and that it did not allow itself 
to be influenced by this fact in the slightest degree. 
The delegates of the other civilised States left The 
Hague under this Impression. Will not this fact make 
itself felt politically?" And again, p. 217: 'Twist 
and turn the objections to the Arbitration Court how 
you will, they were in any case not of such importance 
as to justify a nation in so seriously compromising Its 
whole international and political situation for their 
sake." 

It had been already sufficiently compromised by the 
first Hague Conference! Professor Nippold might 
have added. For the political isolation of Germany 
had been accomplished at the first Hague Conference. 
Instead of using the second Conference to recover lost 
ground our Government completed the "work of en- 
circlement" of King Edward VII. : the Franco-Russo- 
English Entente now became an open offensive and 
defensive alliance against Germany. Germany was 

*"Die Zweite Haager Konferenz," Leipzig, 1908, pp. 213-14. 



PRINCIPLES OF GERMAN POLICY 143 

now surrounded by a world of "silent foes," less 
animated by a desire for Germany's military humilia- 
tion than by a common desire to get rid, once and 
for all, of that era of useless and yet so expensive 
competitive armament, which since Bismarck's day 
had descended upon Europe and stifled all healthy 
progress. 

Why all Attempts at Understanding were 
WITHOUT Result 

It must be confessed that the Chauvinists and war 
parties in France, England, and Russia took full ad- 
vantage of the new situation of affairs created by 
the attitude of the German dynasty, and that, owing 
to their machinations, the warlike mood in those coun- 
tries became intensified as much as in Germany itself. 
Germany has not the monopoly of warHke feelings. 
It is true that no modern State can boast of a Moltke, 
who regarded war as part of the divine ordinance of 
the universe, and scoffed at the idea of perpetual peace 
as a dream, "and not even a beautiful dream." It is 
true that no other country possesses "thinkers" who, 
like Hegel, Treitschke, Mommsen, Lasson, Schiemann, 
Liman, Lamprecht, Bernhardi, Harden, etc., etc., 
preach war as being the supreme aim of policy; and 
still less do other countries possess celebrities who, 
like Clausewitz, Hartmann, Bronsart von Schellen- 
dorf, von der Goltz, Hindenburg and others, declare 
a brutal mode of warfare to be the most humane, be- 
cause it is, so they say, the shortest. But, even if 
other countries in their intellectual glorification of war 
are far behind the country of Kant and Goethe, yet 
in them also there were and are a great number who, 



144 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 

for one reason or another, have an interest in war. 
France, England, and Russia have, Hke Germany, a 
"national Press" which, as has been proved, stands at 
the service of the manufacturers of war materials and 
methodically moulds popular opinion in favour of war. 
They have a war budget, great industries working for 
war, influential officials, traders, and financiers, whose 
greed of gain increases with the increasing desire for 
war. In short, they also possess the same methods, 
developments, and influences, which, in the case of all 
Great Powers, foster those phenomena and activities 
that we collectively style Chauvinism, Nationalism, 
and so forth. 

It would have been in some degree unnatural if 
these people and this Press, now that the German 
dynasty had for the second time flatly refused to agree 
to an international legal organisation for safeguard- 
ing the peace, had not been more clamorous than ever ; 
but, as regards the assertions of the German Govern- 
ment that the Triple Entente was a cynical land-par- 
titioning syndicate, that the cause of the war was envy 
of Germany's increased prosperity, and so forth, it 
ought in fairness to be mentioned that the forces 
working for war in France, England, and Russia 
were dwindling forces, and were not supported by 
public opinion, and, further, that in no case did they 
possess any demonstrable and effectual share of po- 
litical power. 

France, in particular, studiously endeavoured to 
give Germany no cause for mistrusting her or her 
policy. In 1905 she dismissed her Minister Delcasse, 
because the formation of the Triple Entente seemed 
to have made him arrogant and eager for war. In 



PRINCIPLES OF GERMAN POLICY 145 

the same way she not only most readily agreed to 
all the German proposals in the Morocco affair, but 
repeatedly made others of her own, as, for instance, 
in July, 191 1, when Germany, by the dispatch of the 
Panther, insisted on her claims in Morocco. There is, 
indeed, in the whole of Germany scarcely a single 
serious politician who sincerely attempted to assert 
and prove that the policy of France had during the 
past ten years been defiant and warlike. Even our 
Government has never gone so far as to contend that 
France was to blame for the outbreak of this war. 

Germany much more regards England as responsible 
for the establishment of the Triple Entente and the 
outbreak of the World War. But it is easy to show 
that in England also the elements favourable to war 
nowhere exercised any appreciable influence upon pub- 
lic opinion or even upon the Government. Allowing 
it to be true that the Triple Entente was due to 
England, it is equally true that England only regarded 
this entente as a defensive alliance. England's en- 
deavours to arrive at an understanding with Germany 
as regards naval armament have in the last ten years 
been so numerous, so energetic, and so conciliatory, 
that their genuineness cannot be impugned, and one 
can only wonder how responsible German politicians 
can absolutely ignore them. On the occasion of the 
World-Peace Congress in London (1908), Lloyd 
George made an enthusiastic speech in favour of an 
Anglo-German understanding, as did also the Prime 
Minister Asquith, at the Lord Mayor's banquet in 
London of the same year. Even more clear in its 
intention was Asquith's speech in the House of Com- 
mons on March i6th, 1909, which found an echo in 



146 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 

the Reichstag, but was dismissed by our Imperial 
Chancellor with the remark that he anticipated no 
tangible results from negotiations touching the limita- 
tion of naval construction.^ McKenna, First Lord of 
the Admiralty, stated in the House of Commons in 
July, 1909, that England in the past three years could 
show not only words but deeds towards promoting 
an Anglo-German understanding. 

England's unceasing endeavours to bring about an 
understanding with Germany were openly acknowl- 
edged in a sitting of the Reichstag on December loth, 
19 10, by Herr von Bethmann Hollweg, who said: 
"Regarding our relations with England and the al- 
leged negotiations with her, as to a contractual limita- 
tion of naval armaments, I must at once say that it 
is, certainly, piihlici juris, that the British Government 
has repeatedly expressed the wish to enter into a treaty 
to this end. The English Government made a like 
suggestion at The Hague, and has since then repeatedly 
renewed it, without, however, formulating any definite 
proposals which could form a basis for acceptance or 
rejection." It is thoroughly characteristic that this 
text of the Imperial Chancellor's speech was "modi- 
fied" by Wolff's Bureau by substituting the words: 
"fixing of the naval strength" for "limitation of arma- 
ments."^ 

*In July, 1906, England had reduced her Naval Estimates by 
25 per cent, for battleships, by 60 per cent, for destroyers, and 
by 2Z per cent, for submarines, and this voluntarily; and, more- 
over, expressly declared that she took this step in order, before 
the meeting of the next Hague Conference, to show the world 
that she was prepared to take the lead in disarmament, in the 
hope that other nations would follow suit. 

^Cf. Bertha von Suttner, "Der Kampf um Vermeidung des 
Weltkrieges," vol. 2, p. 295 (Orell Fuszli, Zurich, 1917.) 



PRINCIPLES OF GERMAN POLICY 147 

The more the English Ministers tried to press our 
Government for a public discussion of the problem, 
the cooler the reception they found at the hands of the 
German Government and the more were they mocked 
at by our Pan-German Press. In reply to a further 
request on the part of Sir Edward Grey, Herr von 
Bethmann Hollweg clearly stated in a sitting of the 
Reichstag on March 30th, 191 1, that the question 
of disarmament was insoluble "as long as men re- 
mained men and States remained States." That reads 
almost Irke a sneer at the repeated English proposals 
for an understanding. But England's Liberal Min- 
isters refused to be discouraged; and at the begin- 
ning of February, 19 12, dispatched their Minister of 
War — Haldane — on a private mission to Berlin, in 
order, in a private audience, to consult with the Em- 
peror and Chancellor as to the possibilities of an under- 
standing. We are aware to-day, from the Chancel- 
lor's speech of August 19th, 1915, that our Govern- 
ment then suggested to England that she should, in 
the event of a Continental war, in any case, remain 
neutral ; in other words, separate from the Triple En- 
tente. England offered to give Germany the formal 
assurance that she would not attack her, but Germany 
demanded, in addition, the assurance of English neu- 
trality in any event. Without acting the traitor to her 
allies, England could not agree to these terms. 

England made yet more advances. The new Eord 
of the Admiralty, Winston Churchill, stated in the 
House of Commons, on March i8th, 191 2, that Eng- 
land was prepared to repeat the experiment of the vol- 
untary reduction of the fleet, as in 1906; if Germany 
ceased adding to her armaments or even reduced them. 



148 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 

England would, in any case, do the same, "which 
would be a blessing for both countries/' 

And, finally, Churchill, on March 26th, 191 3, pro- 
posed to Germany a naval holiday of a year to begin 
with, during which time both countries should engage 
not to build any new ships of war. 

All to no purpose. The English Ministers were 
secretly scoffed at in Berlin. How could they pos- 
sibly, after their experiences at The Hague, seriously 
persist in clinging to the Utopian idea that Germany 
desired any other peace-guarantee save that of ever 
more formidable armaments ? The logic of our lead- 
ing junkers and Pan-Germanists absolutely annihi- 
lated the logic of the most enlightened minds in Eng- 
land: if England built ships, the Reventlows, Rohr- 
bachs and Chamberlains and their followers exclaimed, 
Beware ! The English are preparing for war I Why ? 
It is clear that they intend to attack us. We are lost 
if we do not also prepare. But if England built no 
ships and voluntarily reduced her naval estimates, 
if the Czar proposed a Peace Conference, and the 
English Admiralty a naval holiday, if France reduced 
her period of military service? Then, the same gen- 
tlemen vociferated yet more noisily: Beware! We 
are going to be tricked ! These English, French, and 
Russians are so cunning, that they will speak of peace 
to our face and continue to make preparations for war 
behind our back. They want to give the stupid honest 
German another box on the ear. We are done for, if 
we do not meet these deceitful tricks by a further 
increase of armaments ! 

If, finally, the responsible leaders of the Entente 
gave way in despair before this marvellous logic, which 



PRINCIPLES OF GERMAN POLICY 149 

was constantly and vigorously re-echoed in the Em- 
peror's speeches, and if, consequently, the Belgian Min- 
isters at Petrograd, London, and Paris had to report^ 
a certain nervousness and warlike mood, who was 
really to blame? Who did actually "encircle" us? 
The diplomacy of the Triple Entente, which offered 
"us" not only one but a hundred opportunities of put- 
ting things on a different footing? Or was it not 
rather our dynasty, which, conscious of its military 
might, in reliance upon its old German God, obstinately 
stuck to its mediaeval principles, and regarded peace 

^ It may be mentioned in this connection that the Belgian docu- 
ments found in Brussels, and since published by Mittler & Sohn, 
of Berlin, do, as a fact, afford much incriminating evidence 
touching the policy pursued by the Triple Entente. The majority 
of writers who wish to exculpate Germany of any guilt in this 
war studiously avoid reference to The Hague Conference and 
to the account given by the American Ambassador, Mr. Andrew 
White, and only talk of the Belgian papers and documents, about 
which they write whole reams. But it is evident that the Ger- 
man Government did not publish all the documents found in 
Brussels. Both dates and numbering show that a careful selec- 
tion was made. Moreover, it is here, as in most diplomatic 
reports, a question only of a survey of transitory moods with- 
out reference to their causes. Diplomatists are not his- 
torians. Otherwise, they would in the case before us have 
had to point out that the nervous feelings and tendencies in 
Paris, London, and Petrograd were but the logical outcome of 
the German Governm.ent's attitude at The Hague Conference. 
The preliminary history of the war in the narrower sense 
begins with July 23rd, 1914, but the preliminary history of the 
war in the wider, more general sense begins with August 24th, 
1898, that is to say, with the Czar's Conference proposal. 
Whoever writes on the history of the "encirclement" with- 
out referring to The Hague Conferences will describe effects 
without causes. And it is only considered in relation to this 
fact that the reports of the Belgian Ministers have any his- 
torical value. 



ISO THE COMING DEMOCRACY 

as being only the fruit of incessant preparations for 
war? 

And what authentic evidence do the German his- 
torians possess that this encirclement was part of a 
malicious plan to compass our humiliation in the field ? 
I have sought long and conscientiously for actual 
(that is to say, emanating from the Governments of 
the Triple Entente) warlike actions or threats; to 
this end I have read a host of German writing, all 
of which promised to furnish this evidence. But, 
alas! here again I had the same experience as in the 
case of the Serbian machinations, the invasions of 
Cossacks, the bombs on Nuremberg, and other crimes 
of the Triple Entente. That is to say, I found nothing 
but assertions, accompanied by citations of opinions, 
books, speeches, and manifestoes of the Chauvinists 
in France, England, and Russia, but never of respon- 
sible people occupying a position of authority. If 
books, newspapers, speeches and manifestoes of private 
people are to be taken to prove anything at all in re- 
gard to the desire for war of a Government, then this 
evidence will turn out to our overwhelming disad- 
vantage. For no country in the world possesses so 
abundant, so ponderous, so "scientifically" and system- 
atically constructed a war-literature as the Germany 
of the last forty years. As far as the Press and the 
disposition of a certain circle is concerned, we too ap- 
pear in a very unfavourable light. Only a year be- 
fore the war Professor Nippold published a little 
work,^ which contains a most alarming collection of 
Press extracts and quotations from the most respected 

*Otfried Nippold, "Der deutsche Chauvinismus,' Stuttgart, 
1913. 



PRINCIPLES OF GERMAN POLICY 151 

German politicians and newspapers, in which the neces- 
sity of a war of conquest is frankly alluded to. If 
there was a League of Patriots in Germany there was 
a Pan-German League quite ten times as strong, both 
as regards membership and influence, as well as a 
Defence League, a Naval League, an Eastern Marches 
League, a Peasants' League, and other powerful asso- 
ciations, which, protected by the official good will, 
devoted their chief energies to popularising the no- 
tion of conquest, and, since the beginning of the World 
War have clamoured with one voice for annexations. 

Truly, people who disregard a Crown Prince, a 
Bernhardi, a Pan-German League, with their enor- 
mous intellectual, financial, and moral resources, in or- 
der to heap abuse upon a Delcasse, a Lansdowne, or an 
Iswolsky, and to draw attention to the machinations 
of the French League of Patriots, give the impression 
of people who trip up in the street over a straw, while 
in their room is a beam, which they do not choose to 
see.^ 

It looked for a moment as though the German 
dynasty had at length realised that a new era had 
dawned, in which disputes between nations could be as 

* As Germans, we have no cause to uphold the policy of Mon- 
sieur Delcasse. As pacifists, however, we may perhaps recall 
the fact that on January 23rd, 1893, Delcasse said in the Cham- 
ber that France had been the first nation to approve the Czar's 
proposal for disarmament. And he added : "Differences must, 
unfortunately, always arise between great States, but I be- 
lieve (the friends of peace have long believed it!) that there 
are none that it would not be possible to settle by a spirit of 
conciliation. And in this spirit I settled the Fashoda affair." 
Has any German statesman of the last decade ever spoken in 
this way? I have sought for an instance, but I have not found 



152 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 

easily referred to a civil tribunal as disputes between 
individuals. On September 25th, 1908, French sol- 
diers forcibly arrested certain deserters from the For- 
eign Legion under the protection of the German Con- 
sul at Casablanca. This episode threatened a serious 
conflict with France. To the general satisfaction of 
Europe, this squabble was promptly settled by a de- 
cision of The Hague Tribunal (May 22nd, 1909). 

This proves that the German dynasty was, in spite 
of its unaccommodating attitude at The Hague, ready 
to adapt itself to the new principle of arbitration. 
Moreover, the peaceful adjustment of the far more 
momentous Franco-German difference in the matter of 
the Agadir warship (at the beginning of June, 191 1) 
seemed to prove that Germany's foreign policy had 
adopted something of that modern spirit which the 
whole world was so anxious to see in her. 

In the years Immediately preceding the World War 
the Reichstag had become a mere shadow of the dy- 
nastic sun. In the spring of 1912, the Minister for 
War had solemnly promised that, after passing the 
moderate Army Bill, it would for a long time not be 
asked to vote any new Bill for increasing the military 
strength. As If In mockery of his promise, hardly a 
year later, the biggest military budget in the history 
of the world was laid before It. This measure at one 
stroke raised the strength of the army by 25 per cent., 
and demanded of the German citizen that. In addition 
to existing taxation, he should furnish another 
£40,000,000. Thus, In the midst of peace, a demand 
was made upon the German people that not even van- 
quished and ruined France had asked her citizens to 
agree to, when she had to pay £200,000,000 to Ger- 



PRINCIPLES OF GERMAN POLICY 153 

many. It was manifest to persons of any penetra- 
tion that William II. on the one side and the Reichs- 
tag on the other were puppets in the hands of the 
militarists and Pan-Germanists and their preposterous 
requirements (in spite of the fact that they had only 
a fraction of the people behind them). 

After the passing of the great Defence Bill, a lead- 
ing Pan-Germanist paper declared triumphantly : "The 
demands of the Chauvinists or Super-Patriots have 
been accepted in official circles; and these demands 
have been approved by those parties that six months 
previously had more or less condemned them as ex- 
cessive. In short, people were now brought logically 
to Chauvinism, or to what was formerly implied by 
that term" (Tagliche Rundschau, May 23rd, 1913). 

This sounded like mockery and scorn of the "hesi- 
tating" Government, like open exultation that the Gov- 
ernment itself had now become "Chauvinist." Under 
the circumstances, the words spoken by William II. 
on May 14th, 1891, at Diisseldorf, evoke only a tragic 
approbation : "I only wish that the peace of Europe 
lay in my hand alone; I would, at all hazards, take 
care that it should never be broken." If by these 
words he undoubtedly wished to express that he was 
not the sole arbitrator of the destinies of Europe, he 
was now made to feel that, in reality, he no longer 
possessed any power, even in his own country, that 
he had become the captive of the military party, which 
he had himself instinctively created and supported. 

Premonitions of the Storm 

From this time on matters proceeded without a 
check. The year 19 13 was marked by the celebration 



154 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 

with great pomp and jubilation of the centenary of 
the "Wars of Liberation/* Alas! when I travelled 
through Germany in this year, I gazed at the Battle 
of the Nations monument at Leipzig, and I then 
realised clearly what Germany was and what she in- 
tended. This massive, clumsy symbol of imperialism 
confronting the world was the sequel of that Sieges- 
allee,^ in which Luther and Kant appear so diminutive 
by the side of the majestic figures of their princes 
that they have the appearance of being their hired 
underlings. The Siegesallee glorifies the past ; the 
Leipzig obelisk the German present and future. There 
is nothing in this pyramidal work that is not awk- 
ward, clumsy, huge, and overbearing. 

In vain one's eye attempted to discover in it a single 
trace of a free, noble, or even delicate line. In vain, 
amid all these heavy blocks of stone and gigantic 
figures, did one endeavour to breathe freely and to re- 
joice in the ''Liberty" it was supposed to symbolise! 
It was impossible! One is conscious of something 
threatening, unnatural, and oppressive in this monu- 
ment. When the guide described the dimensions and 
the ideas underlying these massive blocks of granite, 
I became quite depressed. I still only saw the heavy 
melancholy of this monument, which both in style and 
purpose contained a challenge to free humanity, a 
glorification of power, a mockery of free art, and a 
terrible menace for the future of Germany. The flat, 
huge block of stone that crowns the edifice took away 
my breath; I had the feeling that at any moment it 
would crash down and bury with it the last atom of 

^ Cf. p. 206. 



PRINCIPLES OF GERMAN POLICY 155 

spiritual liberty we still possess in Germany. No free- 
dom, no humanity, no distinction, no upward point- 
ing spires and pinnacles ; nothing but gigantic figures, 
guardians of the dead, corners, square stones and 
tombstones put together without grace or humanity. 
The whole thing was nothing more than a result of 
forty years of imperialism; the symbol of a sinister 
military despotism and a living testimony to the fact 
that we have now delivered over our German soul to 
the Prussian idea that force triumphs over right and 
utility over beauty. 

What did it serve that Herr von Bethmann Hollweg 
lamented in the Reichstag on May 30th, 191 3: 
"Nationalism is the bitterest foe ... of our whole 
policy, and every measure taken to hamper the work of 
this nationalism promotes the welfare of the country 
and Empire." It was too late! The open confession 
of the Imperial Chancellor that Germany was in dan- 
ger of being oppressed by nationalism is really comic 
when one considers that it was this very Chancellor 
who, according to the instructions of his imperial 
master, did all he could to deprive the Reichstag of its 
rights, though the Reichstag afforded the sole possi- 
bility of overcoming this danger. 

Nobody will deny that the German Crown Prince 
was the declared champion at the Berlin Court of a 
war of conquest. His attitude during the Morocco 
crisis of 191 1; his prohibition of Hauptmann's Peace 
drama at Breslau; his interference in the Brunswick 
question in 191 3; his contribution of a preface to the 
book, "Deutschland in Waffen" ; his talk about a "fresh 
and joyful war"; his "By heaven! if it were only 
the real thing"; his attitude in the Zabern debate in 



156 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 

the Reichstag, and his famous telegram "Immer feste 
druff"-^ to the Zabern criminals; these, and his whole 
demonstrative support of the Pan-Germanistic idea,^ 
had made him the centre of the war party at the 
Berlin Court. Harden's Zukunft, and the Leipziger 
Neuesten Nachrichten, edited by his friend, Paul 
Liman, were, owing to their warlike sentiments, re- 
garded in the whole country as mouthpieces of the 
Crown Prince. Books like "Der Kronprinz," by Paul 
Liman; *'Wenn ich der Kaiser war!" by Daniel Fry- 
mann; "Des Deutschen Relches Schicksalsstunde," by 
Frobenius; "Deutschland und der nachste Krieg," by 
Bernhardi (only to select a few of the more impor- 
tant), were, with official recommendation, scattered 
in hundreds of thousands of copies among the Ger- 
man people, and criticised, more or less openly, the 
Emperor's ^'immoderate love of peace," which they 
contrasted unfavourably with the bold and aggressive 
temper of the young Crown Prince. 

The Frankfjirter Zeitiing wrote apprehensively on 
February 12th, 1914: "It is true that the present 
Emperor's love of peace is universally recognised, but 

^ "Stick to it !" 

^For instance, the Crown Prince telegraphed his admira- 
tion to Lieut.-Col. Frobenius, author of "Des Deutschen 
Reiches Schicksalsstunde." And what is there in this book? 
Very much the same as in Bernhardi's : "Deutschland und 
der nachste Krieg." Among many other startling things, Fro- 
benius definitely warns us that 'Trance must in 1915 or 1916, 
under any circumstances, press for war with Germany," and 
therefore demands that Germany shall at once anticipate her. 
Of course, the publisher made immediate and skilful use, for 
purposes of advertisement, of the Crown Prince's recommenda- 
tion, and obtained an enormous circulation for this mischievous 
book. 



PRINCIPLES OF GERMAN POLICY 157 

who can vouch for the permanence of his present 
frame of mind, and who can vouch for his successor ?" 

With impatient cynicism the intellectual leader of 
the German war-party, General von Bernhardi, wrote : 
"Wait we dare not . . . , the situation in the world 
affords us numberless points to which we can apply 
the lever."^ And Professor Delbriick wrote in 191 3 
the equally cynical and impatient words: "Public 
opinion in Germany is to-day full of impatience and 
is despairing as to whether any ends are being really 
pursued. But one thing is certain, if such ends are 
being pursued they cannot be attained in the space of 
twenty-four hours; not only must our armaments be 
sufficient, but we must also, above all, choose the right 
moment. And, moreover, it is self-evident that this 
policy can be the more readily carried into effect if, 
as in our case, the highest authority lies in the hands 
of those who look far ahead, and do not take the whole 
world into their confidence."^ 

This means, therefore, that the whole German for- 
eign and peace policy were entirely dependent upon 
the "feelings," views, and impulses of certain human 
beings only responsible to God, and that the Frank- 
fiirter Zeitung nowhere discovered any guarantee for 
the permanence of the peaceful feelings of these in- 
dividuals. In other words, we must, in accordance 
with Bernhardi's view, "regard war as an indispen- 
sable instrument of politics and culture . . . and face 
it manfully." It means, further, as Professor Del- 
briick points out with patroitic cynicism, that, thanks 

^General v. Bernhardi, "Germany and the Next War." Ed- 
ward Arnold, London. 
' Prof. H. Delbriick, "Reglerung und Volkswille," p. i86. 



158 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 

to the supreme merit of our Constitution, the German 
people, thank God, cannot interpose a word when its 
lords and masters deliberate behind closed doors on the 
life and death, the liberty and welfare, of the German 
nation. 

I believe that if an Englishman or a Frenchman 
were to get up and assert that the main advantage of 
a national policy was that it was not determined by 
the popular will, but by the chance opinions of a God- 
appointed dynasty, he would quickly incur general 
contempt and have to retail his mediaeval sentiments 
through some obscure organ of the Press. Nothing 
of the kind in Germany. We Germans are powerless 
against barbarians posing in the robes of scientific 
professors. For, thanks to the dynasty, the Delbriicks 
hold the chief offices in our State, educate the royal 
princes, wear the highest orders, and dispense their 
imperialist poison in the leading university lecture- 
rooms of the nation. 



V 



THE GERMAN DYNASTY AND THE GERMAN 

NOTION OF CULTURE. TO WHICH IS 

ADDED A STUDY OF THE INTELLECTUAL 

ANTECEDENTS TO THE WAR 

German Philosophers, Professors and Historians 

Dynasties could not, however, despite their mili- 
tary and political power, become the embodiment of 
great States, had they not also behind them the sup- 
port of intellectual forces. In these days of national 
schools, franchise, and military service, rigid military 
discipline would by itself have given a far too despotic 
impression. Since, moreover, the gods are long since 
dead, that is to say, have been relegated to their true 
empire, heaven, a dynasty can no longer be content 
merely to point to the divine ordering of the universe. 

For these and other reasons, the dynasty requires 
a philosophical and scientific justification of its rule, 
which will prove the more effectual in proportion to 
the skill it exhibits in making the views of the mod- 
ern world serve the private ambitions of earthly gods. 

Since the days of Kant, Fichte, Schleiermacher, and 
Feuerbach, the divinity hedging round the dynasty had 
in Prusso-Germany, as elsewhere, become more and 
more a fiction, in which the people themselves had no 

159 



i6o THE COMING DEMOCRACY 

longer any faith. But in contrast to France, where the 
philosophical ideas preached by Voltaire, Diderot, and 
Rousseau were consistently converted into action, 
philosophical doctrines in Germany never passed be- 
yond the stage of mere theory. In France the restora- 
tion of the divine ordering of the world completely 
collapsed. Charles X. had to be taught, in 1830, that 
the gods intended, once and for all, to insist upon the 
first of the ten commandments. Louis Philippe, the 
successor of the last Bourbon, was no longer King by 
God's grace, but a citizen-king, "citoyen-roi." Even 
Napoleon III., although he had founded his Empire 
upon a coup d'etat and emphatically supported the 
hegemony of Rome, refrained from insisting too much 
on his divine origin. Even in the days of the most 
acute reaction (1851-1869) the spirit of Voltaire 
dominated the French intellectual world. Napoleon 
possessed the strongest army in Europe, he ruled over 
the most bigoted country in Europe, but he had no 
power over the consciences of the French Intellectuals 
of the day. That is to say, he did not control the 
national sense of right and was incapable of fettering 
the free play of science by Bonapartist laws. 

Not so in Prusso-Germany. The storms of the 
revolutions were, in our case, only storms in the heads 
of professors and students. Consequently, the nat- 
ural aspiration of all despots (to gain popularity by 
suppressing intellectual forces) was bound, in the 
country of '^pure reason" and critical methods, to give 
vent to itself in a more brutal and systematic man- 
ner than elsewhere. Even Kant, who had for a mo- 
ment forgotten himself and spoken as a Republican, 
was severely reprimanded by the King and had to 



THE GERMAN DYNASTY 161 

promise amendment. Fichte, who had only dared to 
express his Republican ideas under the French regime, 
held his peace after the Wars of Liberation. Politi- 
cal and military democrats, like Baron vom Stein, 
Wilhelm von Humboldt, Jahn, Scharnhorst, Gnei- 
senau, etc., were merely made use of to assist the King 
in recovering his power; and afterwards fell into 
disgrace. The German republicans, Schiller and Klop- 
stock, died at the right time; and so did not witness 
the intellectual ignominy which followed the ''Libera- 
tion." Goethe, who himself, a Minister, exercised dy- 
nastic power, was adroit enough to hold his peace on 
all political topics, but he ill concealed his antipathy 
to Prussia. Goethe, the two Humboldts, Jean Paul, 
Uhland, and a few others were the last heroes of the 
waning glory of classic Germanism. From this time 
forth, Metternich undertook the political and Hegel 
the intellectual leadership of Germany. 

George William Frederick Hegel is the great man 
whose merit it is to have secularised, that is to say, 
modernised, the dynastic idea. He did not attempt 
to re-establish on earth the gods that the French En- 
cyclopaedists and Kant had hurled to the ground. He 
created a new divinity, which ostensibly followed in 
the steps of the achievements of the French Revolu- 
tion and Kant's doctrines, namely. The State. Hegel's 
doctrine, that the State is a divine entity and that man 
is not an end in himself, but only a brick in the fabric 
of the State, and that the people is that portion of 
the State that does not know what it wants, became 
the root idea of that Prussianism which finally tri- 
umphed under Bismarck. In his learned and elegant 
though obscure style, Hegel supplemented to such good 



i62 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 

purpose the somewhat brutal and mediaeval principles 
of Metternich, that he was made a Prussian State 
philosopher and overwhelmed with honours. 

Hegel's philosophy has, not without reason, been 
called an intellectual force. A doctrine may be ever 
so obscure and ever so pedantic, yet, if it obtains 
official sanction, it is sure to find a host of youthful 
enthusiasts and be proclaimed in the journals, uni- 
versities, and drawing-rooms as the acme of political 
wisdom. Such was the case with Hegel's philosophy 
in Prussia. Everyone in Germany was henceforth, 
in one shape or another, compelled to acknowledge 
Hegel's principle, that the State is everything and the 
individual nothing. That is to say, all those German 
intellectuals who sympathised with the French Revolu- 
tion and regarded the individual as an end in himself, 
and political freedom as the foundation of all culture, 
were outlawed and persecuted, had to leave their 
country or renounce all their activity in the field of 
poHtical science. Heine and Borne, Herwegh and 
Freihgrath, Prutz and Pfau, and a hundred other 
German thinkers and poets fled before the Prusso- 
German reaction, and, from foreign lands, hurled their 
scorn and derision against Germany in cries of anguish 
and revolt. Uhland, the last poet in Germany to 
celebrate the democratic idea of freedom, kept silent 
until 1848. "Young Germany" never reached man's 
estate. Metternich, the merciless gaoler of the intel- 
lectual prison of three dynasties, was everywhere tri- 
umphant. He placed a muzzle upon the German in- 
telligence, such as has seldom been worn by a nation, 
and one which Bismarck found very apt to his pur- 
poses after the ill-starred Revolution of 1848. 



THE GERMAN DYNASTY 163 

We find Schopenhauer ironically remarking that a 
Government will never appoint professors who teach 
the opposite of that which forms the foundation of 
their governing authority. And he adds, with biting 
sarcasm, that our official professors of philosophy, 
such as Hegel and Schelling, do not live ''for but hy 
philosophy," and that, therefore, they cannot be re- 
garded as unprejudiced investigators of the truth. 

Schopenhauer might have added, further, that there 
exists nowhere a body of professors and scholars under 
such strict supervision as in Germany. The Prussian 
State has always possessed the indisputable monopoly 
of education. She has never tolerated free schools 
and universities, such as exist in France, Belgium, 
England, Switzerland, etc. All professorial chairs are, 
without exception, in the nomination of the State. 
German professors are State officials. In 1898, for 
instance, a so-called ^'Privat-dozenf'^ law was passed 
for Prussia, placing even these lecturers under Minis- 
terial discipline. In the same year, disciplinary pro- 
ceedings were instituted against Professor Delbriick 
(whom we have already referred to as a loyal sup- 
porter of the Emperor). In his capacity of a Prussian 
State official he had in his Preussische Jahrbiicher at- 
tacked the brutal expulsion policy directed against 
Danish subjects, and, in consequence, in March, 1899, 
received from the Disciplinary Court a reprimand and 
an order to pay a fine of £25. Prussian royal officials, 
or any who aspire to become such, are thus not en- 
titled to their independent opinions in politics (wit- 

*A Privat-dozent is an unsalaried lecturer at a German uni- 
versity, who receives only the students' fees. 



164 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 

ness the cases of Lohnlng, Willich, Arons, Michels, 
Delitzsch, Traub, Jatho, etc.). 

German professors have unhmited hberty in the ex- 
ercise of their calhng, with the exception of the hberty 
to differ from the Government. Provided that they 
regard the Prussian State as a model State, the dynasty 
as appointed by God, and the existing Constitution 
as the highest expression of civic bHss, they have even 
the hberty to rebel against the Almighty (Hackel, 
Ostwald, Eucken) or to criticise the existing economic 
order from a socialistic point of view (Schmoller, 
Sombart, etc.). Hence, among the German profes- 
sors, we find extraordinarily bold spirits — Free- 
thinkers, Freetraders, pedants of Reform, theorists of 
Socialism, sexual-reformers, and even intellectual 
anarchists; but there are among them no actual Dem- 
ocrats, Republicans, or apostles of popular liberty. In 
other countries, professors, after quitting the lecture- 
room, again become citizens and take their place, as 
such, in the political world, without regard to the 
Government. Professors who belong to the Socialist 
party and openly acknowledge the fact, are not un- 
known in England, France, Italy, Switzerland, etc. 
In Germany such a state of things is unthinkable, 
because there professors, in their private Hfe, still re- 
main Government officials. A century of intellectual 
drilling has reduced them to such a condition of ab- 
solute dependence upon the State, as bread-giver, that 
the dynasty can blindly rely upon them. They are 
never guilty of an act of lawlessness; they, in duty 
bound, combat ^'revolution,'* write huge folios in praise 
of science, and in a few years become Privy Council- 
lors and only seldom, and then as mouthpieces of the 



THE GERMAN DYNASTY 165 

Government, intermeddle with politics.^ But, as a 
general rule, they remain aloof from politics. I be- 
lieve that there is not in the whole of England and 
France a single professor who is not acquainted with 
the main principles of his country's constitution and 
who would not, at any moment, in obedience to a 
natural impulse, be prepared to break a lance for the 
inviolability of civic rights and liberties. In Germany, 
on the other hand, there are professors of world-wide 
renown {e.g. Hackel), who have not the slightest ac- 
quaintance with politics, which they regard as an oc- 
cupation unworthy of a man of learning. 

The German professors have been styled "the in- 
tellectual bodyguard of the Hohenzollerns," and in- 
deed, if they are not an ornament of free science, 
they are certainly a source of satisfaction to our Gov- 
ernment. 

In order rightly to estimate the spirit and ideals 
animating the development of German culture during 
the past century, these peculiarities must be borne in 
mind. For example, our labours in the field of his- 
tory and international law, eminently important 

^That there are laudable exceptions to this rule can be 
proved by the case of the Munich Professor, Ludwig Quidde, 
who published at the beginning of the 'nineties a pamphlet 
"Caligula" (a study of Roman Caesar madness). In this he 
characterised the person and acts of the young Roman Emperor 
in a manner that left no room for doubt as to the reason of his 
presenting the German public at this time with this study. The 
pamphlet ran through more than thirty editions and made a 
great sensation (it is to-day even more worth reading than it 
was then). Accused of Icsc majeste and asked, in cross-exam- 
ination, "Whom do you mean by Caligula?" Professor Quidde 
replied, with astonishment : "Whom do you mean, Mr. Attorney- 
General?" The proceedings had to be dropped for want of 
evidence. 



i66 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 

factors in the guidance of coming generations, have 
always been confided to the safe hands of Privy Coun- 
cillors and Excellencies. It is not surprising, there- 
fore, that the volumes on history which Hegel, Ranke, 
Sybel, Treitschke, Mommsen, Lamprecht, Delbriick, 
Schiemann, etc., have bequeathed to us always have at 
bottom the same idea, viz., that the logical significance 
of the world's history must be sought in the rise of 
the Hohenzollerns to the German Imperial dynasty. 
Although differing in scope, form, and method, the 
work of the German historians is terribly monotonous 
in its treatment of this fundamental idea. The theory 
that the old German dream of the Emperor Barbarossa 
has been finally realised, thanks to Bismarck's astute- 
ness, for the happiness of the German people, has with 
innumerable variations formed the constantly recur- 
ring theme of all the German historians since 1870. 

The French historians, such as Michelet, Taine, 
Blanc, Thiers, etc., differentiated between the interests 
of the dynasty and those of the people, and finally 
even went the length of asserting that the interests 
of a dynasty could only be promoted or the reverse 
at the expense of the people; and consequently they 
have always inspired a secret horror in our "Privy 
Councillor historians." In the eyes of the latter, his- 
tory is nothing but a collection of the martial deeds 
of a handful of men, towering above the formless 
and ineffectual mass of the people, and endowing it 
with life and significance by means of their wars. No 
doubt, these historians have achieved wonders in in- 
vestigating and elucidating ancient civilisation; the 
science of historical research has ever stood high in 
Germany. But the idea that populations exist as well 



THE GERMAN DYNASTY 167 

as dynasties, and that these populations are, after all, 
entitled to the same consideration as their God-ap- 
pointed lords, is one which, though now and again it 
dawns upon the German historians, they are forbidden 
to express in connection with Germany. In France, 
where even the dynastic power of the last Napoleon 
was unable to stifle the consciences of scholars, his- 
torians could entertain other ideals. The whole of 
Michelet's historical work is, .for instance, nothing but 
a paean of praise for the vigour of the people and 
their enthusiasm for liberty. But if a German were 
to write a history of the German nation in which he 
proved that the greater the power and glory of the 
Hohenzollern dynasty the greater the loss of the Ger- 
man nation in respect of political dignity and liberty, 
he would never become professor and Privy Council- 
lor and never be allowed to attain celebrity. Uhland 
was, in fact, the last German professor of history 
holding democratic views. And even Uhland, in spite 
of the fact that he laboured in South Germany, and 
not in Prussia, only continued in his appointment for 
three years. Then he gave up the struggle, or he 
would, like so many of his colleagues, have had to 
reflect behind prison bars that the history of the Ger- 
man people must perforce be a glorification of the 
ruling dynasty. 

In the same way that Metternich found in Hegel a 
philosopher after his own heart, so did Bismarck dis- 
cover in Treitschke an intellectual partner for the 
furtherance of his diplomacy. Treitschke was, like 
Hegel, loaded with the highest Prussian honours and 
offices and proclaimed a German national genius. His 
influence upon modern Germany was tremendous. 



i68 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 

Any one in the new German Empire who laid claim 
to education must sit at the feet of this half-deaf Ex- 
cellency. He may, without exaggeration, be styled 
the intellectual father of the present German genera- 
tion. He and his pupils (e. g. Delbriick, Lamprecht, 
Schiemann, and General von Bernhardi) furnished 
Pan-Germanism and the idea of conquest with that 
scientific constitutional basis which (say what one 
will) became the theoretical forcing-bed for the 
policy of war and armaments of the Court Camarilla, 
which now rules over Germany. 

International Law — on this Side and on That 

No less than did Bismarck as the successor of 
Metternich in the sphere of politics, Treitschke, as the 
successor of Hegel in the sphere of history and inter- 
national law, revealed himself the inveterate opponent 
of all the democratic ideas and ideals of the nineteenth 
century .*4Jl'The State is Power." This phrase is the 
essence ol Treitschke's teaching,^ and is in the sharpest 
contradiction to the idea proclaimed by the French 

*ThIs phrase is the idea underlying Treitschke's leading work, 
"Politics" (London: Constable & Co.), lectures delivered in 
Berlin (1875-1895 and 1898-99). These lectures have become 
in Germany a sort of political gospel. Treitschke's funda- 
mental idea, "The State is Power," denotes, first, the ignoring 
of all international treaties and possibilities of amicable under- 
standings, and, secondly, as a positive result, the glorification 
of war. The whole of the domestic and foreign policy of the 
German Empire has, since Bismarck's day, been dominated by 
this leading idea. Had Treitschke himself been Germany's rep- 
resentative at The Hague Conferences, he could not have ex- 
pressed this view better than did Count Munster and Marshall 
von Bieberstein. 



THE GERMAN DYNASTY 169 

Revolution: ^he State is Justice." It is true that 
Treitschke also affirms that justice is one of the main 
functions of a State, but anyone who takes the trouble 
to dip beneath the surface of his teachings immedi- 
ately perceives that the other function, namely, the 
conduct of war, is by far the more important. 

In Treitschke's writings there is not the faintest 
trace of the spirit of classical Teutonism. For in- 
stance, Wilhelm von Humboldt's doctrine that the 
main task of the modern State is the conservation of 
individual liberty was regarded in "modern" Germany 
as antiquated and *'long since superseded." Might 
and War; War and Might; this after 1870 became the 
password, which Hegel had still named "State and 
Politics," and Humboldt "Liberty and Justice." 

All the English and French philosophers of the past 
two centuries have been yearning and striving for an 
ideal Constitutional State. Justice and popular liberty 
were also the aspirations of our classical philosophers : 
Leibnitz, Kant, Lessing, Herder, Humboldt, Fichte, 
Feuerbach, and Schleiermacher all maintained this — 
each in his own way. But with Hegel began the phi- 
losophy of the State and of the striving for Power. 
In the field of politics the existence of these mutually 
opposing tendencies is shown by the fact that both 
English and French philosophers were coming to re- 
gard war more and more as a thing of the past, in the 
last resort as a terrible necessity, but always as some- 
thing immoral, from which the civilised world must 
emancipate itself.^ 

On the other hand, the German philosophers, f ollow- 

*A few exceptions, like Ruskin in England, Jules De Maistre, 
J. P. Proudhon and others, have not altered the general trend 



lyo THE COMING DEMOCRACY 

ing the example of Hegel, glorified war as a neces- 
sary means towards a continual increase of Power, 
as a source of national progress, and, in short, as a 
divine, holy, normal, and moral law governing the 
development of the human race. In his ''Politics," 
Treitschke devotes a whole chapter to the holiness of 
war, declaring it to be the "most potent force in the 
shaping of nations," and "the sole cure for decaying 
nations," and demonstrates his direct relationship with 
Hegel by adding: "And herein lies the grandeur of 
war, that the mere individual is lost sight of in face 
of the great ideal of the State." 

If Hegel be compared with Treitschke, and the lat- 
ter again with Bernhardi, we can, step by step, trace 
the increase in brutality which German ideas of culture 
have suffered under Prussian leadership. In Hegel, 
after all, the doctrine of universal citizenship of the 
Kant and Goethe period is still discernible, but we 
find in Treitschke only the narrow-minded, power-in- 
toxicated nationalist; whilst Bernhardi appears to be 
nothing better than a Red Indian, save for the fact 
that he is able — most unfortunately for us — to read 
and write, and that he has the entree at the court of 
an absolute ruler. 

The French Revolution had thrown overboard every 
idea of a dynastic State and proclaimed the sovereignty 

of intellectual progress in these countries. It is true that 
Proudhon, "the father of Anarchism/' celebrated war in two 
thick volumes and fulminated against the "jurists," Grotius, 
Vattel, Kant, etc. Yet the final result of all his researches 
is the assertion: Mankind will not tolerate war any longer! 
Moreover, Proudhon conceived of war as being entirely a "chiv- 
alrous duel." In this sense, he is in direct opposition to Clause- 
witz and his followers, who scoff at legalised warfare as weak 
and puerile. 



THE GERMAN DYNASTY 171 

of the people. It was the origin of that science which 
all, with the exception of German professors and in 
spite of the present World War, name "International 
Law." In a legal sense, International Law is the 
codification of legal principles touching the attitude 
and relations of civilised States to each other. Now 
the French Revolution had set up an entirely new 
morality in respect to these relations between State 
and State. This morality culminates in the proposi- 
tion (but tell it not to any German professor!) that 
every country has the incontestable right to administer 
its own affairs. 

It is clear at a glance that an International Law 
resting upon this basis is a negation of the former 
divine constitutional right of dynasties, as Machiavelli 
taught it, and as it has been modernised by Hegel and 
by Treitschke. 

The people had been hitherto the absolute chattels 
of their princes, and could by war, barter, treaty, or 
marriage be transferred at will from one dynastic 
house to another. Now, however, the Revolution de- 
clared the nations to be independent individuals and 
collective souls, and exhorted them to govern them- 
selves. Mirabeau proudly stated in the Constituent 
Assembly that henceforth Right was the sovereign in 
the world; no longer that right which a dynasty pos- 
sesses only so long as it is in a position to defend it 
against all comers vi et armis, but that hallowed, un- 
written Right common to every being born into the 
world which slumbers in the collective consciousness 
of every people under the sun. 

These new theories of the free right of nations 
to control their own destinies were immediately put 



172 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 

into practice hy the Revolution. When Alsace de- 
manded its incorporation with the French Republic, 
the new French Government ordered first of all a 
plebiscitum of the Alsatians. When Savoy made a like 
application it submitted to the National Convention a 
popular resolution in these words: "The Nation of 
Savoy, seeing that the deposition of Victor Amadeus 
and his heirs has been proclaimed, declares itself a 
free and sovereign nation," and, as free and sovereign, 
"it unanimously desires to be united to the French 
Republic." The National Convention replied that it 
gladly conformed with this wish, since it had been 
shown that "the free and unfettered desire of the sov- 
ereign people of Savoy, as expressed in their com- 
munal assemblies, was that they should be united to 
the French nation." The Mayor of Annecy an- 
nounced to his compatriots that they were hence- 
forth citizens of the French Republic and proudly 
added : "We are not a conquered, but a free people." 

What "International Law" imports is visible yet 
more clearly in a report that Carnot laid before the 
French Government in regard to the incorporation 
of Monaco: 

"It is the inalienable right of every nation to live 
apart from others, if it so pleases, or, for the vindica- 
tion of their common interests, to unite with others, if 
such be its desire. We French, who know no other 
sovereigns save the peoples themselves, have fraternity 
and not lordship as our system. We worship the prin- 
ciple that every nation, be the territory it occupies 
ever so small, is absolute master in its own house, 
and must, as regards its rights, be treated as equal 
with the greatest; and that nobody can justifiably 



THE GERMAN DYNASTY 173 

violate its independence, unless its own is manifestly 
imperilled."^ 

This new, clearly formulated, and eminently logical 
right of the nations to free self-government, which 
forms the basis of our present international law, was, 
it is true, frequently infringed by France herself; not- 
withstanding, it still shines, as a guiding star of Eu- 
ropean popular aspirations, above the realm of politics. 
The whole European history of the past century is 
characterised by a striving for national forms of gov- 
ernment. The nations no longer intend to be ruled 
by alien conquerors, but themselves intend to control 
their own fate. 

After nearly a hundred years of conflict, the Balkan 
States emancipate themselves from the Turkish 
domination of the last four centuries. Greece, Rou- 
mania, Bulgaria, and Serbia gain their independence, 
thanks to French and partly also to English and Rus- 
sian aid. Poland is maintaining a stout, though an 
alas ! indecisive struggle against the domination of the 
foreigner. Italy, Hungary, and Prussia throw off the 
Hapsburg yoke. The Teutonic States, after having 
in 1848 vainly striven to attain, in a peaceable way, a 
democratic empire, had, after two bloody wars, con- 
solidated their national unity. Popular liberty was the 
cry from one end of Europe to the other. But it was 
not everywhere understood in the same sense. The 
people meant by it their national and their political 
liberty. Not so the dynasties; these (mostly unin- 
vited) were astute enough, in this struggle, to pose as 
advocates and champions of the popular will, while all 

^ Cf. Gabr. Seailles, "L' Alsace-Lorraine," Paris, 1915, pp. 
15-17. 



174 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 

the time they only meant by liberty the freedom of 
their States outside their borders. For instance, the 
Prussian dynasty wages, in the name of this principle 
of nationality, three successive wars, but, at once, pro- 
ceeds to annex foreign territory, and, by its treatment 
of the annexed peoples, to trample this very principle 
of nationality under foot. 

Only France remained, to some extent, faithful to 
that idea of popular and international liberty pro- 
claimed to mankind by the Great Revolution. It is 
a feather in the cap of Napoleon III. that, despite 
the fact that he was the most powerful sovereign in 
Europe, he always respected this right of the people 
to autonomy. Before, in 1859, annexing Savoy and 
Nice, he required their inhabitants to approve, by 
vote, the treaty which, as a result of the Italo- Austrian 
War, ceded these countries to France. Modern Italy 
came into being (between 1859 and 1871), partly 
through Napoleon^s aid, only by virtue of the popular 
vote. Even if it were really the fact, as has been 
often asserted, that these plebiscites were only com- 
edies, yet the fact remains that Napoleon III. recog- 
nised the new International Law, at all events in prin- 
ciple, as a political theory, although by virtue of his 
dynastic power he was never obliged to do so. After 
the war of 1866 Napoleon III. went actually so far 
as to have a clause inserted in the Treaty of Prague 
by which Prussia pledged herself only to incorporate 
Schleswig-Holstein in the German Confederation after 
it had signified its consent to this course by popular 
vote. Prussia endorsed this pledge but with the firm 
resolve never to abide by it. For the right of nations 
to free autonomy, proclaimed by the Great Revolu- 



THE GERMAN DYNASTY 175 

tion, though opposed in Europe by Austria-Hungary, 
Russia, and Turkey, found its bitterest enemy of all 
in Prussia. 

Yet Prussia, unlike Austria and Russia, did not 
support its antagonism to international law by the 
bloody arbitrament of war, but by very edifying 
juristic and philosophical theories. Prusso-Germany 
was not and is not a State bent on bloody conquest; 
no! it is the home of jurisprudence, of progress, and 
of popular liberty! In contrast to Russia, it possesses 
a Constitution and a democratic popular assembly and 
army, and it likewise possesses a culture that hence- 
forth envelops it with the nimbus of a modern and 
progressive State! 

Prussia never makes conquests; she acts either in 
self-defence or in virtue of higher rights. Any one 
who is backed by a victorious army and is executing 
the will of Providence is entitled to claim for himself 
both a special standard of right and a special wisdom. 
An act that, in. the case of a private individual, would 
be called either thieving, swindling, or extortion be- 
comes, thanks tO' a victorious army, a praiseworthy act 
of self-preservation and higher justice. 

It was the task of Treitschke and his apostles to 
condense Bismarck's diplomacy and the invincibility 
of the Prusso-German army into a philosophical and 
legal system. Although this problem seems, at first 
glance, rather difficult, they solved it admirably. 

In contrast to the "revolutionary" right of nations 
to free autonomy, Treitschke and his school were the 
champions of "historical" right. Thus, if a country 
like Alsace, after having been for centuries a possession 
of Germany, is then snatched from it, the latter coun- 



17.6 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 

try has an historic right to the portion wrested from it. 

So much the more, when to its historic right is 
added an ethnographic one. Supposing a race, such 
as the Alsace-Lorrainers, the Swiss, the Flemings, the 
Baltese, etc., are actually of German descent, use the 
German tongue, and have German customs and habits, 
then the great community to which it thus belongs 
has a sacred right to absorb it, in the interest of the 
cultural unit, and to draw it into the great racial fam- 
ily of which it is a member. 

Again to this historic-ethnographic right may be 
added an etymological one, which will carry us a good 
step further. Nancy, for instance, is a patent mutila- 
tion of the good old Imperial city Nantzig, and Dun- 
kirk can only be derived from Diinkirchen; down to 
the present day the Bretons, in the north-west of 
France, employ an affirmative that sounds like the 
German ''J a'' ; and so forth. Whence it not only fol- 
lows that all territories and races whose language and 
local and proper names show Celtic-Germanic roots 
were, originally, German peoples and territories, but 
that Prusso-Germany has also, in the name of Ger- 
man culture, a sacred right to make them German 
once more. 

The French professor of international law says: 
Alsace is certainly German, it belonged to Germany 
for centuries, and Strassburg, in the Middle Ages, 
was a Mecca of Teutonism. Yet Germany has, on 
that account, no right to lay claim to Alsace as its 
own property. Everything depends upon the wishes 
of the Alsatians. Since, in bygone days, out of af- 
fection for our Republic, Alsace voluntarily chose to 
become a part of France, and since every people is 



THE GERMAN DYNASTY 177 

the sovereign master of its destiny, there can be here 
no other "right" than the right of the Alsatian people. 
What concern is it of Prussia that Neuenbtirg was 
once upon a time Prussian? What concern is it of 
us French that French is spoken in Geneva, and that 
we can trace thousands of French roots in the lan- 
guages of England, Spain, Italy, and even Roumania, 
if we trouble to investigate the matter? A community 
governed by the principle of nationalities does not 
build up its rights upon excavations, linguistic roots, 
popular customs, and historical events and investiga- 
tions. For such a community the sole question is: 
What does the Neuenburger want? What does the 
Genevese desire? Does he wish to be a Swiss citizen? 
His will is law and "right"; and when once he has 
clearly expressed it, all further discussion is superflu- 
ous. For us French there are no other rights save 
the universal right of all nations to their autonomy.^ 

"It is difficult" — so writes the French historian 
Ernest Lavisse^ — "to get foreigners to understand why 
France cannot forgive the loss of her provinces. The 
Germans say *it is the law of war.' In the eighteenth 
century, such a view would have caused no surprise; 
and, even now, it appears quite natural to the poli- 
ticians of the old regime. But, in the nineteenth cen- 
tury, France stands for quite another policy. Among 
the nations of the world, France is conspicuous by her 
rationalism and her sense of right and wrong. She 
maintains that a human community is not to be treated 
like a flock of sheep. She believes in the existence 
of a national soul. She has sympathised deeply with 
the sufferings of the victims of force. She wept over 

*G. Seailles, "L' Alsace-Lorraine," p. 21. 



178 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 

Athens, Warsaw, and Venice, and she gave the *op- 
pressed' something more tangible than tears. The 
Peace of Frankfort did not only leave us the humilia- 
tion of defeat; it did not merely violate our frontiers 
and bring our country Into a condition of unendurable 
Insecurity. It was when the victor robbed us of souls 
who were ours, and wished to remain so, that he 
outraged our religion. And this is at the bottom of 
the Alsace-Lorraine question. It brings two civilisa- 
tions face to face, and In our defeat we have a con- 
soling honour : that the reparation of the wrong done 
us would be a satisfaction to the most lofty sentiments 
and to the spirit of the age." 

"You appeal to the principle of nationalities, but 
you interpret It differently from the rest of Europe,'' 
wrote the French International jurist Fustel de Coul- 
anges to Mommsen. "In your view, this principle 
entitles a powerful State to forcibly annex a province, 
without other justification than the fact that this prov- 
ince is peopled by the same race as Is the annexing 
State. According to normal public opinion In Europe, 
and In the civilised world at large, the principle of 
nationalities simply forbids a province or a people to 
obey a foreign dictator against its will. I will give 
an example, by way of illustration; the principle of 
nationalities did not permit Piedmont to forcibly annex 
Milan and Venice, but it allowed Milan and Venice 
to emancipate themselves from Austria and volun- 
tarily to join themselves to Piedmont. You perceive 
the difference. Consequently this principle may well 
give Alsace a right, but It cannot give you a right 
over Alsace. It creates a right for the weak, but It 
affords no pretext for the ambitious. The principle 



THE GERMAN DYNASTY 179 

of nationalities is, by no manner of means, the old 
right of the stronger, under a new name."^ 

Treitschke and the German School of International 
Philosophers were not tardy with their reply: 

The Alsatians are German ; they have been forcibly 
wrested from the great German family. Hence, we 
Germans have not merely a mission of culture to 
execute in Alsace, but, considering that we are, ob- 
viously, the more highly organised and civilised race, 
we have to secure the peace of the world. 

"Who can plead, in the face of our duty to secure 
the world's peace, that the Alsace-Lorraine rs do not 
want to belong to us ? Confronted by the sacred neces- 
sity of these great days, the doctrine of the autonomy 
of all German races, that alluring theme of outlaw 
demagogues, will come to a miserable end. These 
lands are ours by the right of the sword and we will 
deal with them by virtue of a higher right, by the 
right of the German nation not to allow its sons for 
ever to estrange themselves from the German Em- 
pire."2 

As, then, according to the Prusso-Hegelian doctrine, 
nations themselves never know what they want, they 
must be made happy against their will. Treitschke 
solemnly declared : "We Germans, who know both 
Germany and France, know what suits the Alsatians 
far better than that miserable people knows itself. . . . 
We wish to restore to them, against their will, their 
own real self."^ 

*C/. Gabr. Seailles, "Alsace-Lorraine," Paris, 1915, p. 11. 
^ Preussische Jahrbiicher, Juli, 1870. H. v. Treitschke : "Was 
fordern wir von Frankreich?" 

* Ibidem. 



i8o THE COMING DEMOCRACY 

"By the right of the sword!" *That miserable 
people!" "Against their will!" Here we find our- 
selves in the midst of the neo-German notion of con- 
stitutional law and culture. Hegel's fundamental idea 
of the stupidity of the people is brilliantly demon- 
strated to us by Treitschke with reference to those 
"miserable" Alsace-Lorrainers. It is apparent, at the 
first glance, that this "modern" German conception of 
constitutional and international law is not only very 
convenient for the dynastic will to power, but is really 
nothing else than a learned term for it. The funda- 
mental difference in the legal conceptions of the two 
hostile nations is now rendered apparent, and also the 
reason why this antagonism, which has troubled Eu- 
rope for forty years past, could never be adjusted. 

The whole history of France and Italy during the 
last century is entirely animated by the new religion 
of popular rights. England accorded to all its colonies 
having a white population (even to the Boer Republic 
it had vanquished) free autonomy; that the Irish have 
no Home Rule is not England's fault, but the fault of 
the religious differences obtaining in Ireland itself.^ 

^ It is a proof either of ignorance or of deliberate calumny 
that, since the beginning of the World War, it has frequently 
been asserted in Germany that England treated the Irish no 
better than Prussia has treated the Poles, the inhabitants of 
Alsace-Lorraine, and the Danes. During the last decade Eng- 
land has given generous proof of her respect for the right 
of the Irish to control their own destinies. In 1898 Ireland 
received from the English Government the so-called "Local Gov- 
ernment Act," in 1899 a special department for agricultural and 
technical instruction, in 1903 the Wyndham "Land Purchase 
Act" (the direct antithesis of Prussia's Polish Eviction Acts), 
in 1908 a national university (just imagine a Polish university 
at Posen or a French university at Strassburg), and finally, 
in 191 1, the possibility of political self-government (Home 



THE GERMAN DYNASTY 181 

Even Russia granted the Finns and Baltese a kind of 
self-government, such as German Poland and Alsace- 
Lorraine have never known. Russia was even a 
pioneer in this new international law and helped the 
Bulgarians and Roumanians to their national inde- 
pendence. 

But in Prusso-Germany there was nothing but a 
policy of '^Blood and Iron in the hands of potentates 
and princes."^ Not even theoretically might the new 

Rule). What, in spite of this, caused that disaffection in Ire- 
land which, in Easter week of 1916, found expression in armed 
and open revolt? Because a quarter of Ireland (the province 
of Ulster) declared that they would rather die than submit 
to such a Home Rule Act, and thereupon raised up the vol- 
untary army and the revolutionary movement of 1912-13. Be- 
cause a small but very active group of propagandists (the 
Gaelic League) demanded complete separation from England, 
and the revival and forcible introduction of the long-dead 
Gaelic language, and because (O temporal O mores! Herr 
v. Billow) the English Government, until Easter week, 1916, 
not only did nothing to cope with this movement but even 
indirectly encouraged it (by financial contributions towards the 
teaching of the Gaelic language in Irish schools, by tolerating 
the more than revolutionary propaganda of the Gaelic League, 
by not opposing the formation of a voluntary army in Ulster, 
designed to resist the Home Rule measure proposed by the 
Government, etc., etc.). England's policy toward Ireland is thus 
the direct opposite of the policy of Prussia towards the Poles, 
the Danes, and the inhabitants of Alsace-Lorraine. The treat- 
ment of Ireland by the English Government may not always 
have been above reproach, but the chief offenders were in this 
case the Irish politicians, the Gaelic League, and the fomenters 
of religious hate. 

^The proclamation of the Allied Emperors (November sth, 
1916) touching Poland's autonomy is a striking instance of this. 
The new "independent State with an hereditary Monarchy 
and a Constitution" does not arise by reason of any suffrage 
or parliamentary deliberation. It is solely the will of two 
God-ordained dynasties, by right of the sword and as the tool 
of dynastic interests. The term autonomy is here but the mod- 



i82 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 

doctrine of international law raise its head among us. 
It is remarkable that even our German Social Dem- 
ocrats (with a few exceptions) ignored it.^ 

ernised phrase for annexation. For this is what it actually 
means. If it be realised that this proclamation of an inde- 
pendent Poland is only a pretext for the raising of a Polish 
army, then, viewed from a democratic standpoint, it can only 
be regarded as a sheer mockery of the international law of 
modern times. A similar mockery is contained in the very 
style of the proclamation : in order to show plainly that the 
population have no voice in the matter of the creation of 
States, William II. here again, as is his wont, confronted the 
German Reichstag and Poland with a fait accompli. By a 
Cabinet order he adjourned the Reichstag on November 4th, 
and then, on the 5th, without giving an opportunity for any 
discussion on the matter, proclaimed the creation of a new 
kingdom and simultaneously announced that the Prussian Poles 
would still remain Prussians, and that there was no thought of 
a change in Prussia's brutal Polish policy. Truly, the Middle 
Ages and Prussia in all their glory ! 

^When, a year after the outbreak of the World War, I 
translated a book by Gustav Herve, in which he advocated 
for the better assurance of world-peace, the autonomy of 
Alsace-Lorraine and thereby a Franco-German understanding, 
this proposal was rejected with scorn in Germany at large, 
and by the Socialists in particular. The work of the former 
Revolutionist, Paul Lensch, ''Die Sozial Demokratie, ihr Ende 
und ihr Gluck," openly scoffs at the idea of the right of na- 
tions to autonomy. German Social Democracy was, theoret- 
ically, the champion of the autonomy of nations. But it re- 
garded this, according to schedule, as "civic ideology," and 
only awaited its realisation as a result of the great anti- 
capitalist revolution, without which no social amelioration was 
thinkable. Social democracy regarded the eight-hour day 
movement as more important than all the "petty" ideals of 
the revolutions of 1789 and 1848 taken together. Marx alone 
is a praiseworthy exception to this narrow-minded party pro- 
gramme. Writing from London in 1870, in the name of true 
internationalism, he protested against the annexation of Alsace- 
Lorraine, and with extraordinary perspicacity foretold the pres- 
ent war. 



THE GERMAN DYNASTY 183 

How little the Franco-English notion of interna- 
tional law was known, as a theory, in Prusso-Germany 
is apparent from the correspondence which David 
Friedr. Strauss had with Renan, and Mommsen with 
Fustel de Coulanges. The French savants might ex- 
plain to their German colleagues a thousand times 
over that it was not their grief at the military down- 
fall of France which led them to protest against the 
annexation of Alsace-Lorraine, but the fact that, in 
the nineteenth century, no territory ought to be an- 
nexed unless the population declared themselves in 
favour of the change. All to no purpose. The Ger- 
man philosophers either regarded this only as a fur- 
ther proof of their claim, that the stronger is always 
in the right, and that the French standpoint was only 
the hypocrisy of the weaker, appealing in the name of 
international law only so long as he felt himself im- 
potent to try fresh conclusions on the battlefield. Or 
else, if they felt the justice of the French claim, they 
held their peace. Bebel, Liebknecht, and Jacoby were, 
in modern Germany, the sole upright men who dared 
to speak in the name of the free autonomy of nations, 
that is to say, to call the annexation of Alsace-Lor- 
raine a crime against international law. For this 
boldness they had to suffer within prison walls, and 
their fate awed all those who secretly disapproved the 
Bismarck-Treitschke modernisation of dynastic des- 
potism. 

Accordingly, an idea that in most civilised countries 
had passed into political practice remained, in Prusso- 
Germany, punishable even as a theory. And this ex- 
plains to us the fact why, during the past forty years 
in Germany, not a single voice has been raised to tell 



i84 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 

us Germans what "International Law" really means. 
At all the international pacifist and socialist con- 
gresses hitherto held, in which a mutual understanding 
between nations has been aimed at as the goal, there 
was ever an oppressive silence regarding this funda- 
mental principle of international policy. All the truly 
progressive German authors and politicians of the past 
forty years who took part in these proceedings were 
not free agents. A condemnation of the Hegel- 
Treitschke legal doctrine would be equivalent to a con- 
demnation of the Bismarck policy of conquest, i.e., a 
condemnation of the dynasty, or High Treason. 

There was, and still is, among the Germans a 
secret barrier to our flights of thought. And this is 
the dread of certain penal paragraphs in our Code. 
While we, sitting at our firesides, may, as private in- 
dividuals, entertain the same views and ideals as the 
French and English, directly we begin to speak and 
write for the public we become learned metaphysicians 
and sophists, and execute veritable egg-dances in order 
to escape the necessity of speaking the truth. French 
representatives at international congresses have often 
expressed to me their astonishment that the Germans, 
while, in private conversations, condemning the Ger- 
man point of view as being at variance with consti- 
tutional law, actually defended it in public meetings. 
As if we dared to profess any other ideas concerning 
international law save those prescribed for us by our 
Constitution and laws! 

For all these reasons, there exists in Germany down 
to the present day only a caricature of true inter- 
national law. That is, the German savants of to-day 
understand by "international law" only such rules as 



THE GERMAN DYNASTY 185 

have been mutually agreed upon, with the humane 
purpose of lessening the horrors of war, as, for in- 
stance, those embodied in the Paris Declaration con- 
cerning Maritime Warfare, in the Geneva Convention, 
or in the various Hague agreements. A German pro- 
fessor of international law who should declare in- 
ternational law to mean the unfettered right of na- 
tions to autonomy, and to therefore denounce the an- 
nexation of Alsace-Lorraine and of Bosnia, or even 
the violation of Belgium, as being crimes against the 
law of nations, would at once be arraigned on a charge 
of high treason. 

The logical thinking out of the principle of the free 
right of nations to autonomy, which was proclaimed 
by the French Revolution and has been acknowledged 
by the whole civilised world as, at least, a theory of 
international law, is a crime in Germany, because it 
inevitably leads to a condemnation of the whole 
Prusso-German policy. And, therefore, such a logical 
thinking out has never been publicly attempted in the 
Fatherland of Logic. Is it likely that a Government 
will appoint and pay professors who condemn its policy 
as contrary to the law of nations? In the same way 
that Schopenhauer's colleagues did not live for, but by 
philosophy, so Schiicking's^ colleagues live not for, but 

^ Prof. W. Schiicking is almost the sole teacher of inter- 
national law in modern Germany who has had the courage 
to take his stand upon the ground of true international law 
and has not left it even since the war began. His treatment of 
the Polish question in "Das Nationalitaten-problem" (Dresden, 
1908), his ideas on "Die Organisation der Welt" (Leipzig, 1909), 
his "Neue Ziele der Staatlichen Entwicklung" (Marburg, 1913), 
and finally, his masterly treatise, "Das Werk vom Haag" (Leip- 
zig, 1912), are all written in the spirit of democracy and the 



i86 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 

by international law. "I stick up for my master" — this 
is applicable to newspaper editors, Privy Councillors 
and Excellencies alike. 

German Racial Science and Deductions 
Therefrom 

The German constitutional and international law 
we have just described was the scientific complement 
of Bismarck's policy of conquest. And here, in the 
realm of science and philosophy, we are confronted 
by a phenomenon similar to that of the Reichstag in 
the domain of politics. In the same way that the 
latter looks modern and democratic, so also does this 
science, with its numerous foreign words, awake a 
feeling of respect and modernity. However, the 
Reichstag is really only the democratic mask of an 
autocratic regime, and, similarly, historical right and 
the philosophy of the divinity of the State are but the 
modern veneer of mediseval despotism. 

But, after the foundation of the German Empire 
there arose, side by side with this Hegel-Treitschke 
philosophy of constitutional law (which, after all, has 
historical tradition behind it), quite a new science, 
which complements it. Its reaction upon the German 
foreign policy of the past twenty years is so manifest 
that it cannot be dismissed without some notice. It 
IS, moreover, an integral part of German culture. 

This science was originally called Aryan anthro- 
pology, and on its further development was split up 
into various subsections: craniometry, Germanistics, 

true science of international law, and thus have not, unfor- 
tunately, in modern Germany, met with the appreciation they 
deserve. 



THE GERMAN DYNASTY 187 

etymology, ethnography, philology, etc., etc. Certain 
of these sciences had already been in existence, but, 
after the war of 1870-71, they were given an entirely 
new form and significance. 

The father of this completely new science was Gobi- 
neau, a Frenchman who made his mark in the 'fifties 
of last century. His work "Essai sur I'inegalite des 
Races," published in many volumes (i85!4) was prac- 
tically ignored in France, but its German translation 
was eagerly bought and became the theme of much 
discussion. This Count Gobineau did us Germans 
an inestimable service. Firstly, he established the 
contrast between the long-skulled, blue-eyed, and 
fair-haired Germans (the Aryans) and the round- 
skulled, black-eyed, and black-haired Latins, the latter 
saturated with Jewish blood; and, secondly, the 
intellectual superiority of these fair-haired Aryans 
over the decadent Latins. 

This doctrine, which this highly imaginative French- 
man, with characteristic French facility, reeled lightly 
off from his finger-tips, is the most wonderful rubbish 
of modern days, and, down to 1870, was never taken 
seriously, even in Germany; but it fitted in so well 
with the German military successes from 1864 to 
1870, that it was at once raised to the rank of a 
science. Had the German not proved in these wars 
that the Latin "races" had actually played their 
last role in the world, and that the fair-haired German 
was stronger, more moral, and more capable of higher 
culture than his Western neighbours? Yes, the war 
of 1870-71 was a glorious proof of the decline of the 
Latin races, and this Gobineau was now, in truth, not 
only a great thinker, but also a prophet. 



i88 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 

Thousands of German savants now began tO' dig up 
and measure skulls, to invent Aryan aboriginal lan- 
guages, religions, and civilisations, to determine the 
first home of this early Teutonic stock, and to formu- 
late no end of theories as to the rise and fall of races. 
Down to 1870 this ^'science" had been quietly laughed 
at and Gobineau regarded as a wag who was bam- 
boozling the poor honest Teuton for the amusement of 
serious science. Now, however, the whole thing gained 
a politico-scientific background, and, instead of being 
a wag, this Gobineau is really the inspirer of the 
present World War. 

For if , afterwards, Mommsen, Woltmann, Driesmans, 
Reimer, Bopp, Chamberlain, and a thousand other 
"Germanists" were zealous in developing this racial 
science, it was done with the secret intention of prov- 
ing that the Teuton was the highest type of man and 
consequently the only trustworthy creator of culture. 

The demonstration was brilliantly successful. The 
German savants unanimously proved that the brachy- 
cephalists {i.e., the flat-heads) were the inferior and 
the dolychocephalists (the oval-heads) the higher 
intellectual element in Europe. The former, as the 
war of 1870 showed, had finished playing their part, 
and thus the oval-heads have the divine right to 
dominate and (if they resist) to exterminate them. 
The fair-haired German is the born, God-appointed 
vehicle of European civilisation. To him alone be- 
longs the world's future. Science has proved it ! God 
has willed it ! 

Thus arose those superman and super-race theories 
to which not merely a Richard Wagner fell a victim, 
but to a certain degree even Nietzsche, with the result 



THE GERMAN DYNASTY 189 

that in foreign countries these great Germans have, 
very unjustly, been placed in the same category with 
Treitschke and Bernhardi. 

As in German politics one Armament Bill ousted its 
predecessor, so also, in this field, one scientific theory 
dispossessed the other, and the last always excelled 
the preceding one in learned mystification. Reimer, 
Driesmans, Woltmann, and Chamberlain proved to the, 
listening world not only the superiority of Teutonism in 
the present but also in the past. All the glorious 
achievements of mankind are, beyond question, those of 
the German race. Woltmann's works, "Die Germanen 
und die Renaissance in Italien" and "Die Germanen 
in Frankreich," will in future days be marvelled at as 
monuments of German learned stupidity. Every 
sentence in these books is an invitation to satire; 
if Heine were alive to-day, he would have wrung 
from us tears of laughter over this "colossal" science. 
And his sound common sense would have discovered 
in Reimer's "Ein Pan-Germanistischer Deutschland" 
and in Chamberlain's epoch-making work, "The 
Foundations of the Nineteenth Century" (in the 
circulation of which William 11. took a personal 
interest), an equally inviting target for his wit. 

We are confronted here by a development similar to 
that we have just been obliged to recognise in the case 
of the political philosophy of the State. Hegel was as 
little an Imperialist as Gobineau was a Pan-Germanist ; 
Mommsen's Racial Science can, like Treitschke's 
doctrine of Constitutional Law, still claim to be based 
upon logic and historical facts. But In the cases of 
Reventlow, Bernhardi, etc., we are face to face with 
fanatics such as Hegel would scarcely have dreamed 



190 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 

of. In the same way, Gobineau would be utterly 
indignant and astonished could he perceive what 
Reimer, Woltmann, Driesmans, and Chamberlain have 
made of his theories. After these leading spirits of 
a literally world-subverting science had proved 
that all the celebrated men of the Middle Ages 
and of recent times were of German origin (La- 
fayette ="^ typical representative of Germanism" ; 
Murillo = a palpable mutilation of the German Moerl; 
Da Vinci's forebears were called Wincke; Diderot = 
corrupted from Tieteroth; Briand = Brandt, etc., 
etc.), one can readily understand that Reimer 
arrived at the scientific conclusion that Jesus of 
Nazareth must, if he ever existed, have been a 
German ! 

Our German eggs (to the glory of German science 
laid by a Frenchman and hatched by an Englishman) 
have in contradistinction to other eggs two yolks: 
an ordinary yolk, and a special yolk created expressly 
by the Lord God for us Germans, from which all 
civilisation has been born and which gives the whole 
world a Germanic character ! 

Such scatterbrained theories were not, as one would 
expect, confined to the narrow circles of professional 
philosophers, but attained universal popularity. Their 
political deductions found, for instance, an energetic 
expression in the Pan-German League: this Pan- 
German League was not, be it marked, a political 
party, but had its influential representatives among 
almost all parties (even, it is said, among Social 
Democrats). Although the fundamental ideas of this 
pseudo-science remained entirely unknown to the 
common herd, yet in freemason, military, intellectual, 



THE GERMAN DYNASTY 191 

and exclusive circles they were warmly welcomed, and, 
like the Hegel and Treitschke doctrines, enjoyed official 
esteem and approbation. The imperialistic application 
of this racial and craniological science was popularised 
in the text-books of our schools and in the encyclo- 
paedias,^ and was the secret inspiration of German 
foreign policy. More frequently than was pleasant to 
the citizen of cosmopolitan sympathies, it was openly 
expressed in imperial speeches. 

On February 24th, 1892, William II. said in the 
Provincial Diet in Berlin : "To this is added the feeling 
of responsibility towards our All Highest Lord above 
and my irrefragable conviction that our ally of Ross- 
bach and Dennewitz will not leave me in the lurch. 
He has taken such infinite pains with our Mark and 
our House that we cannot believe that he has done 
this to no end. No; on the contrary, Branden- 
burgers, we are destined to higher things, and I shall 
lead you to more glorious days in the future." On the 
celebration of the twenty-fifth anniversary of the 
foundation of the German Empire (January i8th, 
1896), as also in the famous imperial speech of June 
19th, 1902, at Aix-la-Chapelle, there is also a Pan-Ger- 

* For example, Meyer's "Konversations-Lexikon" contains a 
graphic map of the distribution of the Germans in Central 
Europe, which includes the whole of Belgium and Holland (thus 
regarding both countries as legally appertaining to Germany). 
Another chart illustrating German dialects denotes the vulgar 
tongue as spoken from Antwerp to Dunkirk and from Liege 
to Brussels as "low-Frankish/' while the language spoken in 
Holland is partly "Frisian" and partly "Westphalian." That is 
to say there is not, in fact, a Dutch nation or a Dutch language ; 
when Verhaeren and Maeterlinck wrote in French, they were in 
error, because scientific investigations have established that Bel- 
gium does not speak French, but Lower-Frankish ! 



192 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 

manistic undercurrent perceptible, appealing, m the one 
case, more to the commercial, in the other to the moral 
and religious superiority of Teutonism, yet on both oc- 
casions every idea of a war of conquest was relegated 
to the Greek Calends; and stress was laid upon the 
necessity for peace. Again, in his speech to the Berlin 
Academy of Arts (December i8th, 1901), he says: 
"For us Germans great ideals have become permanent 
blessings, whereas other nations have more or less lost 
them. There only remains the German nation, which 
has been called upon to guard, foster, and perpetuate 
these grand ideals.'* But, in the notorious Bremen 
speech (March 22nd, 1905), the Woltmann-Chamber- 
lain theories are very evident : ". . . to abandon our- 
selves to the firm conviction that our Lord God would 
never have given Himself so much trouble about our 
German Fatherland and its people, had He not destined 
us for higher things. We are the salt of the earth, 
but we must be worthy of being so." The famous 
toast on the 105th anniversary of the birth of Moltke 
(October 26th, 1905) at Berlin was less inspired by the 
Pan-Germanic theories than by the resulting imperial- 
istic conception of war. "My second glass is drained to 
both the future and the present. You have seen, gen- 
tlemen, how it stands with us in the world. Therefore, 
powder dry; sword sharpened, the aim in view; our 
energies at tension, and down with pessimists!" On 
August 31st, 1907, he again said at Miinster: "Then 
our German nation will become a block of granite, upon 
which our Lord God can erect and complete His civilis- 
ing work in the world. Then the words of the poet 
will be realised, who wrote : *Teutonism will one day 



THE GERMAN DYNASTY 193 

prove the salvation of the world.' "^ Few comments 
are necessary. It is, besides, known how much William 
11. interested himself in the investigations of Aryan 
anthropology. The racial scientist, Houston Stewart 
Chamberlain, who is of English birth, was his favour- 
ite author. '*I particularly advise you to read what 
Chamberlain has so admirably said in the preface to 
his 'Foundations of the Nineteenth Century* on this 
point," said William II. to the masters and first form 
of the Friedrich Public School at Cassel on August 
29th, 191 1. In the fourth chapter of this book I have 
already shown how such lines of thought were turned 
to practical use by German foreign poHcy. In particu- 
lar, the attitude of our dynasty at The Hague Confer- 
ences is a clear proof that the German foreign policy 
was not only permeated by the tacit presumption of 
Germanic superiority, but also by the fact that by 
"superiority" nothing else was meant than the brute 
force of the stronger. 



*"An deutschem Wesen wird einmal noch die Welt genesen." 
Geibel had written this verse cited by the Emperor as early as 
1861. But Geibel was, like his colleague, Hoffmann von Fallers- 
leben (the author of "Deutschland iiber Alles"), by no manner 
of means a Pan-Germanist, but a democratic patriot, who ex- 
pected the regeneration of the world from the union of German 
races and the resulting political liberty of the German people. 
It is strange that the song "Deutschland iiber Alles" was first 
sung in Hamburg, on the occasion of a manifestation in favour 
of the liberty of the Press. Now, however, since the unity of 
the German races has been effected in a manner so utterly dif- 
ferent from that which our democratic national poets ever imag- 
ined, their words have been given another, namely, an imperialis- 
tic meaning. 



il94 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 

Concerning the Freedom of German Culture 

It may possibly be suggested here that I am confus- 
ing cause with effect, and it will certainly be suggested 
that every nation has the culture that it deserves. Is 
the dynasty really to blame for the fact that, during the 
last hundred years, we have developed a constitutional, 
a military, and a racial science, that has earned us 
the hatred of the whole world? Was it not rather 
the theories and researches of Hegel, Treitschke, 
Chamberlain, and Bernhardi that exercised a decisive 
influence on the attitude of the dynasty? And, if 
Germany failed to produce any effective antidote to 
these teachings, is not this a proof that the German 
people were at fault ? How came it that the teachings 
of Hegel, Treitschke, Gobineau, and Chamberlain won 
such an enormous following? How was it that 
Schopenhauer — a far more distinguished thinker — 
did not become a "spiritual force" in Germany, 
instead of Hegel? And so forth. 

We do not put these questions, and we dO' not fall 
back on the popular assertion that every nation 
possesses what it deserves. Perhaps at some future 
time, when we have nothing better to do, we may 
argue the question whether man is a product of his 
environment, or whether the environment is a product 
of man, or whether mediaeval scholasticism was dic- 
tated by the Papacy, or whether the power of the Pa- 
pacy was the fruit of a scholasticism. But we have lit- 
tle desire to argue the question whether the nature and 
direction of German culture in the nineteenth century 
was dictated by the dynasty, or whether the dynasty 
was a fruit of German culture, because the matter is so 



THE GERMAN DYNASTY 195 

perfectly clear. Just as It is obvious that neither 
Germany's gigantic armaments nor her aggressive 
foreign policy are the products of the will of the Ger- 
man nation, so also the German culture of Treitschke, 
Chamberlain, Bernhardi, and their school, with its 
glorification of war and conquest, is not a result of the 
national spirit of Germany, but a result of the thirst 
for power of the dynasty. It is this thirst for power of 
the dynasty, and not any national ideal, which has been 
the animating and directing force behind all the German 
intellectuals since Kant, Goethe, and Humboldt. It 
has been the German dynasty which, for the last hun- 
dred years, for the safeguarding of its existence, has 
brutally and systematically stifled all free expression 
of opinion, all sound criticism, all democratic senti- 
ments and aspirations. It has been the German dy- 
nasty which has always stood, watchful and suspicious, 
behind its professors. Over the most distiguished 
professors no less than the most insignificant school- 
teachers it has exercised relentless control. 

As Germans, we can only reflect with secret melan- 
choly upon the fact that since the age of Goethe the 
dynasty has lain like a gravestone over the intelligence 
and the aspiration for freedom of Germany. Every 
German who since that time has felt himself to 
possess the right and the talent to come forward as 
the champion of democratic liberties has always been 
confronted with the choice either of wearing himself 
out in fruitless opposition, or of taking refuge in a 
foreign country, or of bowing to circumstances, that 
is to say, becoming tacitly or openly a panegyrist of 
the dynasty. 

In this struggle with their conscience and their 



196 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 

better self, very many talented Germans have 
succumbed. In their youth they have, for the most 
part, nourished democratic and international sympa- 
thies, but sooner or later they have given up the 
struggle and, in order not to be compelled to stifle 
their talent and their longing for recognition, they 
have decided to serve the dynasty. This dynasty, 
which, in Prusso-Germany, disposes of every dignity, 
title, and office, has exercised over the nation for the 
last hundred years an intellectual terrorism v^^hich 
scarcely weighs upon the present generation, which 
outwardly is scarcely perceptible, and which it is quite 
impossible for foreign nations to understand. 

Therefore, almost everything that has been said 
about German culture in France, England, and Italy, 
since the beginning of the war, is false; because it is 
impossible for the people of those countries to con- 
ceive that the national idea of right and of culture can 
be a dictate from above and consequently they believe 
that it emanates from the people.^ 

* When, in October, . 1914, that notorious "Appeal to the Civil- 
ised World" was published, about which we shall speak later, the 
famous French Socialist, Gustav Herve, in his indignation, cried 
to the French soldier : *'Now fire into their ranks without any 
scruple !" Questioned concerning his point of view, said Anatole 
France, Herve gave in this phrase the only possible answer. 
Since then, the conviction that the idea of culture expressed in 
the manifesto is that of the whole German people has in France 
(and to some extent also in England, Italy and the neutral 
countries) become almost a dogma, which every good patriot is 
bound to accept. In the interest of the German people and of 
the coming peace, this notion is all the more to be regretted, 
in that it will be extraordinarily difficult to demonstrate to those 
who are at present our enemies how the case really stands. For 
supposing that the German dynasty is conquered in this war and 
that Germany produces a thousand new representatives of cul- 



THE GERMAN DYNASTY 197 

Many French and English chauvinists went so far 
as to assert that it was this culture emanating from 
the German people, with its sinister dream of world- 
power, which had urged on our Government in its 
dangerous world-policy. The fact is, however, that 
we Germans for the last hundred years have not dared 
to be what we actually are and would like to show 
ourselves, namely, the descendants and the upholders 
of the classical Germanism of Leibnitz, Herder, 
Goethe, Schiller, Kant, Humboldt, Uhland, etc. — that 
is to say, eminently peaceful natures, perhaps somewhat 
heavy, but always of cosmopolitan sympathies. 

It was our dynasty that compelled us to become 
Prussianised. Even Bismarck, as is discernible on 
the first page of his "Reflections and Reminiscences," 
was, as a youth, a Republican, although he would 
never have become Bismarck had he not betimes dis- 
carded his youthful follies. Until his mature years, 
Moltke was a devotee of the old German idea of eternal 
peace, which is developed by Kant, but as soon as he 
perceived that Kant and Peace were in Prussia less 
estimated than war and conquest, he became our most 
famous strategist, and glorified war (by which he 
gained £45,000 and recognition as a national hero) as 

ture, who unanimously condemn the present regime and uphold 
democracy and internationalism, then it is to be feared that they 
will be received in France (and elsewhere) much in the same 
way that in their time Renan, Fustel de Coulanges, and other 
distinguished Frenchmen were received by the German intellec- 
tuals. That is to say, they will be told that their sudden dem- 
ocratic and international sympathy is merely the hypocrisy of 
the vanquished, and so forth. For decades the German intellec- 
tuals will have lost their credit in the world. This is a tragedy, 
the full bitterness of which will only be tasted by our children 
and our children's children. 



198 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 

the spring of healing for nations and an element in the 
divine order of the world. Treitschke was feted in 
Paris in 1864 by the Republicans there as a spirited 
opponent of Prussian despotism; but when he saw 
that the future belonged to Prussian despotism, he 
altered his course, and became our most uncompromis- 
ing philosopher of War and the State, receiving as his 
reward the coveted title of Prussian "Wirklicher 
Geheimrath" (Privy Councillor).^ The same hap- 
pened in the case of Sybel, the historian, in his 
younger years a great opponent of Bismarck, and 
who' later became one of the most reliable of 
"Geheimrathe." Likewise, the author Arnold Ruge, 
who in the 'forties instigated a revolution against Prus- 
sia and, later, became one of Bismarck's great ad- 
mirers. David Friedrich Strauss wrote in his youth- 
ful days a learned pamphlet against *'the Romanticists 
on the throne," and, after the war of 1870, defended 
against Renan the conquering romanticism of the 
Hohenzollerns as a divine right. Even a man like 
Ferdinand Freiligrath, the spirited champion and poet 
of the Revolution of 1848, received unexpectedly, the 
protection of Bismarck, and in 1870 made mock of 
his whole past career by pouring out verses lauding 
the glorious German victories. 

So it went on and sO' it still goes on in Prusso- 
Germany to-day. When the philosopher Kant had a 
severe snub administered him by the King of Prussia 
for his revolutionary writings; when the antiquarian 

*A title not really translatable into English. It carries the 
further appellation of "Excellency," perhaps equivalent to "Sir," 
the Knight's title. The author sets these titles out at length, 
post. [Translator.] 



THE GERMAN DYNASTY 199 

Delitzsch was sternly reproved by William II. (Letter 
to Admiral von Hollmann, February 15th, 1903) 
because he had permitted himself to publish the 
results of his Babylonian investigations in the sense 
demanded by true science; or v^hen charges of Use 
majeste have been based on pure suppositions, pastors 
like Traub and Jatho deprived of their offices for a 
liberal phrase, trivial comedy-writers like Blumenthal 
honoured, and genuine poets like Hauptmann severely 
reprimanded : always and everywhere the same spirit 
and the same will were predominant. Nothing manly 
and democratic could be tolerated; and, instead, the 
shallow, self-seeking, and subservient were extolled. 

Not even in Russia or China are there so many or- 
ders, titles, and official berths as we possess and there- 
fore there are in those countries fewer sycophants, 
lickspittles, and intellectual lackeys. Prusso-Germany 
is the happy hunting ground for titles, uniforms, and 
orders. From the Iron Cross, Second Class, tO' the 
Red Eagle, First Class with diamonds, it Is a long, long 
way. The badges of servility (so-called orders) at the 
disposal of our Government might well be used to 
embellish the corridors of the Reichstag, and so effec- 
tively stifle in our popular representatives any taste for 
opposition. With us, much adroitness is required in 
order not to sin against etiquette. Even the number 
of "councillors" makes a novice giddy. There are 
provincial government, engineering, juristic, account- 
ant, medical, court, ambassadorial, commercial, and 
other councillors, all of whom, in reward for the 
faithful discharge of their duty, await their advance- 
ment to "Privy" and thence to "acting Privy" 



200 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 

councillors. If the novice has contrived to understand 
all these distinctions of rank, and is then actually 
introduced into the presence of a representative of the 
realm of Excellencies, lie has, meanwhile, become very 
humble and asks himself whether on God's earth there 
can possibly be anything grander than to be "acting 
Privy Councillor of a Legation, with the prefix Excel- 
lency." But even this exalted station is surpassed by 
that of a lieutenant in the reserves; for the latter is 
admissible at Court, even more admissible than the 
nobility itself. 

"The gross extent to which the position of officer in 
the German Army is overestimated is not in the least 
realised by the people at large. Among all the varied 
ambitions which throng about the Court, it is only the 
military ambitions which are practically unrealisable. 
Herr Friedlander, for instance, might become Privy 
Councillor of Commerce {Geheimer Kommerziensrat) ; 
he might be raised to the nobility; he might even 
receive the Order of the Red Eagle, Second Class, with 
diamonds, but never will he be created lieutenant in 
the reserves. Herr Dernburg was nominated Acting 
Privy Councillor (Wirklicher Geheimrat), with the 
prefix "Excellency," without any hesitation, but he 
will have to perform wonders in his new office before 
he will achieve promotion from vice-colour-sergeant 
( Vizefeldwehel) to lieutenant in the reserves."^ 

"Prince von Biilow, whose disposition is so entirely 
unmilitary, had to become General in the Hussars, in 
order to hold his own against the toadies of the Court.''^ 

No one in Germany can boast of a full understand- 

*"Unser Kaiser und sein Volk," p. 109. 
^Ihidem, p. T07. 



THE GERMAN DYNASTY 201 

ing of these matters. Merely to acquire a knowledge 
of all the new uniforms, badges, chains, ribbons, oak- 
leaves, order-clasps, medals, titles and other decorations 
which have sprung into existence during the reign of 
William II. has become a veritable science, demanding 
special study of the most arduous nature. In the mat- 
ter of etiquette and of heraldry we have reached a per- 
fection which a Chinaman would by no means envy us. 
For the feature of it all which would arouse the laugh- 
ter of a Chinaman, namely, the fact that the wives 
proudly claim for themselves any title possessed by 
their husbands, no matter how insignificant, is a bit- 
terly serious matter in Prusso-Germany. Just as the 
German Crown Prince was indignant that the Czar 
should take precedence of his father, so every Frau 
Oberpostdirektor (i.e., wife of a manager of a District 
Post Office) will deprive you of her friendship if you 
address her merely as Frau Postdirektor (i.e., wife of 
a postmaster), and if you should address her merely 
as Frau Schulze, then her husband will challenge you 
to a duel with pistols. 

The German fondness for titles has always excited 
the merriment of the world. The great philologists 
of other nations have vainly endeavoured to find 
English, French or Russian equivalents for expressions 
like "Allerhochstdieselben," ''Unterthanigst," "Durch- 
lauchtlgst," "in Gehorsam ersterben," etc., etc. No 
other language in the world possesses like word- 
combinations. For even if the spirit of etiquette and 
caste apparent in such expressions is to be taken as 
characteristic of every monarchic community, yet this 
science exists nowhere in such servile perfection as it 
does in Germany. 



202 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 

In order to avoid any errors in passing judgment 
on the German people, we must be quite clear on the 
point that all this is not a product of genuine Teuton- 
ism, but is only the fruits of dynastic culture. The 
servility and class-distinction it has so magnificently 
nurtured, coupled with the most petty intellectual 
tutelage and the most reactionary policy any country 
has ever known, explain how it happens that all the 
really great Germans of the last century (great not 
only in talent, but in character) have either fled to 
foreign countries, or have risen to fame and have 
laboured in foreign countries, or have studiously held 
aloof from all political activity. 

Wagner laboured in Paris and In Switzerland, and 
finally, after renouncing his republican ideals, found a 
home at the Court of a small dynasty which had, at 
least with regard to art, remained liberal. Like the 
poets of the Young German school, Marx fled from 
Prussian reaction and spent the greatest part of his life 
in Paris and London. Nietzsche lived in Italy and 
Switzerland and called himself a "good Swiss." Scho- 
penhauer remained in Germany, and virulently at- 
tacked Hegel, but he had to wait fully thirty years for 
recognition, and, moreover, carefully avoided descend- 
ing from his high pedestal in order to wage that war 
against the political powers which in other countries 
was receiving the support of Victor Hugo, John Stuart 
Mill, Herbert Spencer, etc. Friedrich Albert Lange, 
one of those quiet German savants who, like Karl Vogt, 
combine knowldege with conscience, proceeded, like 
the latter, to Switzerland, from which country he 
vainly protested against the shrieks of victory set up 
by the Bismarck fanatics. 



THE GERMAN DYNASTY 203 

There is, I believe, no other State in the world that, 
like Prusso-Germany, has driven continually its best 
men into foreign lands, leaving us only broken reeds 
and strictly tutored Privy Councillors. A Tolstoi, who 
was possible in Russia, would have had to emigrate 
had he been a German. As far as Prussia itself is con- 
cerned, it has not, since Kant, produced a man of 
genius and character who would have held out in 
Prussia. A man like William von Humboldt may suc- 
ceed for a time in remaining near the throne and yet 
in energetically championing popular liberty, but he 
cannot remain there long. Even Humboldt fell into 
disgrace and had to smother his bitterness of soul in 
foreign travel; his brother, Alexander von Humboldt, 
a genius of whom Prussia may well be proud, held 
aloof from all political activity (which did not prevent 
his intervening with Frederick William IV. for a poet 
like Prutz), and so forth. 

German Culture, Then and Now 

The matadors of the divine order of things (Metter- 
nich, Hegel, Bismarck, Treitschke) ruthlessly sundered 
the threads woven from the German classic epoch 
to modern days. When, in 1859, the centenary of 
Schiller's birth was celebrated as a German national 
fete-day, the public jubilation rang out like a cry of 
yearning for the return and continuation of that 
genuine culture as embodied in Schiller and his era. 

It was too late! Schiller and his epoch were offi- 
cially outlawed. Their works still lived on, but not 
their free, German ideals. In the classical sense, 
liberty, progress, and public weal had vanished in Ger- 



204 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 

many. Within the past forty years we have managed 
to banish the free ideas and cosmopoHtanism of our 
classical school so utterly that we have been obliged to 
import cosmopolitans. Despite all official discourage- 
ment, the instinctive demand of German readers and 
theatre-goers for cosmopolitans was so strong, and 
German cosmopolitanism was so thoroughly dis- 
heartened by the German Empire, that people like 
Ibsen, Tolstoi, Gorki, Zola, Maupassant, Anatole 
France, Wilde, Bergson, Maeterlinck, Verhaeren, and 
others became our gods. 

The roles were changed. The country of poets 
and philosophers had, at the beginning of last century, 
become the intellectual teacher of the world; we 
were the fountain-source of ideas. Our philosophers 
and musicians, our poets and men of science, were 
admired and quoted in foreign lands. Madame de 
Stael drew for her countrymen an enthusiastic and 
sympathetic picture of the Germany of Weimar days, 
and all the world then spoke with the highest respect of 
our intellectual, artistic, and scientific culture. 

But now foreign countries, with astonishment and 
apprehension, interested themselves only in the "views" 
of our "racial scientists" and military authors. 
Nietzsche was the last German cosmopolitan 
that foreigners translated into their languages and 
discussed. With silent amazement our neighbours 
heard (on November loth, 1908) from the Emperor's 
lips that Count Zeppelin was the greatest German of 
the twentieth century. General Bernhardi became 
Germany's most lamentable celebrity; his books 
were translated into most civilised languages, and, 
together with other productions of our "Realpolitik," 



THE GERMAN DYNASTY 205 

were everywhere regarded as the symbols of modern 
Teutonism. A nation of philosophers and poets, 
which had now apparently become a greedy race of 
fire-eaters and warriors. In all the innumerable 
speeches William IL has made during his twenty-eight 
years' rule, names like Goethe and Schiller occur at 
most two or three times (not to mention Kant, Herder, 
and Lessing). Bombast and arrogance had taken the 
place of the Weimar peaceful liberty of thought. 
We were no longer the disciples of our classicists, but 
the devotees of Bismarck and Treitschke. Politically 
isolated by our policy of the "mailed fist," we had, 
intellectually and artistically, sunk to the level of the 
tolerated and rapacious. The cleverest of our 
so-called ''moderns" were not equal to the task of 
dimming the lustre of a Count Zeppelin or lessening 
the influence of the works of a Chamberlain, a Liman, 
or a Frymann. 

A general cloud of uneasiness brooded over the land 
of poets and philosophers. We were discontented 
with ourselves, stood in our own light, and did 
not quite know why. We had a sort of misgiving 
that we were loathed by the rest of the world, and 
a dim sense of how little we could now offer 
it compared with formerly. Of course, we were 
comforted to some degree by the reflection that we 
had become the leading merchants, men of science, 
chemists, and organisers in the world, yet, after all, 
we instinctively felt that this could not be the true 
role we had to play in the world. Everyone spoke 
sentimentally of German culture, but no one knew 
really what this implied. But, in our innermost 
hearts, we wanted this culture to be actuated by 



2o6 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 

cosmopolitan ideals. Openly, however, we scoffed 
(even in the halls of German Freemasonry) at this 
"cosmopolitanism" of our ancestors. Ridicule of 
the ideal of a thoroughly German and democratic 
period was considered good taste under a monarchical 
regime. But here, as always, we spoke without real 
conviction. We would so gladly have become what we 
really are, by virtue of our national gifts and tradition, 
but could we ever become it ? Not even in the province 
that is furthest removed from any dynastic influence, 
namely, in art, were we allowed liberty. "An art 
that disregards the laws and limits I have laid down 
is no longer an art," said William II. to the Berlin 
artists, who, under his direction, had sculptured the 
statues of the Siegesallee (December i8th, 1901). 
And he added : "This much I can tell you : the im- 
pression the Siegesallee makes upon the foreigner is 
quite overpowering ; everywhere we find an enormous 
respect for German sculpture. I trust you will main- 
tain this high reputation. ..." 

What William II. here said about the Siegesallee is 
generally applicable to German culture ; the impression 
it made upon the foreigner was overwhelming, and 
everywhere in the world it was regarded with 
the greatest respect. Yet only externally. Secretly, 
the foreigner was amazed, perturbed, and depressed at 
the sight of its uniformity and stiffness. The 
foreigner was as far as the German people itself from 
guessing that in Prusso-Germany everything is shaped 
on the same last, and that this is a dynastic last. 
Political Constitution, Siegesallee, or German culture — 
it is all one; all alike are inspired by the dynasty, 
executed according to orders, and forced upon the 



THE GERMAN DYNASTY 207 

German people as a glorification of the hereditary 
despotic house. 

But Heaven has granted the German people the 
gift of good temper ; vexed, at times, about this excess 
of military discipline, it yet secretly admired the versa- 
tility of a ruler who not only interested himself in 
soldiers and battleships, but, also, in art and artists. 

To be sure the German people failed to realise how 
matters really stood. For just as it yearned in secret 
for a really national government, army, and policy, 
without actually attaining it, so it dared not foster 
a really national culture that would have satisfied 
the true German ideal. As, in the realm of politics, 
our constitution and army were only a semblance, 
and not the reality of true German thought, so since 
Hegel our official German culture had long ceased to 
be a product of true Germanism, and had become 
merely the will-to-power of the dynasty expressed in 
scientific and artistic forms. 

This fact, realised only by a few (among them, 
Nietzsche), was revealed to us with the most unmis- 
takable clearness on the outbreak of the World War. 
When in October, 19 14, that appeal "An die Kultur- 
welt" was issued, which was signed by ninety-three 
of the leading German intellectuals, and caused so 
much amazement and excitement in the civilised world 
(even in the real though muzzled Germany), then 
this German culture threw off the mask and showed 
itself in its true form, a protective bulwark of the 
dynasty. 

There is no longer any question here of that scien- 
tific logic which in Kant's days had Its home in Ger- 
many: "It is untrue!" *Tt is untrue!" This is not 



2o8 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 

the language of logicians, scientists, and free Ger- 
mans, but of lackeys, whose views may well be dis- 
counted. 

Investigation of truth, reflection and objectivity, 
once the hall-marks of German science, are foreign 
to this modern culture. ''Often enough, during his 
reign of twenty-eight years, has William II. proved 
himself the protector of the world's peace . . . And 
only when a superior enemy long lurking at our 
frontiers fell, from three sides, on our nation did it 
arise as one man." Thus do people speak who, for 
a century past, have been drilled to express them- 
selves not in accordance with their convictions but 
in accordance with the wishes of their Government. 
Whenever the dynastic Government is assailed, all 
sense of honour and scientific evidence is for such 
persons non-existent. 

The quintessence of this appeal, the spiritual bal- 
ance, as it were, of a hundred years of intellectual 
tutelage, is contained in the following sentence, which 
will bring a blush to the cheek of our grandchildren 
and great-grandchildren : ''But for German mili- 
tarism, German culture would long since have been 
wiped off the face of the earth." After this, all doubt 
must cease. Everyone who feels within himself a 
spark of true Germanism will be forced to admit that 
this sentence amounts to a declaration of the bank- 
ruptcy not only of classical Germanism, but of every 
human aspiration towards culture. Even though we 
were able to emerge victorious from this war, and to 
build up a German world-empire from Antwerp to 
Bagdad, this sentence would proclaim us eternally 
vanquished. It is a Sedan of the German spirit. 



THE GERMAN DYNASTY 209 

Militarism as the pre-requisite and basis of German 
culture! It looks as if these ninety-three champions 
of culture had struck themselves in the face, in order 
then with blushing cheeks to confess that a free man 
does not allow himself to be struck in the face, he 
only performs the act himself — on command. 

The fact that these ninety-three intellectuals include 
not only official professors and dignitaries, but also 
persons who, before the war, were honoured as citi- 
zens of the world and as affording the highest hopes 
for a free Germany — Dehmel, Eucken, Eulenburg, 
Wilhelm Forster,^ Hackel, the two Hauptmanns, Ost- 
wald, Sudermann, Ludwig Thoma, etc., etc., whose 
signature is thus a voluntary act — is only a fresh proof 
that the official control of the German idea of culture 
had already demoralised a great many of the free 
German writers and artists, and that they too, in re- 
turn for titles and decorations, are now ready to sell 
their consciences.^ 

That true culture can only be born in a world out- 
side the prejudices of countries and dynasties, of this, 
as the appeal shows, the ''champions of culture" in 
modern Germany have no idea. Talk to the world- 
renowned jurists Laband and Liszt about the aggres- 
sion in Serbia and the violence done to Belgium, and 
they will only reply, not as unprejudiced jurists, but 
as staunch patriots : German necessity knows no law ; 
and be very cautious not to seek any valid evidence 
of such necessity. Speak to our Dehmel and Fulda 

* Not to be confused with his son, the Munich Professor F. W. 
Forster. 

^ Hauptmann, Sudermann, and others have meantime received 
the Fourth Class of the Red Eagle, the lowest m that series. 



210 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 

of the destruction of Invaluable libraries and churches, 
and it would not surprise me if they dilated on the 
tragical beauty of a cathedral blazing in the service of 
German culture. Complain, again, to Hauptmann 
about Germany's questionable methods of warfare, 
and he will, like any chance German lieutenant of 
the Guard, tell you that any desecration is not more 
than Germany's power and dignity demand. Speak 
to Scheidemann and Siidekum of the necessity of at 
last bringing the European nations under a democ- 
racy, and of utilising the potentialities of this World 
War for the acquisition of new international rights, 
and, with scarcely veiled admiration for the model 
German social legislation, they will reply that even 
the most liberal republic conceivable, considering that 
it is always controlled by accursed capitalists, is no 
better for the labouring man than an absolute mon- 
archy. 

For Emperor and Empire! Between these ever- 
lasting blinkers, our historians view their documents, 
the professors their antiquities, the freemasons their 
corner stones, the classical scholars their Pegasus, and 
the Social Democrats the ark of the covenant of the 
sacred Marx. 

German culture in the German Empire? No! A 
Ptolemaic cosmic system of superstitious theories, 
which circle round the stationary level of their dy- 
nasty; a graciously tolerated cloak of militarism; a 
puerile phantom machine with ''energetic imperatives" 
and thousands of empty phrases ; a Ptolemaic religion 
of fawning mandarins ; at the best, a musing on pious 
sentiments and a splendid naivete of prophetic souls; 



THE GERMAN DYNASTY 211 

here and there, perchance, a subservient attempt to 
curb the war-thirsty beast. Nothing more. 

The German ^'champions of cukure"? Among a 
hundred there is hardly one who dares to play the 
man: slaves, who carry their master's whip; pedants, 
who belaud as liberty what all the rest of the world 
has long felt to be serfdom ; acrobats and court jesters, 
who are permitted by their grand lords to present 
all manner of burlesques of freedom to the people; 
occasionally an earnest eccentric who has heard it said 
that dynasties are not indispensable in our modern 
world; but the overwhelming majority of them, in- 
tellectual lieutenants in the Hohenzollern Guard, ready 
to obey at the word of command. 

Learning without character, knowledge without con- 
science, organisation without humanity, discipline 
without liberty, ideal without dignity; such is the re- 
sult of a mental development that, commencing with 
the disappearance of the Weimar Germanism, and po- 
litically trained by Metternich, Bismarck, and Wil- 
liam 11. , and intellectually by Hegel, Treitschke, and 
their disciples, could only play its part as a protecting 
power of the dynasty. The World War is the absolute 
proof of this. It has shown the culmination of this 
development in a complete victory of Potsdam over 
Weimar. I believe that, after this catastrophe, we 
require an entirely new generation of men to answer 
by entirely new conduct this — for Germany — entirely 
new question, namely, what Culture really means. 



VI 

THE GERMAN'S FATHERLAND 

In the foregoing pages we have embarked on a 
strictly judicial voyage of discovery through modern 
Prusso-Germany, basing all our observations upon 
actual facts. As a subject of the Fatherland of scien- 
tific logic my aim was to apply this logic, as far as 
in me lay, and without prejudice or malice, to a topic 
hitherto totally excluded from free German investiga- 
tion — namely, the legal, military, political, and intel- 
lectual relation of our dynasty to our country. I do 
not claim completeness for my studies. The materials 
I have collected on these subjects would have suf- 
ficed to fill a book of fully threefold the volume I 
now present to my readers. In Germany things exist 
which afford the most valuable evidence in support 
of the views here urged,^ concerning which, however, 

*The reader will, perhaps, have noticed that I have said noth- 
ing about the Prussian Constitution, the Prussian franchise and 
Upper House, the privileged position of the Junkers in the 
Prussian political system, the infamous Prussian Polish policy, 
etc. I have also left unmentioned numerous expressions of 
William II. which, though indubitably uttered, have not been 
officially confirmed. A special chapter, which really belongs 
here, and would do much to elucidate the psychology of dynas- 
ties, would be an honest account of those numerous scandals 
at the Berlin Court (Stocker, Schrader-Kotze, Hammerstein, 
Waldersee, Eulenburg, etc.) which, since Bismarck's fall, have 
disclosed the secret workings of the Berlin Camarillas and exer- 
cised an unsuspected influence upon German politics. 

212 



THE GERMAN'S FATHERLAND 213 

a good patriot prefers to keep silence. Yet the little 
evidence I have above adduced will, I trust, suffice. 

If, for instance, by the word "fatherland" we mean 
what all civilised nations to-day, except the Russians 
and Turks, mean by it, then by the light of our in- 
vestigations we arrive at the result that we Germans 
have no Fatherland at all. For what the French, 
English, Swiss, Americans understand by "father- 
land," namely, the country in the government of which 
they have a voice, does not exist in Germany. 

The modern notion of "Fatherland" was first cre- 
ated by the French Revolution and is, essentially, an 
ideal of public weal and justice; it is (let Germans 
realise this fact) inseparable from the notion of the 
sovereignty of the people. The Frenchman, the 
Italian, the Englishman, and the Swiss (lately, per- 
haps, the Chinese) is willing to give his life for his 
country, because he feels himself a responsible part 
of a sovereign whole, a member of a national organism 
striving towards a continually higher ideal of justice 
and welfare — in short, free citizens; possessing equal 
rights in a political and constitutional community. 

But we Germans are not permitted to attach such a 
meaning to the word "fatherland," since, as already 
shown, the antecedent conditions to such a conception 
are wanting. Any German who honestly investigates 
this question must admit this fact. Both as a function 
and in its effects, our electoral right is only a pretence. 
We have neither ruling statesmen nor responsible min- 
isters, neither a legally guaranteed position as against 
our Government, nor soldiers, sworn to uphold our 
Constitution. Thus, we are not the free citizens of 
a constitutional State, but, as William II. in his 



214 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 

speeches has again and again insisted, the subjects of 
a God-appointed ruler. 

First of all, there is no question with us of real 
spiritual liberty. There are many Germans who 
proudly boast of our liberty of the Press; but, alas! 
the German liberty of the Press is the same demo- 
cratic illusion as the German Reichstag and the Ger- 
man popular army. As German policy is exclusively 
the business of the German Emperor, and the speeches 
and actions of the Emperor may not be criticised (the. 
mere supposition of an intention to insult the sov- 
ereign^ suffices, in Germany, to get anyone into 
prison), in Germany our much vaunted liberty of the 
Press stops just where, in other countries, it begins, 
that is to say, where it begins to fulfil the purpose for 
which it was founded. There is nothing worse and 
more stupid than liberties, which are counted upon, 
and yet, at the very moment when they ought to prove 
their use, become crimes. Liberties that prove value- 
less, as soon as they are to be employed for the pur- 
poses for which they were ostensibly created, are, in 
truth, Hegelian speculations on the stupidity of the 
people. If we made no pretence of having liberty of 
the Press, then we should, at least, know how we 
stood. But as things are, one has to take infinite 

* One instance out of a hundred. In January, 1899, the editor 
of a Magdeburg SociaHst paper was sentenced to four years 
and one month's imprisonment for an article written in the 
form of a legend, but which, unfortunately for him, the Court 
held to bear upon German politics. By the aid of that suppo- 
sition (that German politics were intended), the Attorney-Gen- 
eral made out a case of Use majeste of the Emperor and the 
twelve-year-old Prince Eitel Fritz and was entirely success- 
ful. 



THE GERMAN'S FATHERLAND 215 

trouble to bring a German to comprehend that liberty 
of the Press, absolute government, and lese majeste 
are three things, like surgeon, sickness, and belief in 
miracles, i.e., the last produces the second and scoffs 
at the first.^ 

As far as human despotic power can reach, the Ho- 
henzollern dynasty is in Germany politically omnipo- 
tent. Despite all advances in civilisation, the words ad- 
dressed in 1 71 7 by Frederick William I. to the Prus- 
sian Estates — *'the authority of the Junkers will go 
to the wall; but I establish the *souverainete' as a 
'rock of bronze' " — and, again, to the General Di- 
rectory, on December 20th, 1722 — "we are, after all, 
the King and we do what we please" — have 180 years 
subsequently been repeated emphatically by William 
II. in countless speeches : thus, "my course is the right 
one and I shall go on steering it" (February 24th, 
1892) ; or again, "the descendant of him who by his 
own right became sovereign duke in Prussia will pur- 
sue the same paths as his immortal ancestor; just as 
once the first King said 'ex mea nata corona' (my 
crown I have myself created), and his illustrious son 
established his authority as a 'rocher de hronzef so 
do I, like my imperial grandfather, represent the mon- 
archy by divine right." (Konigsberg, September 6th, 
1894). 

^This criticism refers, of course, to the constitutionally guar- 
anteed liberty of the Press before the war. That since the out- 
break of war we have been completely deprived of even the 
semblance of liberty of the Press, and that (despite solemn 
undertakings to the contrary) it has not been restored, is well 
known. Moreover, it is only in England, among all the belliger- 
ent countries, that any real liberty of the Press has survived 
since the outbreak of the war. 



2i6 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 

The sovereignty by Divine Right is not, in Germany, 
a meaningless phrase, not a dynastic fiction, and, cer- 
tainly, not an imagination, as alleged, of so-called un- 
patriotic subjects. It is an absolute fact; and two 
centuries of human development have not altered it a 
jot. As we, as good Christians, have to believe that 
God created the world in six days and rested the 
seventh, so have we, as good patriots, to believe that 
the dynasty with God's help arranges everything for 
the best. Come what may, and be it ever so much in 
conflict with the times, we know that it is a part of 
the Divine order and that behind it is concealed a 
higher plan. 

We Germans are, in truth, born critics; we have 
probed the mysteries of the universe, established the 
limits of human knowledge, and conceive ourselves to 
be the cleverest and most highly educated people in 
the world; yet, in matters of political government, we 
have been struck blind by the gods and by Hegel. 
And, our dynasty has, to simplify matters, forbidden 
the nation of thinkers to think about these matters. 

What then have we Germans left? Upon what do 
we found our German patriotism ? As a fact we base 
it upon our affection for the imperial house. Any 
other devotion to country would be senseless. William 
II., Professor Delbriick, and other authorities assure 
us, and with truth, that the army "Is the basis of our 
political system." But, since this army is sworn to 
allegiance not to our country and its Constitution, but 
to the person of the Emperor-King, it follows, by 
mathematical logic, that our whole German political 
system does not exist for the behoof of us German 
citizens, but is merely a creation and possession of 



THE GERMAN'S FATHERLAND 217 

the German dynasty. And so it is; Emperor and 
Fatherland are in Germany one and the same. The 
Emperor is not only the supreme authority under the 
Constitution, but the born incorporation of our po- 
litical system, the leader of our national fortunes in 
peace and war, umpire in matters of art and science, 
and sovereign plenipotentiary of the German people — 
in short, the sole initiating and guiding force of the 
German Empire within and without. 

As he is all this, the notion of Fatherland implies 
for the German only the person of the German Em- 
peror. Our devotion to him is our love of country. If 
a German were to love his country, as other civilised 
nations do theirs (as a political community of which 
he is an active member), he would be a revolutionary. 
Even to-day the idea of a Fatherland belonging to the 
German nation is regarded as a crime. 

Of course, it may certainly be disputed which no- 
tion of Fatherland is the higher, that of the French, 
the English, and so forth, or that of the Germans. 
But it cannot possibly be disputed that on this point, 
as on most others, we have sundered ourselves from 
the rest of the civilised world, that is to say, we have 
placed ourselves in diametrical opposition to it. For 
State and Fatherland, which elsewhere form a natural 
entity, are in our case only notions artificially welded 
together. In reality, the Prussian conception of the 
State is the absolute negation of the conception of 
the Fatherland obtaining in other countries. 

:ji :js jji 5fc s(j 

It has been shown that in all vital questions Ger- 
man domestic and foreign policy has been guided not 
with the co-operation of, but in opposition to, the 



2i8 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 

German people, and that, therefore, logically, where 
the policy "of Germany" is referred to, it ought rather 
to be described as the policy of the German dynasty. 
I wish here, once more, to emphasise that in all im- 
portant questions in which the German people have 
been allowed to have a voice. They have invariably 
given it against the policy of their Government. The 
fable that the German people are one heart and one 
soul for their dynasty ought to be finally discredited. 
Foreign countries, who have, as a rule, no idea how 
things stand in a country where Use majeste, tele- 
grams from the Crown Prince, and adoration of the 
military uniform are taken for granted, have an idea 
that the German people are delighted with their dy- 
nasty. At this crisis, no stone must be left unturned to 
dispel this illusion. Had the dynasty been really so 
assured of the support of its people, it would long since 
have dispensed with those protective laws behind which 
it has so carefully shielded itself. But during the last 
twenty years those laws have become both more se- 
vere and more frequently applied than ever. The 
dynasty went yet further. It demanded the applica- 
tion of these laws to the Reichstag and forbade any 
discussion of speeches from the throne. Finally, de- 
nunciations for lese majcste had become such a public 
nuisance, that William II. (1907) reduced the period 
of limitation for actions of the kind from five years 
to six months (without, however, making the crime 
dependent upon publicity). This shows that the dy- 
nasty was, in Germany, only popular because by every 
available resource it enforced this popularity and ruth- 
lessly suppressed every other sentiment. It further 
shows that the proverbial obedience of the German 



THE GERMAN'S FATHERLAND 219 

is not a natural trait in his character, but only the 
result of brutal and long compulsion. A monarchical 
Government that has never tolerated the smallest 
openly republican association within its realms may 
easily assert that its citizens are loyal to the back- 
bone. As no counter-evidence is allowed, and as this 
fealty has not sprung from the soil of liberty and 
free will, it may be regarded with suspicion. 

There is no large party in Germany which desires 
the monarchy for the monarchy's sake. The funda- 
mental factor in genuine monarchical fealty, namely, 
unselfishness, is to be sought for in vain among our 
so-called monarchical parties. We have, in Germany, 
men who regard monarchy as a political ideal, disin- 
terested politicians, journalists and scholars, who are 
anxious to further this ideal, but no political party, 
supported by a popular majority, disinterestedly serv- 
ing the monarchy in its present form. Those very 
parties, who are reckoned pillars of the throne and 
the Church, support the throne not for the sake of 
God and King, but only because God and King serve 
their own ends best. That is the plain truth, which 
is naturally contradicted most vehemently by those 
who live by and not for the monarchy. 

The Prusso-German people, as a whole, have for 
decades past regarded the divine right of the monarchy 
with some scepticism. Whenever opportunity offered, 
they have protested against this divine right. In the 
National Assembly of October 12th, 1848, Schultze- 
Delitzsch declared in the discussion of the Constitu- 
tional Charter : "It is usual, when a commercial house 
goes bankrupt, not to make use of the old name for 
the new business. Now I believe that in past history 



220 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 

absolutism has come to complete bankruptcy under the 
old title *by God's Grace/ Accordingly, I suggest that 
we do not adopt this old, bankrupt name for our new 
business." And by 217 to 143 votes the "bankrupt 
God's-grace firm" was then struck out of the Draft 
of the Constitution. Was it the fault of the Prussian 
nation that Frederick William IV. forcibly dissolved 
this assembly, and, in defiance of all popular demands, 
forced upon it a Constitution (which has continued to 
this day) beginning with the words "We, Frederick 
William, by God's Grace, etc."? 

Had the spirit of the German people been really as 
monarchical, slavish, and imperialistic as our enemies 
of to-day allege, then it could never have come into 
conflict with its Government. But, as a matter of fact, 
these conflicts have been frequent and numerous.^ 

^ Some of the acutest conflicts of the past decade between 
the Government and the people have already been noted in 
the fourth chapter of this work. How strong is the opposition 
of the German people to its Government is evidenced not only 
by these conflicts, not only by the unconstitutional character 
of the German popular assembly, a character which has been 
preserved in defiance of every protest, but, in particular, by the 
attitude of the Reichstag since the commencement of this World 
War. The so-called "Burgfrieden" and the boasted "sacred unity 
of all parties" have not been able to prevent the Reichstag from 
protesting, almost unanimously, and vigorously, against protec- 
tive detention and censorship, against the exclusion of Jews and 
dissenters from the corps of officers, against the disregard of the 
German popular representation in matters of foreign policy, etc. 
All in vain. What in England, in 1629, was abolished by the 
so-called Petition of Rights (namely, the arbitrary power of 
the royal officials and the unprotected state of the citizens) the 
German citizen demanded the Imperial Government to abolish 
(unanimously but fruitlessly) at the end of October, 1916. The 



THE GERMAN'S FATHERLAND 221 

That the German people never emerged from them 
victorious was not their fault, but rather a consequence 
of that law of the world's history which ordains that 
the people only begin to gain the upper hand when 
the dynasty has suffered a loss of prestige outside. 
But Prussia has suffered no such loss of prestige since 
the period from 1806 to 1813. 

Our democratic neighbours and present foes, who 
tax us with not being ripe for democracy and declare 
that we have slavish minds and no understanding of 
liberty, should give a little consideration to their own 
history. The French, especially, w^ho are regarded 
as the most revolutionary nation in the world, should 
reflect that they, too, in the past, and under like cir- 
cumstances, possessed almost the same (apparent) 
faults as those they tax us with to-day. For instance, 
so long as the two Napoleons returned from their 
campaigns flushed with victory, the French never 
dreamt of a revolution. And, at that time, they were 
just as hated and feared in the world as we Germans 
have been for the last few decades. Since the French 
dynasty was boastful and eager for war, the story was 
spread about the world that the whole of France was 
Intoxicated with militarism and vanity and was a men- 
ace to Europe. Here, as elsewhere, the faults and 
errors of the victorious dynasty were thoughtlessly 
placed to the account of the people. 

A French revolution between 1798 and 18 10, or 
between 185 1 and 1869, might have saved us from 

tragi-comic element of the whole business is that, with the same 
unanimity, the same Reichstag voted all war credits, which were 
demanded under the plea that Germany was fighting a crusade 
against — Czarism. 



222 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 

the catastrophes that the Bonaparte dynasty brought 
upon the world, just as a German revolution could 
have saved us from this present war. Why did not 
the French revolt at that time ? The answer is simple : 
because they could not. The course of events is every- 
where alike; victorious dynasties bring despotism; 
against this despotism arises a secret revolt, which, 
however, is shouted down by the loud praises of those 
who live in the pay of dynasties and wield the power. 
The louder these praises resound in the land, the 
stronger and the more embittered becomes the silent 
dissatisfaction of the real nation. In order to exer- 
cise the growing popular discontent, dynasties must 
have recourse to war as the sovereign remedy. And 
only when it is proved that their calculations were 
wrong, and when the eagle flutters wounded to the 
ground, can this popular indignation burst out and 
be victorious. Jena and Auerstatt, which strengthened 
the dynastic rule in France, were for Prussia the sig- 
nal for a popular uprising culminating in a conspiracy 
against the Prussian King. But as the Prussian Rev- 
olution of those days needed for its victory both the 
Russian and the Austrian dynasties, it could not, un- 
fortunately, gather its fruits. On the other hand, 
Sedan marked the birth of the German Empire "with 
its Prussian summit," and in France the birth of the 
Third Republic. 

There are, after all, rigid laws in history. One of 
these ordains that dynasties which are victorious out- 
side their realms are at the same time victorious at 
home over the politics, logic, science, and liberal as- 
pirations of their peoples. When Lamartine said, "It 



THE GERMAN'S FATHERLAND 223 

is not the country, but liberty that is most imperilled 
in war," he should have said "in victorious war." For 
every victorious war means for the victorious nation 
a loss of political liberties, whilst for the vanquished 
it is a fountain of inspiration and democratic progress. 
Had there been no Koniggratz, Austria would still 
be without a Constitution and Hungary still under 
the Austrian scourge ; yet, on the other hand, without 
a Koniggratz the National-Liberals in Prussia would 
not have unexpectedly become "Reptiles/' Without 
a Sedan, no Bismarck regime but, also, no Gambetta. 
Had Russia been victorious over Japan, the Russian 
people would to-day have no Constitution. And so on. 
Hence, just as the victories of Wagram, Austerlitz, 
Jena, Sebastopol, and Solferino could not unchain 
revolutions in France, so from us Germans no revolu- 
tions could be expected after Diippel, Koniggratz, 
Sedan and Paris. Victorious revolutions are only ren- 
dered possible by lost campaigns,^ and it is the mis- 
fortune of us Prussians that we have not lost a cam- 
paign since Jena. Yes, my dear readers, it was in 
truth a misfortune, for had Prussia been only once 
overcome, "the old bankrupt firm" would have been 
long since extinguished and the present war would 
not have come to pass. For then there would not 

*We must lay stress here upon the term "victories." The 
Revolutions of 1848 were not begotten of wars and not waged 
against dynasties conquered in the field. But in France, as also 
in Germany and Austria, they were victorious for a moment 
only, and immediately after made room for a fresh reaction. 
Something similar can be said of the great French Revolution, 
which dethroned a King in order to bring home an Emperor who 
set all Europe in a ferment. 



224 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 

have arisen the arrogant dream of a German world- 
empire and the Pan-Germanism of the present day. 

Rather more historical logic is seriously needed by 
our friends across the Vosges and the Channel. They 
would then realise that we, as a people, have done 
what we were able to do. They would no longer 
reproach us on account of faults and bad habits which, 
under similar circumstances, they themselves evidently 
possessed, and which are merely due to the dictates of 
victorious dynasties. The recognition of this fact 
would be of vital importance in securing a sensible 
conclusion of peace. 

So far as the militarism and foreign policy of the 
German Empire is especially concerned, I have al- 
ready Indicated that it Is quite correct to say of the 
German people that It has been militarised to the mar- 
row. But one ought not to confound militarism with 
eagerness for war. The indubitably strong (arti- 
ficially created) military spirit of the German people 
was no menace to peace, but, as our nation honestly 
believed and was again and again assured by William 
II. in his speeches, a means of maintaining the peace. 
This Is to say, the German people, like all other peo- 
ples, considered militarism as a necessary evil for the 
defense of the Fatherland. It could not, would not, 
dared not realise the fundamental idea of the dynas- 
tlcally nurtured German militarism — that is to say, its 
eagerness for war. 

This was strikingly proved at the outbreak of the 
war. In the first chapter of this book I have, by the 
light of German documents, unearthed a few of the 
numerous contradictions and forgeries to which the 



THE GERMAN'S FATHERLAND 225 

German Government was obliged to have recourse in 
order to represent a patently offensive war as a holy 
war of self-defence. It would not have needed these 
very compromising contradictions and forgeries, had it 
not been well aware that any policy of war as a means 
of conquest was absolutely repugnant to the German 
people as a whole (in spite of all attempts to militarise 
them). But after the Government had spoken of 
Cossacks in East Prussia and bombs on Nuremberg 
and all this had been expressly confirmed by ^'ofhcial" 
reports; after it had suppressed, in the Press and the 
Reichstag, the mediation proposals of the Czar and 
those of the English Foreign Office, it was a mere 
trifle to announce solemnly : "Envious foes compel us 
to a just defence. The sword has been forced into 
our hand" (speech of William II. on July 31st, 1914, 
delivered from the balcony of the Palace). Thanks 
to these imperial and official announcements, German 
patriots believed themselves faced with that sacred 
need of self-protection and self-preservation which in 
the view of every civilised nation is always the justi- 
fication for armament; the sacred wish and will to 
defend one's country. When, then, the German peo- 
ple, proudly and as one man, rushed to arms in August, 
1 9 14, what were the objects of its enthusiasm? The 
plans of conquest, as enunciated by Bernhardi, Harden, 
Reventlow, Keim, Frobenius, and their like? Was it 
the world-power policy of the Hohenzollerns, the 
"Greater Germany," the "liberation" of the Flemish, 
the Baltic races, etc. ? Not a bit of it. Anyone w?^ 
imputes this kind of enthusiasm for war to th^ mft^- 



226 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 

jority of the German people is doing them injustice. 
If so many and such mad plans of annexation crop 
up, at the present time, everywhere in Germany, while, 
on the other hand, protests against them are both few 
and far between, and then only shyly expressed, that is 
no proof whatsoever that our politicians who desire 
conquest have the majority of the German people be- 
hind them. This alleged lust of the German people 
for conquest is on a par with its loyalty to the Crown. 
The Government will not suffer any counter argu- 
ment, and anyone who at present should advocate an 
immediate conclusion of peace without annexations 
would be compelled to hold his tongue. For instance, 
the Berliner Tagehlatt was suppressed for several days 
because it ventured to describe the demands for an- 
nexation of the six agricultural unions as calculated 
to prolong the war. In this way, the impression can 
readily be engendered abroad that the whole German 
people is dominated by a barbaric lust of conquest. 

Here again, as everywhere in considering this Ger- 
man problem, appearances must be distinguished from 
actualities. The actuality is that the German people 
in August, 1 91 4, waxed enthusiastic for the patriotic 
idea of defence of country. We should not have de- 
served to remain a nation had we not been animated 
by this idea. As soon as our national honour and 
independence are assailed, we, like all other nations, 
become bellicose; and on the authority of the official 
German description of the causes of the war we were 
compelled to believe that this was what had happened. 
What German, in the confusion of those days, could 
for a moment conceive that in Prusso-Germany of the 



THE GERMAN'S FATHERLAND 227 

twentieth century those theories of divine constitu- 
tional right still prevailed which Machiavelli com- 
mended to the princes of mediaeval times? The most 
vigilant democrats, the staunchest opponents of war, 
could not believe in such a monstrosity; even persons 
like Liebknecht, Haase, and Bernstein voted the war 
credits in honest belief that it was for the defence of 
their country. 

In this w^ay, and no other, can the psychology of the 
German war enthusiasm be explained. It was en- 
gendered by the aid of falsifications and the solemn 
assurance that "we enter upon war with a clear con- 
science and in the conviction that we did not wish for 
war" (speech of the Imperial Chancellor to the popu- 
lace on August 1st, 19 14). 

It is a simple task (and, perchance, a not unwelcome 
one to foreign lands) to refute the correctness of this 
account. Let us, for this purpose, suppose for the 
nonce a Germany under parliamentary rule. Let us 
suppose that, in Articles 11 and 68 of the German 
Imperial Constitution, the phrase "German Reichs- 
tag" is substituted for that of "German Emperor," 
or else that to the latter are added the words "by 
consent of the German Reichstag." Then, in the 
realm of German politics, there would be no longer 
room for the insolent application of the doctrines of 
Machiavelli. In their place there would be an army 
subservient to the popular will, Ministers responsible 
to Parliament, and who could be impeached, reason- 
ably formed electoral divisions, that is to say, a Reichs- 
tag with about 660 deputies (instead of 397, as to- 
day). Then let the election results of 191 2 be ex- 
amined. Out of a total of twelve million votes, almost 



228 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 

eight million are in manifest opposition to the Pan- 
Germanistic idea of conquest.^ These eight million 
of German electors, all of more or less democratic 
sympathies, would have to be represented, in this rea- 
sonably constituted Reichstag, by about 440 deputies, 
whereas the real Pan-Germanists, for whom, in the 
elections of 1912, about four million votes were given, 
would, in such a Reichstag, have secured about 220 
seats. 

Now imagine the outbreak of the Austro-Serbian 
dispute. This Parliament is convened in accordance 
\uith the Constitution, and there is presented to it not 
only the Austrian Ultimatum to Serbia together with 
the latter's almost obsecjuious reply, but also Grey's 
proposal for a Conference of the four Powers (Nos. 
67 and 84 of the English Blue Book), the telegram 
of the Czar to William II. of July 29th, which sug- 
gested the settlement of the dispute by The Hague 

*The following can obviously not be regarded as Pan-Ger- 
manist: Social Democrats, Liberals, Poles, Alsatians, Guelphs, 
and Lorrainers. On the other hand, the following are con- 
fessedly Pan-Germanist : — National-Liberals, Conservatives, the 
Imperial Party, Anti-Semites. The Catholic "Centre" occupies 
an intermediate position. It secured over two million votes in 
the election of 1912. As the supporters of this party are mostly 
people in humble circumstances and the candidates of this "Cen- 
tre Party" in many electoral districts (such as the Rhine Prov- 
inces, Alsace-Lorraine, and Upper Silesia) hold definitely dem- 
ocratic views (the Centre has more than once voted against the 
Army Bills, it opposed the Polish policy, and was, in 1907, even 
the ally of the Social Democrats), we shall not be far wrong if 
we halve the Centre votes, and allow about one million as being 
non-Pan-Germanist. Had the plain question been put to them, 
Do you wish for a war of conquest? four-fifths of the Centre 
Party of 1912 would have responded with a loud "No." 



THE GERMAN'S FATHERLAND 229 

Tribunal, and, finally, also, the further mediation pro- 
posals of Sazonow (Russian Orange Book, Nos. 50 
and 6y^ and of Grey (Nos. loi and 103 of the Eng- 
lish Blue Book). Instead, then, after the declaration 
of war, of acquainting an unconstitutionally organised 
and constitutionally impotent Reichstag four full days 
after the declaration of war with accomplished facts 
and grossly deceiving it with fables of Cossack in- 
vasions, bombs dropped by aviators, and by the sup- 
pression of the most vital proposals for mediation, 
etc. (which, be it repeated, is only possible under 
Articles 11 and 68 of the German Imperial Constitu- 
tion), our Reichstag, reconstituted upon a rational 
basis, and endowed with full powers, would, consti- 
tutionally, have had to decide on war or peace. 

Realise this fact, and then honestly reply: Would 
the German Government, in the face of these pro- 
posals for mediation, have ever been empowered by 
such a Parliament to deliver to Russia on July 31st, 
1 9 14, that twelve-hour ultimatum which rendered war 
unavoidable? 

I reply to this question most emphatically, and I 
believe that all who possess any logical sense will also 
reply, ''NoT With the same determination with 
which the German nation, deceived by falsifications 
and suppressions of the truth, embarked upon a holy 
war of self-defence, it would then have demanded 
(seeing that two-thirds of the German electors are not 
Pan-Germanists) that all the endeavours and proposals 
for a reconciliation should first be discussed, and that 
all possibilities of maintaining the peace compatible 
with the dignity and independence of the nation should 
first be exhausted, before the General Staff was sum- 



230 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 

moned and entrusted with the continuation of politics 
"by other means/* 

As a German patriot, I am proud to state here in 
the name of my country that two-thirds of the Ger- 
man electorate have a horror of a war of conqujest, 
they secretly condemn the crimes committed against 
Belgium, and can only conceive the World War as the 
result of Cossack invasions, bombs dropped by avi- 
ators, and "actual attacks.'* Two-thirds of the Ger- 
man soldiery have taken the field with "a clear con- 
science," in the proud conviction that they are defend- 
ing their country and in the firm belief that "we" 
did not want the war. 

I only wish that this fact could at length be clearly 
realised. The constant reproach that we are a servile 
nation, unripe for self-government and craving for 
world-dominion, has not been levelled at us only by 
foreign nations, but, alas ! even by those few German 
Socialists and Democrats who are, to-day, in opposi- 
tion to the German Government. They shrug their 
shoulders and inquire: What do you expect? The 
whole German people stands behind its dynasty. It 
is poisoned with militarism. If William II. had not 
declared war on August ist, 19 14, our people would 
have forced him to do so. 

The election results of 1907 and 191 2 show, at a 
glance, the criminal absurdity of such a statement, and 
it is a gross insult to our peaceable, industrious Ger- 
man people. A people that dreams only of booty and 
robbery need not be worked up to enthusiasm for Em- 
peror and Empire and defence of the Fatherland by 
means of laws concerning lese majeste and violations 
of constitutional rights, and certainly not by "actual 



THE GERMAN'S FATHERLAND 231 

attacks." On the contrary, such a people might have 
been calmly told, what our Pan-Germanists had al- 
ready vociferously proclaimed, "We are stifled. We 
need more space under the sun! As we possess the 
strongest army and the highest civilisation, we have a 
sacred right to expand." But the Government took 
good care not to approach our people in this way (al- 
though they would thereby have avoided the respon- 
sibility for those subterfuges). Sufficient proof has 
been adduced to show that we Germans are, at heart, 
as peace-loving as other nations, but that we were 
artificially and forcibly inoculated with a belief with- 
out which our Government could not have carried on 
this war. 

To sum up : the German Fatherland is embodied in 
a God-appointed dynasty — ^that is to say, a dynasty 
ruling with all the mediaeval attributes of power. Be- 
lief in this dynasty is a patriotic dogma, to which the 
Prusso-German people assents not of free will but by 
coercion. The true German national sense has long 
ago declared the old firm "by God's grace" bankrupt. 
That is to say, the dynasty has not been able to prevent 
our nation passing through the same development and 
evolving the same democratic ideals of culture as other 
nations. And, as far as war in particular is con- 
cerned, it thoroughly abhors any idea of conquest and, 
like every other civilised nation, is only moved to en- 
thusiasm for the sacred ideal of defence of the Father- 
land. 

But, unfortunately with us Germans, this sacred 
ideal fares in the same way as other political ques- 
tions. As our idea of the Fatherland, in accordance 



232 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 

with the Constitution, culminates in the dynasty, as 
German soldiers, in accordance with the Constitution, 
fight not for their country but for their War Lord, 
so our sense of nationality is regarded by our rulers 
only as a means to ^'higher ends," which we have the 
less right to know or to criticise, in that it is our 
bounden duty to come whenever the King calls. Since, 
then, the sum of the German national sense is simply 
the patriotic sum of the dynastic dogma, it follows 
mathematically that our own desire and will are in 
such matters both immaterial and troublesome to our 
masters, and that hence they obtained from the gods 
the right to deal with them according to their pleasure. 
This is then the unvarnished constitutional and (by 
the aid of the German documents) scientifically proven 
truth. We are not to blame if to-day it sounds mon- 
strous and revolutionary. It none the less remains 
the truth, and it has to be said. 



VII 



THE ORIGIN OF AND MEANING OF THE 
WAR 

The Opinions of German Pacifists and 
Socialists 

Having discussed the Germany dynasty and the 
World War from the German point of view, let us 
now essay to treat succinctly the dynastic problem from 
the European point of view and to realise the universal 
import of this World War. First of all, we must be 
perfectly clear in our minds that all wars arise from 
a dynastic craving for power. In these days of **mod- 
ern ideas,'' this truth seems, it is true, somewhat "anti- 
quated," and many intellectuals will dismiss it with a 
superior smile. We have seen that intellectuals do 
not, by any means, always follow their inward craving 
for truth. Here, in particular, where the investiga- 
tion of truth is compelled to respect certain legal para- 
graphs and patriotic dogmas, the True, the Simple, 
and the Obvious easily come under the heading of 
Revolutionary. Consequently, the question as to the 
origin of wars has been needlessly complicated. The 
views held by our German official philosophers and 
other intellectuals rarely satisfy present-day common- 
sense and frequently give the impression of avoiding 

233 



234 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 

the truth. Only our great Kant had the courage sim- 
ply and straightforwardly to characterise "insensate 
war-waging" "as the affair of the monarchs, who are 
never tired of war." A confirmation of this state- 
ment of Kant has been furnished by his diametrical 
opposite, Bismarck, whose authority, it may be hoped, 
no one will question. "The majority has, as a rule, 
no inclination for war; war is kindled by minorities 
or, in absolute States, by Sovereigns or Cabinets," he 
said with laudable frankness in his speech in the 
Reichstag of February 2nd, 1876. 

In fact, war has always been the business of mon- 
archs. And so it will continue as long as the latter 
remain endued with divine power. 

Accordingly, whoever sets himself the task of de- 
nouncing war (and who would not do so to-day?) 
must first, if he be honest, commence with an attack 
upon the dynasties. Yet since Kant's day few have 
undertaken this. In Germany, in particular and for 
obvious reasons, nobody has dared to develop Kant's 
doctrines. The more numerous, during the past 
twenty years, the "scientific" pacifists in Germany be- 
came, the more carefully did they avoid Kant's re- 
publican thesis. Instead of dwelling upon the dynastic 
will for power, they only criticised its external phe- 
nomena (armament policy, militarism, secret diplo- 
macy, Chauvinism, Pan-Germanism, inflammatory 
Press, etc., etc.). The chief German exponent of so- 
called German Pacifism, Dr. A. H. Fried, nowhere, 
for instance, in his voluminous writings speaks of dy- 
nasties, constitutional powers, supreme control of the 
army, universal military service, autonomy of nations, 
etc., but has a great deal to say on the topic of "inter- 



THE ORIGIN OF THE WAR 235 

national anarchy," of the workings for force, of the 
irrational organisation of international society and 
other matters, concerning the origin and effects of 
which he tells us a great deal, but he does not tell us 
who originates, develops, and employs them. Thus, 
Fried and his school do not pose as politicians, demo- 
crats, or even revolutionaries, but only as cautious 
scientists, rhetoricians, or (as Fried likes best to de- 
scribe himself) "pioneers of peace." 

When, shortly before the outbreak of the war, I 
privately Inquired of a distinguished German pacifist 
what he honestly believed to be the real cause of war, 
he replied, with the candour that we Germans only 
dare to display in our private conversations, "Oh, 
we have long known that : — the dynasties !" He gave 
me certain information touching the already very 
threatening world-situation at that time (which I can- 
not repeat here), and when I said to him that, under 
these circumstances, it was essential to make our strug- 
gle firstly a political one, that is to say, to oppose the 
dynastic principle of power, he replied dejectedly, 
"What can we do? If we were to say in public who 
and what drives us into war we should be got rid 
of on the spot. We have to be glad that we are 
suffered to remain as we are. The initiated know all 
the same that we are Republicans." This conversation 
made such a deep impression upon me that it finally 
induced me to write this book. From that time forth 
it became clear to me that every German fighting for 
peace, popular liberty, and democratic progress must 
perforce employ a special kind of phraseology, so as 
not to offend the "powers that be" in Germany. 



236 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 

What Dr. Fried, for instance, cautiously styled "in- 
ternational anarchy" is, when it is thought out to a 
logical conclusion and clearly expressed, "dynastic will 
to power." The advantage of the term "interna- 
tional anarchy" lies in its scientific sound, which does 
not afford the Attorney-General the pretext of look- 
ing behind it for any "revolutionary" meaning. 

Whom does the army obey? To put this question, 
examine it, answer it, and extract from it any prin- 
ciple which may be used to serve the maintenance of 
peace, has, as far as I know, never occurred to the 
German Pacifists. Woe to the German who, whether 
Democrat or Republican, ever posed this, the most vital 
of all questions. 

And so modern Germany might be instanced as a 
proof of the fact that, in a State ruled entirely by 
technical science, the dynasty need not abate one jot 
or tittle of its divine and military powers. A closer 
investigation has proved to us, moreover, that in mod- 
ern Germany our much boasted "culture" is entirely 
subservient to dynastic will-power, and, instead of be- 
coming a counterpoise to war, it in fact became its 
secret tool. What does Dr. Fried make of the fact 
that in modern Germany, despite its highly perfected 
technical science, Articles 11 and 68 of the German 
Imperial Constitution, based as they are upon mediaeval 
ideas, remain unaltered ? How was it possible that, in 
spite of the continuous development of commercial 
science and the resulting desire for political freedom, 
any demand for such a democratic modification of the 
Constitution as would secure this was punished as lese 
majeste ! 

It was possible because, as we see, the most modem 



THE ORIGIN OF THE WAR 237 

technical science is absolutely compatible with the 
darkest political mediaevalism. The more "scientifi- 
cally," that is to say, the more timidly, the leaders of 
the intellectual and political opposition protest against 
it, the easier it is for the rulers of the country to bring 
about this strange harmony. As long as the "scien- 
tific" pacifists are afraid of openly becoming demo- 
crats, so long will that technical science which is sup- 
posed to promote international brotherhood be a curse 
rather than a blessing to mankind. For, under these 
circumstances, modern technical science labours en- 
tirely in the interest of war; the World War proves 
that the horrors of warfare have increased to a degree 
that fills us with loathing. Whoever, like Dr. Fried and 
his disciples, expects true culture — that is to say, 
peace — as a result of technical science, and holds aloof 
from all constitutional questions and the fundamental 
demands of democracy, will, like Ostwald (who, more- 
over, also styles himself a pacifist, and is one in his 
own way), regard culture merely as technical organisa- 
tion and social discipline. But true culture is no ideal 
for mechanicians and technical scientists ; man did not 
invent the machine in order afterwards to be enslaved 
by it. No ! the essential condition of every true culture 
is and remains the political liberty and dignity of the 
citizen. 

Sovereignty of the people, human dignity, and in- 
tellectual liberty — where these are lacking there is no 
culture whatever, and pacifism. Socialism, etc., be- 
come mere caricatures. The collectivist war economy 
prevailing in Germany to-day furnishes a proof that 
even Socialism (so long as it is only a question of the 
needs of the stomach, and confines its demands to 



238 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 

questions of household economy) can perfectly well 
subsist by the side of an absolute dynasty. If there 
exist people who give the name "Culture" to this 
blending of a seemingly most revolutionary principle 
(collectivism) with the most arbitrary feudal dictator- 
ship (Btirgfriedcn) — and some people have in fact 
been heard to declare that it is only necessary to trans- 
plant the present-day war economy into the coming 
state of peace, in order to realise the chief aims of 
Socialism — we must beg to differ from them most 
emphatically. For as long as, in the midst of the most 
gigantic technical and economic organisation, dynasties 
are left in possession of their divine privileges, so 
long will this culture be not the work of man, but a 
gift of the gods; a constant threat of war will hover 
above it, and a bomb dropped from an aeroplane upon 
Nuremberg will be able to bring the whole structure 
to the ground. 

Is earthly culture in general, and the German in 
particular, any longer to depend upon the incalculable 
caprices of the gods and the god-ordained? We ask 
this question of all who, like Dr. Fried, expect "cul- 
ture" to bring about a pacifist ordering of the world, 
without first inquiring as to the political and constitu- 
tional foundation of this culture. The antecedent his- 
tory and the outbreak of the World War show that 
our much vaunted culture is not ours, but belongs to 
others. So, my dear Dr. Fried, nations look for their 
happiness as the result first of all of political Constitu- 
tions, and not of technical science, culture, and organi- 
sation; these and other similar blessings are, after all, 
of no value for safeguarding the world's peace, so long 
as they are under the control of "God's grace." 



THE ORIGIN OF THE WAR 239 

Peace and war are, after all, not so much the results 
of foreign policy as (strange though it may appear) 
the inevitable consequences of the inward constitu- 
tion of the State. "International anarchy" is not a 
thing apart, but only the natural consequence of feudal- 
military Constitutions! Hence away with these Con- 
stitiitions. All else is only puling pacifist quackery. 
What have they to do with our great Kant ? ChercheB 
la dynastie! My dear Doctor, wars are never de- 
clared by "International anarchies," but only by dy- 
nasties. Cherches la dynastie! 

The Socialists attack war with equal prudence. 
Whenever they bring themselves to speak of dynasties 
(and they do it charily and un frequently), they de- 
clare them to be the representatives of the capitalist 
interests of the ruling classes, and maintain that wars 
will be inevitable as long as that evil thing, capital, 
rules the world. If anyone speaks to them of the 
dynastic will to power, they smile at this '^plebeian 
ideology" and prove from the height of their "ma- 
terialistic conception of history" that this so-called 
dynastic will to power is only a small portion of that 
"capitalist spirit" to which we are indebted for all 
(yes, absolutely all) the evils in this world. 

Yet, merely to represent universal military service 
as an outcome of the "capitalist spirit" is in itself a 
big undertaking. For universal military service is an 
achievement of the French Revolution and has evi- 
dently not the least connection with capitalism. For 
those very wars which are waged in the interests of 
capitalists (namely. Colonial wars) are waged without 
resort to universal military service. Very highly de- 



240 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 

veloped capitalist States, such as the United States 
and England, had no universal military service at all, 
v^hile, on the other hand, undeveloped capitalist States, 
such as Russia and Austria-Hungary, possessed it. 

And then, if war is really the necessary consequence 
of capitalist interests, why, I ask, have very highly 
developed capitalist countries, like the United States, 
England, Switzerland, Sweden, Australia, etc., not 
waged any wars for the past hundred years,^ whilst 
it was those very European States whose capitalist 

*(7/. note to p. Z7 — England's wars since Waterloo have been 
all Colonial wars and waged by volunteers. Wars fought by 
volunteers (as the war of the North American Union against 
Spain) are never really national affairs, but capitalist under- 
takings. Whether a contractor sends workmen into a mine, or 
whether a syndicate dispatches for its own purposes mercenary 
troops to the Transvaal, Cuba, etc., it is, really, all the same. 
Although, of course, we strongly condemn a bellicose Colonial 
policy, yet we cannot quarrel with a person who, for good pay, 
is ready to risk his life for the interests of others. Our hope is 
that, henceforth, no mercenary soldiers will be found available 
for such capitalist marauding expeditions. Moreover, England's 
past history affords a very apposite instance of the incorrectness 
of the Socialist thesis. In the course of the past century, Eng- 
land has allowed numerous and frequently very serious disputes 
to be adjusted by arbitration, despite the fact that she, more 
than any other State in the world, possessed the means of com- 
pelling a settlement favourable to her own interests. In 1863, 
the King of Belgium settled a dispute between England and 
Brazil; in 1869, the President of the United States another 
between England and Portugal; in 1872, the Court of Arbitra- 
tion at Geneva that pending between the United States and 
England; in 1893, the Paris Court of Arbitration determined 
the differences between England and North America touching 
the seal fishery; in 1904, The Hague Arbitration Tribunal ad- 
justed the serious dispute between England and Russia in the 
matter of the Hull affair, etc. Whence comes this predilection 



THE ORIGIN OF THE WAR 241 

economy is a hundred years behind the others, namely, 
Russia and Turkey, who, in the nineteenth century, 
waged the most numerous and the most sanguinary 
wars? 

The attentive reader who, as in my case, scrutinises 
without prejudice the actual causes of war will in- 
stinctively feel that the Socialist theory that capitalism 
is at the root of war contains, it is true, a grain of 
truth (especially in relation to Colonial wars), but is 
in the main nothing but a web of sophistry, which, like 
the scientific pacifists, they wish to weave round the 
core of the problem. 

2i: ^ ^ :ic >i: 

One great curse of our days is that erudition which 
intermeddles with matters with which it is not in the 
least concerned. War is a blackguardly and irrational 
thing and requires no learned exposition. But our 
age so revolts against the natural brutality of certain 
things which have been taken over from the Middle 
Ages, that it demands "scientific" investigations and 
justifications even where they cannot possibly be 
found. And, therefore, our professors narrate to us 
the most extraordinary stories as to the origin and 
purpose of wars. The scholar, who is diametrically 
opposed to the philosopher, may, it is true, have a 
good grasp of things lying within his own domain, but 
he is timid and circumscribed in his views, that is to 
say, incapable of bringing his special knowledge into 
relation with the world and mankind at large. Thus, 

for arbitration in a country wholly controlled by capitalism? 
The answer is clear. In England the dynastic will to power 
was wanting. If England is economically ruled by capital, yet 
politically it is ruled by Parliament and Liberalism. 



242 THE COMING DExMOCRACY 

the biologist proves that the stern law of the preserva- 
tion of the race and the individual is the cause of 
war; the Marxist bewails the evils of capitalism, the 
"civilian" national economist the aspirations for eman- 
cipation of the Fourth Estate, the theologian the lack 
of religion in the world, the scientific pacifist the in- 
ternational anarchy, and the vegetarian, perchance, 
the wantonness of a flesh-eating society, as the origin 
of war. There are even in Germany representatives 
of the so-called "yellow" trade-unions who seriously 
maintain that the English trade-unions have been the 
impelling force towards war! 

Thus, every party and sect enlightens us with its 
own particular fad as to the origin and import of 
wars; and while Europe is passing through a catas- 
trophe, the simple causes of which every man in the 
street knows full well, our professors, with pathetic 
helplessness, present us with their theories, like the 
Byzantines, who at the very moment when the Turks 
had made the first breaches in their walls spoke in 
oracles concerning the light of Tabor. 

Smiling and exalted, the world of the dynasties 
stands above this learned chatter. It is quite content 
that a thousand theories should be invented as to the 
causes of war, for the express purpose of avoiding the 
mention of the real causes. In this way, the people 
are sustained in that belief in the unavoidability of 
wars, which is just what the dynasties require for the 
maintenance of their absolute rule. Should a new 
Kant one day arise, who, with his brilliant simplicity, 
will merely call things by their right name, then the 
dynasty will find a way to bring him to reason. Even 
in the case of Kant, it has succeeded to such an extent 



THE ORIGIN OF THE WAR 243 

that our Konigsberg philosopher is to-day not known 
at any university as a RepubHcan and champion of 
international law; his name is associated only with 
the theory of knowledge. 

Whenever I talk with a socialist, and he explains 
that capital is at the root of all evil, that wars will 
cease as soon as the villainous capitalist domination 
is got rid of, etc., I always think of an incident which 
befell an officer's orderly. 

He brought his master's sick horse to a veterinary 
surgeon for advice. After examination the surgeon 
gave him a powder with the following instructions : 
"Take a piece of thick paper, make a roll of it, put the 
powder inside, put the roll into the animal's mouth, 
and then vigorously blow the powder into its throat." 
The following day the servant came back with a woe- 
begone, sallow face, and, when the veterinary surgeon 
inquired whether he had carried out his instructions, 
faintly replied : "Yes, doctor, but the animal blew 
first." For years the Social Democrats boasted of 
their powder for the sick horse. Two years before 
the outbreak of war, in Berne and Bale, they threat- 
ened it with a terrible Revolution by way of a laxative. 
But when it came to action, the Junkers — blew first. 
Yes, and since then the Scheidemanns, Davids, Heines, 
Lensches, Siidekums, and their associates have been 
running about the country with sallow faces and hid- 
ing their chagrin under loud abuse of the capitalism — 
of others. 

Dynastic Statesmanship and War 

If wars, as is proved by universal history, arise, 
on the one side, from a dynastic will to power, yet 



244 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 

they, on the other, demand justification in the eyes 
of the people. Before the introduction of universal 
military service, when wars were still the unquestioned 
private concern of monarchs, the people (excepting 
perhaps those inhabiting the theatres of war) were 
mostly disinterested lookers on. But since every citi- 
zen has become liable to general military service, a 
dynasty can only wage such wars as have the consent 
of their peoples. This consent it creates by an appeal 
to the need of defence and the patriotism of its citi- 
zens. 

If, then, wars are, on the one hand, the means of 
existence and the object in life of dynasties, they are, 
on the other hand, from the point of view of the 
peoples, struggles for safeguarding the national exis- 
tence. That is to say, what for the dynasties is only 
a pretext for the attainment of their secret ends is, in 
the eyes of the people, a sacred, serious actuality. 

Dynasties have been commissioned by the gods to 
look after the happiness and independence of the peo- 
ples under their sway. Hence, they pose as guardians 
and promoters of national interests, and the people 
have all the greater confidence in them, in that, in the 
hour of peril, any opposition is made a penal ofYence. 
In principle, therefore, the policy of every dynasty is 
directed to the end of proving to its subjects their 
incapacity for self-defence and self-government, while 
holding itself up as the indispensable instrument of 
national independence. This policy, which is summed 
up under the name of ^'Statesmanship," is only in 
the rarest cases dictated by the demands of the general 
welfare. When, for example, a war breaks out, it is 
always concluded with an eye to dynastic interests. 



THE ORIGIN OF THE WAR 245 

Intentionally, or accidentally, but in any event, in- 
stinctively, the demands of the common weal are 
passed over, so that the peace just concluded contains 
the germ of a fresh conflict, by the successful settle- 
ment of which the dynasties may reap fresh laurels 
and once more demonstrate their indispensability. 

Let us adduce a few instances : After the Russo- 
Turkish war, Bismarck prevented the absorption by 
Bulgaria of Macedonia, though the latter was Bul- 
garian both in language and sentiment. He thus ran 
counter to the justifiable aspirations of the Mace- 
donians, who remained under the detested Turkish 
yoke. Why did Bismarck act thus? He, as the repre- 
sentative of dynastic interests, regarded the national 
aspirations of the Macedonians as an absolutely un- 
important matter. His purpose was not to pacify the 
Balkan States and to group the peoples according to 
the principle of nationalities. No! his chief object 
was not to weaken, to any great extent, the friendly 
Osmanli dynasty as against the semi-inimical Roma- 
noff dynasty. This pre-eminently important object 
was worth several wars, and Bismarck attained it by 
reversing the Peace of San Stefano, which, to some 
degree, satisfied the principle of nationalities, and by 
restoring Bulgarian Macedonia to Turkey. The prac- 
tical issue of this statesmanship was three sanguinary 
revolutions of the Macedonians against the loathed 
Turkish despotism and almost half a dozen Balkan 
wars. Had the Macedonians and Bulgarians been ac- 
corded their due rights on the previous occasion, the 
notorious Balkan problem would have been practically 
settled and there would no longer have been a "witches' 
cauldron" in Europe. But would not the '^Russian 



246 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 

predominance" in the Balkans have then become in- 
tolerable? Could the Hapsburgs and HohenzoUerns 
tolerate that? No! the important thing was, on the 
one hand, to prevent the Romanoff trees from grow- 
ing too high, and, on the other hand, to keep the 
"witches' cauldron" seething in the Balkans. For, 
if the diplomacy working for dynastic ends no longer 
possessed such a 'Vitches' cauldron," this would in- 
volve the loss of a number of things without which 
politics would be very tedious, for instance, the 
"menace to the Austrian sphere of interest in the 
Balkans," or the "peril of Russian preponderance," 
or the "machinations of Panslavism," etc., etc. This 
cauldron had to be kept boiling in Europe. It afforded 
occupation for the diplomats, provided the nations with 
endless disputes and occasions for mutual abuse, and 
finally served Herr von Bethmann Hollweg, in 19 13, 
with a pretext for his tremendous Army Bill. All 
this is infinitely more important than all the interests 
of the Macedonians, Bulgarians, Serbs, and Greeks 
put together! 

In 1 87 1, Bismarck annexed Alsace-Lorraine in spite 
of the protests of its inhabitants.^ The consequences 

* Bismarck was no blind enthusiast for annexation in the sense 
of our modern Pan-Germanists. In 1866 he prevented the in- 
tended annexation of Austrian territories, not merely in the 
hope of a subsequent alliance, but, as he writes in his "Reflec- 
tions and Reminiscences": "I asked myself, as regards terri- 
torial aggrandisement at the expense of Austria and Bavaria, 
whether it was probable, in any future wars, that after Prussian 
officials and military had been withdrawn they would yet remain 
faithful to Prussia and receive orders at its hands." Similarly, 
in 1871, he vigorously (though in vain) raised his voice against 
the incorporation of the French-speaking part of Lorraine. This 
attitude of Bismarck does not alter, but, rather, on the contrary, 
confirms the fact that his policy was everywhere only determined 



THE ORIGIN OF THE WAR 247 

are well known: the French thirst for revenge (which, 
as we have seen, is really a demand founded on inter- 
national law). From that time forth, Germany was 
haunted by a terrible bogey ; each time that the Reichs- 
tag makes a show of resisting the arch-reactionary 
policy of its rulers, this bogey is brought up and it 
never fails in its effect. Triple Alliance, Dual Al- 
liance, colossal armaments, encirclement, etc., are, as 
it were, developed automatically by the agency of this 
bogey, and make it more formidable every day. Thus, 
we must be grateful that we have the strongest army 
in the world, and must take care that it remains the 
strongest. For "our peace only depends upon our 
military equipment." In view of this constantly in- 
creasmg insecurity, we must, as Professor Delbriick 
tells us, be more than glad that "the decision lies with 
those who look far ahead." Who, in the face of this 
serious situation, would dare to prate about democratic 
constitutional changes, less severe military discipline, 
etc.? Alas! for us, if we, like .France, possessed 
a miserable "Parliamentary Arrrjy"; immediately the 
French revanche would destroy us. Every German 
feels that under such circumstances the dynastic su- 
preme control of army and policy is an iron necessity 

by regard for dynastic interests and future wars. He does not 
protest against the annexations in the name of the peoples con- 
cerned, but only in the interest of his lord and master. He fears 
not the hate of the annexed or the disapproval of the civilised 
v^orld, but only the possibility of disastrous wars in the future. 
Thus, from the democratic standpoint, Bismarck can only be 
regarded as the most violent opponent of the modern ideal of 
international arbitration, that is, as the most thorough and most 
successful regenerator of the dynastic policy of power in the 
last century. 



248 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 

for Germany. Thus, in the most natural manner in 
the world, these continual menaces from without be- 
come the most cogent reasons against all reforms from 
within, and the astutest statesman is the man who 
knows how to furnish a constant supply of fresh 
menaces. 

In 1908, in defiance of the existing treaties, Austria 
annexed Bosnia and Herzegovina, and thereby caused 
in Serbia an irritation similar to that caused in France 
by the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine. In the same way 
as the French thirst for revenge hangs like a perpetual 
threat above the head of Germany, so have, hitherto, 
"Serbian intrigues'' hung like a millstone round the 
neck of Austria-Hungary; they finally imperilled the 
existence of the Dual Monarchy to such an extent 
that the latter was, in dire necessity, compelled to 
appeal to arms. Had Bismarck, in 1878, humoured 
the national aspirations of the Bulgarians, had not Aus- 
tria annexed Bosnia, and by the artificial creation of 
Albania blocked out Serbia from the seaport she had so 
painfully won, then this whole policy would have found 
a simple solution, in accordance with the national weal 
and the principle of nationalities. But then the business 
of the world-power politicians would have been at an 
end : the Austrian politicians, with their brazen-faced 
falsifications (vide the Friedjung case, the Agram 
case, the Prochaska case, etc.), would not have been in 
a position to testify to the Serbian intrigues, and 
everything would have become very dull. 

The obvious result of these simple solutions would, 
however, have been that the nations living at peace 
would eventually have demanded democratic reform, 
and might, perchance, have asked what purpose was 



THE ORIGIN OF THE WAR 249 

served by divine dynasties, standing armies, etc., when 
there was no menace to be feared from without. Na- 
tions who have nothing else to do begin philosophising. 
But philosophising nations are revolutionary, danger- 
ous nations. Metternich and Bismarck knew this full 
well. They and their successors took good care to 
stifle this threatening development. The simplest 
method for the purpose is never to allow the people to 
enjoy peace of mind, to keep them by perpetual threats 
in constant apprehension, and so prove to them contin- 
ually that they are incapable of self-government. 

Hence, the most marked feature of dynastic state- 
craft is the art of, from time to time, conjuring up new 
bogeys, which are held up before the people on suitable 
occasions, in order to keep them in a state of sub- 
mission, to wean them from all democratic aspirations, 
and, one fine day, to utilise the artificially created 
witches' cauldron and bogeys as pretexts for fresh 
wars. It is all a policy of poking the fire with the 
sword. In the same way as beasts of burden are, in 
North Africa, goaded on by having their festering 
wounds constantly tickled with a stick, so are the peo- 
ples of Europe ever driven forward into new dangers 
of war and armaments by never allowing the old 
wounds to heal, but always opening and irritating them 
afresh. Hence It results that wars are an unavoidable 
and indispensable element of the divine order of things. 

Down almost to 1900, Germany's bogey was "French 
revanche" ; then it was the "encirclement" brought 
about at The Hague, or the *Tanslavist danger" threat- 
ening in the Balkans. Poor Austria, on the contrary, 
had constantly to struggle against the Russian designs 
in the Balkans and against "Serbian intrigues." At 



250 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 

length this ^'higher poHcy" became a wondrous chain 
of effects, and these effects became causes, until the 
ordinary human intelligence was absolutely bewildered. 
For, as it is almost invariably forbidden by the 
police to call the secret ambitions and ideals of this 
dynastic secret diplomacy by their right names, at 
length they come to be regarded as merely instances 
of "superior judgment," and the humble citizen bows 
respectfully before the high authorities who ^'look so 
far ahead." 

But, by means of this statecraft, the dynasties, as 
clearly pointed out, also secure the internal political 
conditions requisite for the maintenance of their 
despotism. It is clear that dynasties faced by loud 
threats of and preparations for war cannot possibly 
have either time or money for democratic reforms. 
Armaments become, under such circumstances, the 
first law for the safety of the State, the Alpha and 
Omega of all financial and taxation policy. A State 
which argues logically (and Germany has in this re- 
spect remained the fatherland of logic) is bound, under 
such conditions, to devote all its energies to the perfect- 
ing of its armaments ; whoever now talks of democratic 
and social and political reforms is a traitor and wants 
to reduce us to a state of defencelessness, etc. 

What, then, is the secret of this God-inspired dynas- 
tic policy, which is constantly engendering quarrels 
and war? What is its position? A terribly simple 
and commonplace one. It is the purely instinc- 
tive impulse of dynasties for self-preservation and self- 
aggrandisement ; the very same impulse that causes the 
artisan to demand such an increase of wages as he 
deems necessary for his existence and general comfort 



THE ORIGIN OF THE WAR 251 

is, mutatis mutandis, the cause of wars. Were the 
dynasties no longer the rulers of the nations, were 
they, for their higher wages, compelled to rely upon 
their own resources, then wars would be impossible. 

If the concern of the dynasties for their own exist- 
ence and for the extension of their power were not the 
secret mainspring of European politics, that is to say, if 
politics were guided in conformity with the views of 
the people, we should no longer have in Europe an 
Alsace-Lorraine, a Polish, a Macedonian, or an Irre- 
dentist question to deal with. The peoples would long 
since have settled these points comformably with their 
own interests and wishes, and not troubled their heads 
about "spheres of interests" and "world-power 
policy." Europe would have long since become a 
gigantic Switzerland with a thousand cantons, a 
hundred tongues, terrible wars of the pen, amazingly 
revolutionary "modern ideas," serious collisions be- 
tween Capital and Labour — would be, in short, engaged 
in a heated and continuous struggle for progress, but 
yet would be a Europe of true culture living in peace. 
But all this would have been too human, too simple, 
and too beautiful. In a Europe constituted on such 
lines the dynasties would have become superfluous. 
And so it is only they who have thwarted this free 
autonomy of the. nations, that is to say, have obstructed 
the beautiful policy of simple solutions and have 
promoted the welfare of the people after their own 
fashion. Everything may be demanded of a man and 
even of a dynasty, save only the renunciation of the 
basis of its existence. Whoever attacks this will 
always meet with the most bitter resistance. This 
free autonomy of the nations is not, to be sure, a direct 



252 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 

attack upon the existence of the dynasties (England, 
Italy, Denmark, Sweden, etc., are proofs of this), but 
it is, none the less, a step in this direction, that is to 
say, it is a limitation of their powers and influence. 
Hence their open or secret, but always embittered, 
resistance against International Law and everything to 
do with it.^ 



The Meaning of the Present World War 

We have formulated the conditions under which 
war must remain an inevitable and periodically recur- 



*C/. here note to p. i8i. The Proclamation — in defiance of 
every conception of International Law and of Nationality — of 
the Kingdom of Poland on November 5th, 1916, is a fresh proof 
of the fact that the dynasties now as ever are intent upon pur- 
suing their arbitrary policy of self-interest, despite the fact that 
this is bound to bring about fresh wars. Owing to the fact that 
the Prussian Poles — as expressly set out in that manifesto — 
remain Prussians, and the Austrian Poles remain Austrians, the 
new kingdom (if it ever materialises) by its composition and 
situation will present grave dangers. Instinctively and inevi- 
tably it would strive for the emancipation of its brothers "op- 
pressed" by Prussia and Austria. In this it would, of course, 
be able to reckon upon the open or covert assistance of the — 
in this case, defeated — Entente. There would be no end to in- 
trigues, and these would, of course, immediately be made a pre- 
text for reprisals on the part of the Central Powers. Thence 
would ensue, on the part of Germany, the same policy against 
Russia that Austria has hitherto pursued against Serbia, and 
Germany against France. Fresh conflicts and frictions would 
be the inevitable result, until, one day, the sword would again 
have to ward off those machinations, and secure the peace of 
the world. An absolutely free Poland would be one of the most 
powerful guarantees for the peace of Europe. But a free and 
united Poland would comprise not only Warsaw, but also Lem- 
berg, Cracow, Ratibor, Beuthen, and Posen. 



THE ORIGIN OF THE WAR 253 

ring evil. Yet many a monarch has gone to war under 
the pretext of furthering his people's good, and with 
the secret intention of adding a fresh pearl to his 
crown, but, instead of this, has secured the victory of a 
principle which had served him only as a pretext. 
Thus, Gustavus Adolphus was desirous of increasing 
the fame and power of his dynasty, and became in fact 
the executor of the Reformation. It was Napoleon's 
dream to become Emperor of Europe and make vassal 
kings of all the members of his dynasty. As a result of 
this endeavour, he became the pioneer of the new 
social principles established by the Revolution. 

The present World War affords a perfect instance 
of this ''dualism" of war. At its root is, manifestly, 
the world-power dream of the Hohenzollerns. Like all 
dynasties which have acquired power and prestige, the 
Hohenzollerns became intoxicated with the idea of 
world-power. This is so logical and is so grounded in 
the very nature of all dynasties, that we have not the 
smallest right to upbraid the Hohenzollerns on this 
account. Take whatever dynasty you please (includ- 
ing the Papacy of the Middle Ages) : they all had their 
dream of world dominion, w^hich they sought to realise, 
sword in hand. Only Rome succeeded in attaining it, 
for a few centuries. But always a military defeat was 
necessary in order to induce the dynasties to forego 
their aims. The Merovingians and the Lancasters, the 
Hapsburgs and the Capets, the Hohenstaufens and 
the Bonapartes, the Caliphs and the Popes, had first 
to be convinced, on sanguinary fields of battle, that 
world-empires have no place in the plans of Divine 
Providence. 

But side by side with this Hohenzollern bid for 



254 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 

world-power, the present war presents another aspect, 
given it by the peoples concerned. In fact, if we leave 
the privy dynastic ambitions out of account for a 
moment, and only view this war from the standpoint 
of the nations, it presents itself to us as a terrible 
collision between two conceptions of the world which 
are now striving together for predominance in Europe. 
This antagonism which is now being brought to a 
sanguinary issue may be expressed in a great many 
equally correct formulae. For instance, the Right of 
Might, or the Might of Right? Machiavelli or Kant? 
Sparta or Athens? The nation which possesses an 
army, or the army which possesses a nation? Bis- 
marck or Jaures? The right of the nations to free 
autonomy, or the right of the dynasties to their policy 
of self-interest? Idealism or Materialism? The pol- 
icy of nationalities or of despotic rulers? A Civil or 
a Military Constitution? And so on. 

Any one of these antitheses might be used to sym- 
bolise the cause of the World War. 

For us democrats and pacifists, this World War 
represents the final struggle of the dynastic coercive 
policy against the demands of modern humanity. It 
was not these demands of modern humanity that 
brought about this war, but the arrogance of the dynas- 
tic idea. This war, like others before it, might have 
been avoided, had dynasties only understood their age 
and made concessions to it. But what dynasty has 
ever understood the age? What dynasty has ever 
made concessions at the right moment ? It is they and 
they alone who, with their divine rights and powers, 
have always and everywhere opposed the spirit of the 
age and have made a sanguinary settlement inevitable. 



THE ORIGIN OF THE WAR 255 

One would have to be a narrow-minded partisan, a 
half-dead Pan-Germanist, or a professor grown with- 
ered in the service of the State, in order, in the face of 
this conflict of principles now being decided in Europe 
with all the infernal devices of the modern science of 
murder, to represent side-issues as being the real 
origins of the war, and to say, for instance : English or 
German world commerce? English naval supremacy 
or the freedom of the seas? Economic throttling or 
economic expansion of Germany? And so forth. 

Every book published in Germany, in the course of 
this World War, has repeated the same old theme. 
German scholars and statesmen, with their ingrained 
dynastic conceptions, are simply incapable of seeing 
anything in a war except plain, material questions of 
power. And they always employ the term "power" 
in the most material sense of the word. Thus, for 
example, Herr von Biilow writes : — 

"Germany will in future require protection against 
hostility and desires for revenge, both old and new, in 
the West, the East and beyond the Channel ; such pro- 
tection can only be found in the increase of her own 
power. . . . Only if our power, political, economic 
and military, emerges from this war so strengthened 
that it considerably outweighs the feelings of enmity 
that have been aroused, shall we be able to assert with 
a clear conscience that our position in the world has 
been bettered by the war."^ 

In an essay on "The Meaning of the War," Profes- 
sor Otto Hintze says^ : "The two Central Powers of 

* Prince von Bulow, "Imperial Germany." London : Cassell & 
Co., p. xlii. 
^ "Deutschland und der Weltkrieg," pp. 678 et seq. 



256 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 

Europe are in danger of being crushed by the sur- 
rounding countries of our continent. . . . Everything 
must be directed towards frustrating this attempt. We 
intend to maintain our place in the sun ; we intend not 
to allow ourselves to be squeezed out of the rank of the 
World Powers in spite of our closed-in position. . . . 
The predominance of Britain must be broken. ... In 
this struggle against the British naval and world domi- 
nation, we are fighting in the interests of the free 
intercourse of all nations/' and so on. 

Questions of material power, aims of domination, 
increased hostility on every side and immediate prep- 
arations for another war; such, according to our 
statesmen and philosophers, is the meaning and natural 
result of all wars. They are as delighted as children 
as long as we are the strongest. And although they 
maintain that the stronger is always in the right, they 
bewail the ill-success of their country's arms as a na- 
tional shame and a crying wrong. They are incapable 
of discarding for a moment their narrow, nationalist 
conception of the world and of taking a wider view of 
the world's history. If they did so, they would be 
forced to recognise, in the first place, that the dream of 
power has been fatal to every nation (increase of 
material power has always involved both the prepara- 
tion for fresh conflicts and also decadence) ; and, in 
the second place, that the military defeat of a nation 
is invariably followed by a progressive development in 
respect of freedom and culture, by means of which it 
recovers its former political significance. (France, 
after 1870, is the latest and most glorious example of 
this. ) The fact that, in war, it is really not nations but 
only dynasties that are vanquished, and that vanquished 



THE ORIGIN OF THE WAR 257 

dynasties imply victorious nations, finds abundant 
proof in the world's history, but it has never been 
admitted by our scholars, and for very obvious reasons. 
For them war is, what it has always been for the 
dynasties, a duel between brutal appetites for power. 
Or if, like Professor Ostwald, they regard it as a duel 
between two Cultures, the word "culture" is used in 
such a revolting materialistic sense that those who re- 
spect human dignity and freedom are alarmed and dis- 
tressed. 

But only the mediocre intelligence can be content 
with such Central European ideas. No! the World 
War is not a question of the larder ! It is not waged, 
as our Pan-Germanists and Social Democrats imagine, 
for the sake of a few thousand square miles of terri- 
tory, for seaports, colonies, commercial outlets, or, in 
fact, for any material benefits. Like all wars, this one 
will result in alterations in the map and new commer- 
cial treaties. But these are only the most obvious 
among its secondary issues. 

The World War of to-day is actually a struggle 
between two conceptions of the world. Dynasties, 
which always go to war with the secret intention of 
increasing their material and moral power, are, in 
reality, the puppets of the world's history. Against 
their wish and will, they invariably bring about the 
triumph or defeat of some conception of the world. 
The victorious nation gains a new or rejuvenated 
dynasty (with all its reactionary consequences) ; the 
vanquished nation gains a new liberty and a fairer 
human ideal. And this triumph or defeat of a con- 
ception of the world is the real meaning of wars and 



258 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 

their significance in relation to the progress and culture 
of mankind. 

Not that we share the opinion of Bernhardi and 
Treitschke that war is one of the principal instruments 
in effecting human civilisation. On the contrary: 
since war brings reaction to the one and liberty to the 
other, its results are, from the point of view of world- 
citizenship, to promote strife and disunion and to hin- 
der the progress of civilisation. During the last forty 
years there have existed, side by side, two powerful 
States, which, as a result of war, not only developed on 
diametrically opposite lines, but were in every sense 
hostile to one another : France and Germany. On the 
one side, liberty and progress; on the other, reaction 
and decadence in all the true human values. Sedan 
brought France liberty, it brought us reaction ; and it 
was inevitable that this contrast should result in the 
present World War. Thus the culture gained as a 
result of war by the vanquished nation (that is to say, 
by the nation that has been freed from the yoke of its 
dynasty) is always intensely national and not uni- 
versal. From the point of view of world-citizenship 
(and we emphatically repudiate any other) war is con- 
sequently the enemy of culture. 

"The history of the world is the judgment of the 
world." This statement of Schiller is one of the few 
truths that our scholars and journalists have been 
energetic in popularising since the beginning of the 
war, and we unconditionally ourselves endorse it. 

It seems to be a divine and undeviating law of the 
world that in every war victory falls to the protagonist 
possessing the higher right and the nobler culture. 



THE ORIGIN OF THE WAR 259 

Kant declares emphatically: "We see then that 
Nature is absolutely determined that right shall 
conquer in the end." And the history of the past 
century is a striking proof of the truth of these sayings 
of Schiller and Kant. 

But what is Right? We have already compared 
the dynastic and the democratic conceptions of the 
world and we have seen that all civilised communities, 
with the exception of Germany, Austria, Russia, and 
Turkey, have developed in accordance with the demo- 
cratic idea outlined by the great French Revolution. 
We may therefore assume that **Right" is where the 
majority of civilised mankind feel it to be, hence, in 
this case, undoubtedly, where the right of the nations 
to self-government is recognised, if only in theory. In 
like manner, the nobler culture must be sought for 
where this right to self-government, both within and 
without, is felt to be the unalterable basis (or, at all 
events, the ideal) of the modern State. 

If we examine the results of the chief wars of the 
past century in relation to this question, we can easily 
prove that, in every case, dynastic and historical right 
has had to lay down its arms before the right of the 
nations to self-government. 

The newly founded French Republic was victorious 
all along the line, against the coalition of the European 
dynasties. And why? It was defending the principle 
of the sovereignty of the people which it had itself 
proclaimed. Similarly, Napoleon remained victorious 
over his opponents so long as he remained the cham- 
pion of the rights of humanity proclaimed by the Great 
Revolution; but as soon as he deserted the cause of 
,freedom and scoffed openly at the new principle of 



26o THE COMING DEMOCRACY 

nationalities, the national sense of honour, both in 
Prussia and elsewhere, was stirred to such indignation 
that his fall became inevitable. In all the Balkan wars 
of the past century the principle of nationalities 
prevailed over the dynastic idea of absolutism. From 
1827 down to 19 12, the Turks were worsted in almost 
every campaign and forced to yield their independence 
to Greeks, Bulgarians, Serbians, and Roumanians in 
succession. Similarly, Prussia, in 1866 and 1870, found 
herself, as against Austria and France, playing the role 
of a champion of a national ideal. Granted that God be 
omniscient. He could scarcely have foreseen that the 
Prussian dynasty would subsequently take advantage of 
the German ideal of national unity in order to outrage 
the principle of nationalities ; although Bismarck had, 
after 1866, presented us with a Reichstag, and from 
1866 until 1870 ruled on fairly liberal lines. At that 
time, the Hohenzollern dynasty represented the higher 
right as against the craving for domination of the 
Hapsburgs and the Bonapartes; the latter had to 
succumb because they disputed this higher right.^ 
Consider the military history of Russia. Why has she 
been vanquished in all the wars of the past century? 
Because, both within and without, she was revealed as 
the bitter foe of popular autonomy. And why was she 

*We have already seen (pp. 112-4) to what extent the wars 
of 1864- 1871 served "purely dynastic interests." The assertion 
that none the less, from the standpoint of the principle of na- 
tionalities, they had right on their side does not entail contra- 
diction. It is, on the contrary, a striking illustration of what 
we have said above (p. 253) concerning the "dualism" of wars. 
If the German idea of unity was a deeply serious matter for the 
German races, for the German dynasty (as the events of 1848 
prove) it was only a pretext for the furtherance of their ambi- 
tions by means of war. 



THE ORIGIN OF THE WAR 261 

victorious in 1877-78 over Turkey? Because, in this 
case, she chanced to come forward as the Hberator of 
oppressed races and helped Bulgaria and Roumania to 
their independence. 

Yes, the history of the world is the judgment of the 
world ; and Kant's saying will remain eternally true. 

Dear readers! We have seen what ideas and 
principles the German dynasty represents in this 
World War. They are manifestly not such as lie in the 
direction of the higher progress of mankind. He who 
stands face to the sun loses the battle. Alas! We 
Germans in this war stand face to the sun of inter- 
national law and liberty. Germany, Austria-Hungary, 
and Turkey have, for the last forty years, held 
themselves aloof from the movement for popular 
self-government. From Armenia to Alsace-Lorraine, 
from Schleswig-Holstein to Bosnia-Herzegovina, they 
have, both at home and abroad, by word and 
by deed, opposed to the right of the nations to free 
self-government their divine rights and despotic prin- 
ciples, which are the very abnegation of all popular 
liberty. The good God may have been "our Ally of 
Rossbach and Dennewitz," and may love us dearly; 
but He cannot make any exception in our favour from 
the eternal laws of His world. 

I, as both democrat and pacifist, must confess that I 
do not desire that He should. For what would happen 
if we Germans emerged victorious from this war? 
Our victory would only mean a strengthening of the 
dynastic principle of arbitrary power all along the line. 
Those of us who bewail the political backwardness of 
our Fatherland must realise that a "German" victory 



262 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 

would prolong this backward condition for centuries. 
And not only Germany but the whole of Europe would 
have to suffer the consequences. All the political 
liberties painfully achieved during two centuries would 
give way before the omnipotence of the victorious 
dynasty and only their shadow would remain. Our 
Polish policy, which even Professor Delbriick severely 
censured, would be extended to the newly conquered 
territories and in an even more brutal form. There 
would be in Europe only as much liberty of thought 
and of the Press as the German dynasty would 
allow ; and we are well aware how little it does allow. 
The Burgfricden, which has been developed into a 
systematic negation of all citizen rights, would (just 
like the Socialist law after 1871) become a permanent 
institution in the land of intellectual liberty. And, 
just as Professor Delbriick blessed Bismarck because 
he had known how to mutilate the Ems telegram in the 
interests of German unity, so now a hundred Delbriicks 
would rise up and glorify the man who invented 
Cossack invasions and bombs from aeroplanes in 
order to win popularity for this victorious war. The 
victor is not accountable to anybody; in his honour, 
new sciences and new codes of morals are invented, 
applauding nations wait upon his wishes, and whoever, 
amid this lofty enthusiasm, ventures a word as to the 
universal morality is at once outlawed and imprisoned. 
To talk of a right of nations to self-government 
would be Use majeste. States such as Switzerland, 
Holland, and Denmark would only with the greatest 
difficulty preserve their national independence, and, 
at most, for ten years. For a thousand learned pro- 
fessors, following in the footsteps of Treitschke and 



THE ORIGIN OF THE WAR 263 

Chamberlain, would perpetually demonstrate that the 
Dutch, the Swiss, the Danes, etc., are but "lost sons 
of the great Germanic family," until these unhappy 
nations would themselves believe in it at last, or be 
compelled "by the right of the sword" to believe in it. 

All republican ideas would pale before the brilliancy 
of the divine dynasty now ruling in Europe. Europe 
would become a China (and not even a modern 
China), in which learned Mandarins, after the manner 
of Ostwald, would realise their "energetic impera- 
tive" — in other words, succeed in subordinating all 
human activities to the higher honour of the dynasty, 
in a kind of Taylorian theorem. 

And all this glorious technical culture would be 
under the supervision of the noble officer, with his 
divine privileges. Whenever anyone dared open his 
mouth in the name of intellectual liberty and human 
dignity, as being outside the dynastic sphere, he 
would soon bring the "reptiles" to their senses and 
receive congratulatory telegrams and decorations from 
Berlin. What little Switzerland dared do in the 
'eighties, namely, to reject forthwith Bismarck's 
insolent demands (the affair Wohlgemuth), she would 
now have to suffer for. And not only this "nest of 
democracy" (as Bismarck then called Switzerland) 
would be at once cleared out and lose all its indepen- 
dence ; but all other European States in which "demo- 
cratic intrigues" could be detected would have to 
expect a second Wohlgemuth or Prochaska affair, 
and, probably, an Ultimatum. Democracy would be 
dead in Europe, and any reference of it would be a 
crime. 

Where would there be any check upon this dynasty 



264 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 

ruling from Antwerp to Bagdad absolutely, and from 
Haparanda to Gibraltar morally? Perhaps German 
Social Democracy? The very idea provokes a smile. 
The noisy champions of revolution have, owing to 
a few bombs from aeroplanes and inroads of Cos- 
sacks, become so submissive, that a dynasty returning 
triumphant from the war would not need a new 
Socialist law to keep them in subjection. 

There would, in fact, be no longer checks upon the 
dynasty. France, to which, for a hundred years past, 
the nations have looked up with quiet hopes, would 
now be utterly crushed. England, the home of 
Liberalism, would be forced, in order not to lose her 
independence, to expend all her energies on armaments 
(that is to say, to renounce Liberalism). Neighbourly 
relations would be opened up with Russia, and the 
whole of Europe would be forced into a fresh, terrible 
armament policy (as foretold by Herr von Biilow). 
On the one hand, under England's leadership, the 
nations great and small (which are to-day neutral) 
which had been entirely or partially annexed, as well 
as the threatened States, would be thirsting for 
revenge, that is to say, for liberty; and, on the other, 
the new German World-power, which in another 
twenty years would be encompassed with so many 
fresh threats, intrigues, jealousies, and witches' caul- 
drons, that, once again, with a "clear conscience," 
she would be compelled to take the field in order to 
safeguard the world's peace. 

And do you, dear reader, wish us to take this 
terrible backward step into the Middle Ages? You 
wish Napoleon's prophecy, "Europe will within a 
century be either democratic or Cossack," to be 



THE ORIGIN OF THE WAR 265 

realised in the sense of this latter possibility? Can 
we, as Germans, really desire that? But whether 
we wish it or not, the world's history takes its own 
inexorable course. And, since it is impossible that a 
Cossack Europe should form part of the design of the 
world's history, the German dynasty cannot and will 
not be victorious in this war. Europe will be demo- 
cratic ! 

That the victory of democracy need not imply 
the annihilation of the German people and its future 
part in the world is also vouched for by the history 
of the world. Vanquished dynasties are not only not 
vanquished nations, but even emancipated nations. 
This was not only the case in England, France, Hol- 
land, and Switzerland, but even in China. Why should 
it not be equally the case in Germany? Is universal 
history to make an exception in our case? Are we 
more stupid than the Chinese? 

And supposing we were: the world's history is 
remorseless; it would cut off our pigtails, however 
much Scheidemann and Siidekum might bewail that 
our nation was being destroyed. 

"It is the implacable will of Nature that right should 
finally prevail." 

"The history of the world is the judgment of the 
world." 

We should be interested to know whether all the 
gentlemen w^ho at the commencement of the war 
triumphantly shouted this sentence will still testify 
to its truth when, as is inevitable, the German people, 
as the result of this war, will be found to have 
conquered not provinces but only liberties. Will they 
have the courage to admit that our dynasty could not 



266 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 

conquer because she was not defending the higher 
right and the nobler culture? Or will they have the 
effrontery to contest the logic of the world's history 
which they themselves only yesterday proclaimed, 
merely because the history of the world is, in fact, 
the judgment of the world? 



VIII 

ONWARD! TO DEMOCRACY! 

Dynasty or Humanity? 

To THE German Reader! 

You may, for the first moment, feel that the 
freedom with which I have spoken of German condi- 
tions, and of the origin and meaning of the World 
War, shows a want of patriotism. And even if, as I 
know is bound to happen, your own investigation of 
the Constitution and politics of Germany completely 
confirms the above conclusions (for there can be no 
refutation of actual facts), yet you will perhaps still 
hesitate to give me your countenance. Our German 
Constitution is so wreathed about with democratic 
garlands, and, on the other hand, respect for the 
dynasty is so deeply rooted in the German spirit, that, 
although at bottom we have the same democratic 
yearnings as other nations, we instinctively oppose the 
logical establishment of the real truth. 

This has been my own experience. That one should 
maintain, as the result of studies in history and consti- 
tutional law, that we really possess not a Fatherland 
but only a dynasty, and this at a time when millions 

267 



268 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 

of Germans are bleeding and dying, weeping and 
wasting, for this supposed Fatherland? Is this not 
betrayal of the Fatherland? Is this justifiable in any 
German at the present time ? 

While I was still weighing this question in my mind, 
I thought of Bernhardi, Ostwald, Chamberlain, 
Schlidemann, Frymann, Liman, Harden, Georg Bern- 
hard, Leimdorfer, Lasswitz, who are among the most 
famous people in Germany. I was even so lacking in 
modesty as to compare myself for a moment with these 
celebrities. I admired their patriotism, their deep 
understanding of culture, their style, in short, all their 
profoundly flaunted Germanism, and I began to lose 
confidence in myself. For to my shame I must admit 
that I am neither so learned nor yet of such exotic 
origin as they. For all these gentlemen are of Russian 
or Polish or English origin, and as it has become an 
established custom in our country that foreigners 
and Jews should represent pure and undefiled Ger- 
manism, I have really no right, under these circum- 
stances, to speak as a German to Germans. 

It is, then, to some extent an act of presumption 
if a German, who is neither Russian nor English nor 
Slav nor Jew, but a Prussian who in his youth excelled 
his schoolmates in the enumeration of the Prussian 
kings and their battles, should to-day present himself 
before his countrymen with the intention of speaking 
to them about Germany. The development of German 
culture has raised the intellectual charlatans and half- 
castes to such high consequence among us that, at 
the present day, in the German Fatherland, the true 
German wears a somewhat pitiable aspect. 

It seems to me that here, more than anywhere, we 



ONWARD! TO DEMOCRACY! 269 

have indeed been "actually attacked"; attacked in 
our true Germanism, our most sacred feelings and 
traditions. And it was just because I felt that, from 
the standpoint of classical Germanism, we have to 
wage a sacred defensive war against the representatives 
of culture in present-day Germany, that the examina- 
tion which I have made in this book — however revo- 
lutionary it may appear at the first glance — seemed 
to me necessary for the restoration to health of the 
German nation. 

Is it necessary or possible or right that to-day, 
when the World War has slaughtered and crippled 
and ruined millions of men, and has destroyed 
innumerable cultural values, we should accord 
unconditional approval to the wisdom of these intel- 
lectual celebrities? Ought we to look upon 
this world-drama (the greatest in the history of the 
world) with that enforced respect for the dynasty 
w^hich has been drilled into us? Must we give 
credence to the official description of a "maliciously 
attacked Germany," despite all the documentary 
evidence and the conduct and traditions of Prussia 
during the last decade ? Is it right that, following the 
example of certain pacifists and socialists, we should 
explain the World War with learned phrases, merely 
in order to evade the painful necessity of calling the 
true cause of the war by Its right name? 

Our Government may possibly have succeeded, by 
the aid of its foreign and Jewish champions of culture. 
In breeding among our nation a kind of fetish belief 
in the dynasty; but we remain none the less a people 
who have learnt to think logically, and who, like all 
genuinely civilised nations, strive instinctively towards 



270 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 

democracy. In the end, as Napoleon said, the spirit 
always triumphs over the sword. And even supposing 
that our dynasty were to emerge completely victorious 
from this war, none the less it could not prevent 
inexorable logic from bringing us at last to the bitter 
recognition that in this war the dynasty set itself 
against our nation and against the whole of humanity. 

Dynasty or Humanity? That is the question here. 
That is the meaning of the World War. 

And being confronted with this question, we declare 
ourselves frankly for Humanity. For a dynasty is 
never more than an accident in the world's history. 
Even if it be descended from the gods, it is 
prone to error and to evil purposes. But Humanity 
is not an accident; Humanity too is descended from 
the gods, and with this advantage over the dynasties, 
that it can neither err nor fulfil evil purposes. 
Humanity is the meaning of the world; and, what- 
ever Prussian Privy Councillors may say. Humanity 
is also the meaning of history. 

The conscience of Humanity is eternal and infallible. 
Even for dynasties the fatal saying is true, that man 
is longer under the earth than on it. But this is not 
true of Humanity. A hundred dynasties, fatherlands, 
and nations pass away; Humanity remains. Un- 
touched by catastrophes and individual purposes, it 
marches on. Slowly but surely. Humanity marches 
ever onwards and upwards, towards more light, free- 
dom, happiness, and human dignity. 

In the light of this truth, what are high treason, 
unpatriotic sentiments, and the like? Merely the 
conception of a moment, a crime in a space of a 
few square miles, the anger of a government of a few 



ONWARD! TO DEMOCRACY I 271 

years. Certainly it is our duty, as members of a 
fatherland, to serve it and obey its laws. But when, 
as here, our Fatherland obeys an alien will, thereby 
setting itself in opposition to the eternal laws of 
humanity, we have no longer the right to affront 
humanity with patriotic stubbornness. 

The dynasties have, in fact, always set themselves 
against humanity. Every other page of the world's 
history furnishes proof of it. At the very beginning, 
when we were still half brutes, when you and I still 
instinctively fell upon one another, whenever we 
encountered each other at some turn of the road, the 
chiefs and the dynasties which sprang from them may 
have exercised a certain influence on humanity in the 
direction of order and civilisation. It is possible to 
go further and to say that (with the possible exception 
of the United States) national unity has in every case 
been due to the dynasties. The proudest French 
republicans admit that it was the Capets who made 
their Fatherland great, so that the Revolution was 
able to take it over from them on behalf of the people. 
Even though Switzerland was never actually ruled by 
a dynasty, its national unity was indirectly brought 
into being by dynasties. 

But at the present day, when the national develop- 
ment has been, as it were, accomplished entirely, 
and when it is only a question of rounding off the 
national unities in accordance with the wishes of the 
people, and of securing their political independence? 
To-day, when throughout the civilised world we 
find organised administrative bodies? What higher 
meaning and function can the dynasties by divine 
right have in this modern world? In ancient times. 



272 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 

when they themselves, at the head of their tribe, were 
the first to go forth to battle and the last to come 
home, they might still, with some justification, claim 
the governing authority. For then they lived, fought, 
thought and spoke in the midst of their tribe; they 
had grown up with them, they knew their feelings and 
needs, and, in virtue of their spiritual and physical 
superiority, they had a natural right to leadership and 
authority. But the times have changed. Among the 
old Germans, leadership conferred upon the man not 
only dignity, but also an obligation; at the present 
day, on the contrary, it confers dignity on the man 
but relieves him from all obligation. The dynasty 
of the Hohenzollerns is a warrior dynasty of the 
first rank, yet every member of it has died in his 
bed. Your grandfather and mine perchance, though 
members of no warrior dynasty, have yet died a 
soldier's death. And although the World War is not 
yet ended, we know already that the Imperial family 
will have been the only family in all Germany who 
will have sent six sons to the field, and not have lost 
one of them at the conclusion of peace, unless, of 
course, through some unforeseen mishap. Progress 
and the resultant modernisation of war have brought 
it about that the members of the dynastic families no 
longer fight in person, and that their quarrels and 
ambitions have become national concerns. If, in 
former days, it was their duty and their ambition to 
fight at the head of their armies, in these stern days 
of ours it is their highest duty to preserve themselves 
for their peoples ! 

But not only on the field of battle has a new 
morality superseded the old. In other respects progress 



ONWARD! TO DEMOCRACY! 273 

has wrought important changes. In ancient days 
and in the Middle Ages it was easy for a dynasty to 
reign with absolute power. Their States were for the 
most part small, their subjects numerically incon- 
siderable, superstitious, maintained in serfdom, and 
indifferent to politics. The rulers had only to settle 
their affairs with the nobility and the priesthood, 
and governing was therefore a straightforward and 
humanly possible operation, which even now and then 
might bear good fruits, as in the case of Henry IV. 
in France, Henry I. in Germany, and the Great Elector 
in Brandenburg. In the meantime men and conditions 
developed. At the present day Germany alone contains 
as many inhabitants as the whole of Europe in the 
time of Charlemagne. The populations are no longer 
superstitious; they are no longer in a state of serfdom, 
and they are no longer indifferent to politics. Numer- 
ous discoveries have revolutionised our commerce, our 
ideas, and our needs, and have brought into being that 
which we describe collectively as culture. In such an 
age, with such States and ideas, the greatest genius of 
all the centuries would no longer have been capable of 
ruling and deciding absolutely in all things. We have 
been gratified to observe from the various speeches of 
William II. that he understands all things, and that 
all things are subject to his direction and rule! We 
have stood amazed before that proficiency both in 
peace and war which borders on universality ! Yet we 
are compelled to recognise in his case also that which 
applies to every dynasty at the present day ruling by 
divine right : they live in a world completely separated 
from the nation at large; they are so hedged about 
with an artificial barrier that they are deprived of any 



274 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 

free outlook upon the world and mankind; and they 
are maintained by their advisers in a more or less 
complete ignorance of the spirit of the age and of the 
real needs and demands of humanity. 

All our present-day science and technology is op- 
posed to the idea of the divine and the arbitrary. In 
such a world, is it possible that a God-appointed 
dynasty should be the rational embodiment of the 
whole life of a great State? 

To put this question is to answer it. In fact, the 
cultural development of humanity tends in all depart- 
m.ents towards the elimination of arbitrary rule and 
of capricious divinity. Culture is the elimination of 
individual despotism, and the subduing and utilisation 
of the divine natural forces to the service of humanity. 
And we Germans, in particular, have rendered impor- 
tant service in this field. We have even, apart from 
politics, become one of the most democratic nations in 
the world. Our whole organisation in respect of jus- 
tice, finance, local government, taxation, insurance, co- 
operation, is so democratic that it has, at any rate in 
part, become the model for other countries. No other 
nation (least of all France, the fatherland of democ- 
racy) can boast such a democratically organised in- 
come-tax as we. Nowhere, save in England, have the 
co-operative societies and the democratic organisation 
connected with them attained such proportions as in 
Germany. No one claims that our courts of justice 
are perfect, but everyone in Germany is of opinion 
that they afford the best guarantees against possible 
bias and arbitrariness on the part of the judges, and 
that they are one of the most excellent achievements 
of civilisation. Our German town councils are for 



ONWARD! TO DEMOCRACY I 275 

the most part organised on thoroughly democratic 
Hnes. None of my German readers would buy shares 
in a society unless he knew that it submitted every 
year a clear balance-sheet of its proceedings. None 
of my German readers would feel disposed to join an 
association which did not vouchsafe to its members 
at the least a voting right in return for their subscrip- 
tions, or whose managing committee were sedulous in 
inventing a whole philosophy respecting the stupidity 
of its members, and endeavoured to prove that they 
were empowered by God to make whatever use they 
might see fit of the funds of the society. 

All these things we Germans treat as a matter of 
course. The most inveterate supporter of the monarchy 
would not have them otherwise. Now the State is, 
as it were, the biggest joint-stock company and the 
biggest association. We belong to it not of our choice 
and will, but because we were born in it. This State 
demands from us not only taxes, obedience, and 
patriotism, but also, in cases of necessity, our lives. 
It might have been imagined that, under these circum- 
stances, the State would, as a matter of course, be 
subject to the control of its members, and that every- 
thing would be done to fulfil their wishes as far as 
possible. But, in fact, just the opposite is the case : 
the State recognises no duties whatever towards us. 
That which for the board of directors of a joint-stock 
company or the committee of management of an 
association is a matter of course, namely, the voting 
right acquired by the shareholders or members in 
virtue of their subscription, it is a crime on the part 
of the German citizen even to ask for. The dynasty. 



276 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 

which IS the embodiment of the State, rules by divine 
right, that is to say, arbitrarily. 

Dynastic Politics and Culture 

Dynasties which plead divine authority for the 
conduct of their political affairs and obstinately reject 
any popular control can have but one motive for their 
attitude, namely, that their interests are not coincident 
with those of the popular weal. 

In fact, between "politics" as understood and 
desired by nations and politics as conceived by dynas- 
ties there is a deep gulf which apparently can in no 
way be bridged over. 

Ever since Plato there has existed the idea of a 
polity based primarily upon justice and liberty and 
having as its supreme goal the attainment of the 
greatest possible general well-being for the greatest 
possible number of human beings. Since the days 
of ancient Greece there has existed in the world a 
conception of justice and liberty that is sufficient for 
all purposes and is the real criterion of civilisation. 
This conception is not dependent upon any political 
power; its blessings descend upon the just and the un- 
just; it is not bound to any time or to any circum- 
stances, and ought not to be diminished or destroyed 
for the sake of any advantage or in the face of any 
peril. With the immortal proclamation of human and 
citizen rights, it again became the guiding motive of 
State-policy and was proclaimed to the nations as the 
goal of all political endeavour. 

Were dynastic interests compatible with those of 
human welfare, the dynasties would have approved 
this conception of human dignity and international 



ONWARD! TO DEMOCRACY! 277 

right. But history teaches us that they always opposed 
it with all their power. Why? Because their divinely 
inherited right is really incompatible with this 
humanly created right, that is to say, because their 
whole existence was menaced. Therefore they stood 
on their defence and marred and interrupted the work 
of the Great Revolution. Even if, here and there, 
they had to make certain concessions, yet we have 
seen that their fundamental rights (and particularly 
in Germany) have remained entirely unaffected. 
These fundamental rights are, above all, a danger 
to Peace. Hitherto political life has been controlled by 
dynasties; the history of the world has been not 
the work of nations, but a "give and take, and hither 
and thither" of dynastic interests, and thus entirely 
the work of individuals. Wars are the "inevitable,'* 
that is to say, the entirely natural, consequences of 
this state of things. And they will remain so as long 
as European politics, instead of being directed with a 
view to the welfare of the nations, continues to serve 
only dynastic ambitions and intrigues. 

The secret aims of all dynastic politics are its own 
aggrandisement or the prevention of the aggrandise- 
ment of a neighbouring dynasty. These aims are 
served by the military-political organisation of their 
States, by diplomacy and its continuation — war. 

"Augustus drank, and Poland became drunk !" The 
history of the past century proves, alas! that the 
dynasties, in spite of all revolutions, have dipped deeper 
into their cups and have, moreover, kept their peoples 
in a state of intoxication. And in the case of us 
Germans they scored a success, in that we, like most 
drunken people, always maintained we were quite 



278 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 

sober. We have been told by a thousand professors 
that we are the freest people in the world because the 
dynasty was nowhere freer than it is with us.^ But 
one must have long enjoyed freedom in order to 
understand and love freedom. Alas! the dynasties 
never gave us time to become sober and to attain a 
true perception of freedom. It is both their mission 
and their divine right to think only of continual 
aggrandisement, to keep the nations uneasy by a dis- 
play of their power, and to wean them from their 
natural civilising occupations. What right, what lib- 
erty, what peace is possible, when the Fatherland is in 
danger and we have continuously to protect it, by in- 
cessant increase of armaments, against future attacks? 

The dynasties oppose their ideal of a State based 
upon Power to the democratic ideal of a constitutional 
State. Whenever the nations dreamt for a moment of 
the solidarity of all human interests, of justice, peace, 
of a constitution and autonomy, straightway the dynas- 
ties, in the name of their eternally menaced Father- 
land, replied with a demand for veneration of, blind 
obedience to, and confidence in the God-appointed 
rule. In the place of Constitutions, they gave us 
conquered provinces, thereby flattered our national 
vanity, and compelled us to look to the preservation 
of the conquered lands. 

Despite all the achievements of the last century, 
they contrived in this way to keep alive among their 
peoples that sense of ''enmity" which is a necessary 

^ *'We feel ourselves," says Professor Ernst Troltsch, "Deutsch- 
land und der Weltkrieg" (p. 71, Berlin, 1915), "in any event 
freer and more independent in many respects than the citizens 
of the great democracies." We? Professor Troltsch speaks, no 
doubt, in the name of his colleagues. 



ONWARD! TO DEMOCRACY! 279 

factor in their politics, but which, in our modern 
world, has no longer any natural foundation. The 
various nations exhibit differences of ideas, customs, 
temperaments, languages and religions, in the same 
way as they exhibit contrasting interests and aims. 
[But it is only the dynasties who, with their primitive 
and mystic policy of force, have persuaded us that 
war must always be the natural consequence of this 
peaceful rivalry.^ 

''Quidquid delirant reges, plectiintur Achivi" so said 
Horace, and Heine has expressed it, in his own way, 
in German: *'If princes itch, nations must scratch 
themselves.'* And, hitherto, the w^orld's history has 
been nothing but an everlasting itching of dynasties 
and a scratching of the nations for their sake. Inter- 

^How often have not our racial scientists and statesmen em- 
phasised the natural enmity that is supposed to exist between 
Germans and ^Slavs, and is bound to culminate in war. This 
"natural hostility" between Germans and Slavs was nothing but 
a dogma of our racial science, and, when the World War broke 
out, it was declared in Germany (at all events at first) to be a 
crusade against "arrogant Panslavism." Compare with this the 
fact that it was German thinkers and poets who showed the 
deepest sympathy with the tragic fate of Poland. On the first 
division of Poland, Schubert, Zacharias Werner, and J. G. Seume 
lamented in inspired verse the sorrows of our Polish neighbours 
and found a grateful echo in the German people. In the 'thirties 
of last century, in consequence of the ill-starred Polish revolu- 
tion, and its sequel, there sprang up in Germany a whole poetical 
literature on the subject of Poland: Grabbe, Holtei, Lenau, 
Platen, Hebbel (only to name the more important lyricists) 
wrote moving verses on Poland and its unhappy people. The 
whole of Germany applauded them, and some of these poems 
are, even to-day, popular in Germany. This German poetry in 
celebration of Poland is not merely a noble monument for the 
land of poets, but is likewise a striking proof that, despite the 
learned polemics and intrigues of dynastic State politics, no 
natural feeling of enmity exists between the peoples concerned. 



28o THE COMING DEMOCRACY 

national history was like a long-continued serial story 
of brigandage. In each part, for the furtherance of 
^'higher aims," some crime was committed, and at 
the end of each part stood the words: **to be con- 
tinued." 

War engenders war. Until now almost every peace 
has been concluded in accordance with dynastic views, 
and therefore has contained within it the germ of a new 
war. If nations regarded and waged every war only 
as a step towards peace, dynasties, on the contrary, 
regarded it only as a step towards another war. In 
ancient days the exercise of power was limited to the 
duration of war; can we be surprised, therefore, that 
the leaders continued the wars as long as possible, 
and then used all the means at their disposal to conjure 
up fresh wars? Their rank and very existence were 
at stake. No war without leaders, no leaders without 
war. Dynasty and war: the one is inconceivable 
without the other. The world's history shows us on 
every page that not peace but war is the aim of 
dynasties. Peace is for them not an ideal, but only 
the natural intermediate stage before the next war. 

A wolf cannot be expected to fill the part of 
shepherd. It is in the nature of sheep to keep the 
peace and to seek good feeding-ground. It is in the 
nature of wolves to keep the sheep in perpetual fear, 
and to devour them till they can devour no more. 
Civilised nations are, without exception, peace-loving, 
and even if they desire to protect their feeding-ground, 
they have, by the aid of international commerce, so 
organised the world that the feeding problem has long 
since been solved, and is no longer a motive for war 
enterprises. The much-talked of ^'craving for expan- 



ONWARD! TO DEMOCRACY! 281 

sion" of this or that people, even if it existed, would 
nowhere lead to war. But it does not exist; like the 
"enmity" between peoples, it is an artificial product 
of dynastic sophistry and politics. The most densely 
populated countries (China in Asia, and Belgium in 
Europe) have ever been the most peaceful. 

But dynasties, by their very nature, have always 
been soldiers and conquerors. In the House of Hohen- 
zoUern, for example, royal princes are made lieutenants 
of the Guard on the completion of their tenth year.^ 
Can it be marvelled at that all their later actions and 
thoughts are controlled by military conceptions ? Men 
with such an education and habit of thought would 
of necessity feel themselves very superfluous in a world 
of unbroken peace. A world without war and adven- 
ture would necessarily seem to them an insipid and 
tedious world. One who is dubbed a soldier in his 
cradle and surrounded his whole life through by none 
but soldiers is led finally to believe that the whole 
world was only created for soldiers. And what is to 
become of soldiers, if matters are so arranged, that 
henceforth they will find no employment ? A man who 
regards the organisation of armies and the elaboration 
of strategic plans as his life-work is naturally de- 
pressed at seeing all his work and genius become only 

^ Still more pronounced is the military tradition of the House 
of Hapsburg. One of the first orders issued by Emperor Charles 
I. of Austria on his recent accession to the throne was that of 
November 28th, 1916: "I desire that my first-born son, sent me 
by God's grace, shall from now be a member of my brave, heroic 
army, and I therefore make him honorary Colonel-in-Chief of 
my Infantry Regiment No. 17, which henceforth shall bear the 
title 'Crown Prince.'" This new Colonel-in-Chief was then but 
four years old. 



282 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 

of theoretical importance. "Heavens ! If it were only 
the real thing!" exclaimed the German Crown Prince 
on the occasion of a sham cavalry charge. What else 
should he say? It must necessarily appear absurd 
to him that an army should always remain a plaything. 
How galling then it must be to generals and diplomats 
to see their splendid genius packed away as of no 
further practical use. 

If the world were organised for peace, it would at 
length inquire, Why all these armies and generals? 
Why these manoeuvres for the delight of Crown 
Princes? But the world is not organised for peace. 
"Should anyone attempt to assail or violate our good 
right, then strike out with the mailed fist ! And, if God 
wills, wreathe about your young brow with laurels, 
that no one in the German Empire will begrudge you." 
These were the words of William II. to his brother 
Henry on his expedition (December 15th, 1897) to East 
Asia. And God wills it always ! The old German god 
has never allowed eternal peace to last eternally. Al- 
ways there comes a day on which the dynasty is in the 
sad necessity of having to show that army and navy 
are in truth no playthings and that it has been sum- 
moned by God to wreathe laurels round its brow. 
''Diplomacy is traffic in human flesh"; so said Bis- 
marck, who must have known. 

We are no Jacobins and fanatics. It would be 
absurd to reproach us with hating the monarchy per se. 
The lessons of history have not been lost on us. 

And it was in fact a Hohenzollern who defined 
monarchy in a way that we democrats and pacifists 
would subscribe to with alacrity. Frederick IL, 
named the Great, wrote in the year 1738: "Here lies 



ONWARD! TO DEMOCRACY! 283 

the error of most princes. They believe that God has 
created this multitude of men, whose welfare is com- 
mitted to their charge, expressly and out of special 
consideration for their greatness, their happiness and 
their pride, and that their subjects are only destined 
to be the tools and servants of their lower passions. 
Since the principle from which one starts is itself false, 
all the consequences from it must also be unsound : 
for instance, the craving for false glory, the burning 
desire to conquer everything, the burdening of the 
people with crushing taxation, the sloth of the princes, 
their pride, their injustice, their inhumanity, their 
tyranny and all those other vices which degrade human 
nature. If princes would only be persuaded to emanci- 
pate themselves from such erroneous views and to 
recognise once again the purpose for which they were 
instituted, they would perceive that this office of 
which they are so proud, and their elevation to it, has 
been purely the work of the peoples; that these 
thousands of human beings committed to their charge 
by no means made themselves the slaves of a single 
man in order to make him more terrible and more 
powerful still ! that they by no means subjected them- 
selves to a fellow citizen in order to be the victims of 
his caprices and the plaything of his fantasy; but 
that they chose from their midst him whom they 
considered the most upright, to rule over them for 
their good, and to care for them like a father; him 
whom they deemed the most humane, that he should 
sympathise with and aid them in their afflictions; 
him whom they deemed the strongest, that he should 
protect them against their foes; him whom they 
deemed the shrewdest, that he might not involve them 



284 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 

at a wrong time in destructive and ruinous wars; in 
short, the man whom they deemed fittest to repre- 
sent the whole body pohtic, whose sovereign power 
should be a pillar of law and justice and not a means 
of committing crimes and practising tyranny with 
impunity."^ Thus wrote Frederick the Great 175 
years ago. Let us now compare these truly kingly 
words of a Hohenzollern with the imperial words 
of another Hohenzollern and note that between 
the two lies a period of 150 years of democratic 
development : 

"As he (William I.) thought, so do I also think 
and I see in the people and country which I have 
inherited a talent entrusted to me by God, which — 
as it is written in the Bible — it is my duty to increase, 
and concerning which I shall one day have to render 
account. I intend to devote all my energies to putting 
out this talent to such good usury that I shall add to 
it, I trust, many talents more. Those who desire to 
aid me in my task are heartily welcome, whoever they 
may be; but those who oppose me in this work I 
will crush" (Berlin, March 5th, 1890). 

"I may remark, moreover, that the fact that we 
have been enabled to achieve what has been achieved 
is primarily due to the fact that in our House the 
tradition prevails, that we regard ourselves as ap- 
pointed by God, to rein over the peoples whom we have 
been called to rule, and to guide them in accordance 
with their welfare and the furtherance of their 

*"K6mgliche Gedanken und Ausspriiche Friedrichs des 
Grossen," published by the Deutsche Bibliothek in Berlin, pp. 
5 and 6. 



ONWARD! TO DEMOCRACY! 285 

material and spiritual interests" (Bremen, April 21st, 
1890). 

"I do not believe that the Mark of Brandenburg 
will hesitate to follow me on the paths I am treading. 
You know that I regard my whole position and my 
mission as one entrusted to me by God, and that I 
am called to execute the mandates of a Higher Being 
to whom I shall hereafter have to render account" 
(Berlin, February 20th, 1891). 

"He (William I.) came forth from Coblence, on 
ascending the throne, as a chosen vessel of the Lord, 
and as such he regarded himself. For us all, and 
especially for us Princes, he has once more lifted on 
high a jewel and endowed it with greater brilliancy, 
a jewel that we must keep high and holy ; I mean, the 
monarchy by God's grace. The monarchy with its 
heavy duties, its never ending, ever continuing toil and 
labour, with its fearful responsibility to the Creator 
alone, from which no man, no minister, no house of 
deputies and no people can relieve its prince" 
(Coblence, August 31st, 1897). 

I do not believe that there are many Germans who, 
comparing these views of two Hohenzollerns, would be 
inclined to give the preference to that of William 11. 
For, just because Frederick the Great regards the 
monarchy as the work of the people and the King as a 
citizen among citizens, he appears to us more human, 
greater and nobler than his imperial successor, who no 
longer speaks as the "first servant of the State" and 
as a man to his fellow-men, but convulsively clings to 
that divine authority so vigorously denounced by 
his great ancestor, belauds the monarchy as the 
work of Heaven, and speaks to us, on every occasion, 



286 THE COMING DEMOCRACYi 

as the governor of the State, the ruler of his 
subjects. 

To repeat: We are not Jacobins and demagogues. 
We are writing without hatred and passion, as uphold- 
ers of free States and free peoples. We leave to the 
dynasties what belongs to dynasties. Frederick the 
Great found no imitators, least of all in his own house. 
For humanity, genius, and liberalism are, on thrones 
as elsewhere in life, only exceptions. The average in- 
telligence of dynasties will always regard the monarch 
as the earthly representative of God and thus always 
choose out of two possible solutions the one that is 
the less liberal and the less well disposed towards the 
people. The limitations of human dynasties will 
always lead them to discover in Liberalism a direct 
menace to their existence. Kant says ironically: 
"It is not to be expected that kings should become 
philosophers or philosophers kings, nor is it to be 
wished; because the possession of power inevitably 
renders the mind incapable of free judgment." And 
Nietzsche adds (in reference to Germany and the 
Germans) : *The cost of power is high; power 
destroys the intelligence." 

The possession of power does actually rob dynasties 
of their free judgment, of a noble sense of justice, and 
of a rational regard for the interests of others. It is, 
accordingly, only what might have been expected if 
they recognise no limits and laws, in respect to the 
satisfaction of their own energies and ambitions, and 
if they view the world's history as merely a chain of 
glorious martial achievements, for the renewal of 
which they must constantly provide, inasmuch as 
they are the representatives of God and wars 



ONWARD! TO DEMOCRACY! 287 

are an element of the Divine ordering of the world. 

In the eyes of dynasties a nation is a mere rude mass 
and chaos which God has placed in the world for their 
sole pleasure. Dynasties may have the best inten- 
tions, but they are and remain the prisoners of their 
origin and upbringing. Even Frederick II. is not 
styled "the Great'^ because he was a philosopher 
and poet, a friend of Voltaire and the author of the 
"Antimachiavell," but because, in spite of his philo- 
sophical and liberal ideas, he became a great strategist 
and the conqueror of new provinces. And, in our own 
times, we have the case of William II., which, like 
so many others, furnishes a striking proof of the fact 
that a dynasty, even where it regards peace as a 
good thing in principle, is none the less, as a result 
of its mystical, in some degree practical, but 
always profoundly traditional policy of armaments 
and provocations, finally driven into yet another 
war. 

As long as there are dynasties endued with divine 
prerogatives, they will remain, what they must be 
from their very origin, adventurers and not statesmen. 
When their adventures are successful they become 
heroes; when they fail, they forfeit a portion or the 
whole of their power. But, in any event, their concep- 
tion of the world and humanity will remain primitive, 
mystic, pagan and romantic. He who enjoys inter- 
course with the gods can claim a separate moral code 
for himself. Perfidy, deceit, treachery and brutality 
are the necessary accompaniments of all statecraft 
which serves dynastic interests. Military victory 
hallows everything. Guilt is here the necessary 



288 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 

condition of greatness; honour and truth a subject 
for mockery. 

The craving for power knows no other hmit than 
the power of another. In the realm of dynastic poHcy 
everything is a question of brute force. The theory of 
all dynastic policy is competition for the greater power, 
its practice — the butt-end of the musket. The question 
Who is the stronger, the more influential, the wealthier, 
you or I? dominates all. Popular weal and progress 
are merely a phrase and a pretext. Their true phi- 
losophy is the cannon, their right the right of the 
stronger, who remains a darling of the gods so long as 
he does not meet one stronger than himself. The right 
of the brigand too is divine, as long as he does not 
allow himself to be caught ; he too can pose as a darling 
of the gods as long as he can defend himself success- 
fully against the police. 

Why should one blame dynasties for this? The 
thirst for power and riches is in all of us. It is a law 
of our existence, without which there would be no 
progress in the world. In order to keep this "will to 
power" within such bounds as are essential to civil 
order and security we established codes and courts of 
law. These set limits to the "will to power" in private 
life and create what we call "Culture," administration 
of justice, civilisation, morals, and so forth. 

But, thanks to their divine origin and calling, 
dynasties stand beyond and above all legal control. 
For them, there are neither laws nor judges, and, even, 
in most cases not even critics. They prescribe laws for 
themselves, they alone control their actions and are 
only responsible to the "Almighty," to whom they 
will "one day" have to render account. Altogether, 



ONWARD! TO DEMOCRACY! 289 

a most envious position, from which, as they them- 
selves say, "no Minister, no Parliament, no people" 
can release them. Hence, everything that they do is 
"done well," for all their acts are done in accordance 
with directions from above. Why then should it 
surprise us if the dynasties, in order to satisfy their 
craving for power, resort to means which we, in pri- 
vate life, should call criminal? The idea of guilt and 
crime does not exist for a dynasty, or, rather, only be- 
gins to exist when its vital interests are imperilled. If, 
for example, it is a crime to doubt the divinity of the 
dynasty, it is not a crime to violate, in the higher 
interests of the State, treaties that have been solemnly 
ratified, and to send hundreds of thousands of citizens 
to their death for a matter that in reality is of quite a 
different complexion from that in which it has been 
represented to them. 

We must, once and for all, make clear to ourselves 
that the "dynasty by God's grace'' is nothing else 
than lawlessness reduced to legal forms. What is 
prohibited to the citizen is enjoined upon the soldier; 
where the one is punished, the other is rewarded, and 
vice versa. The dynasty has the right to change the 
highest into the lowest, the common into the sacred, 
and lies into truth, without anyone having the right 
to protest. There is something of an adjuration in 
the words that Gustav Freytag used with regard to 
the Hohenzollerns — "To stand above others, as God 
of Battles and as the earthly Fate of hundreds of 
thousands, renders the best and noblest man at last 
susceptible to the hateful idea: I am the State!" 
Freytag forgets that this thought is never hateful 
to dynasties; it rather belongs to the logic of their 



290 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 

case, it is noble and God-ordained. For the "will to 
power" is a law of life that cannot disappear until 
the world ceases to be a world. It would be folly to 
attempt to deny or suppress this will to power. It 
is sufficient to reckon with its existence and to pre- 
scribe for it those limits that must be prescribed in the 
interest of the common weal. 

Just as a servant girl who, by her good looks and 
coquetry, has come to dress in silk will at once 
want to become a countess, so a dynasty that, with 
wars and victories, has arrived at the purple will be 
at once possessed by the idea that it has not its due 
place in the sun. A dynasty without a dream of 
power would be as absurd as an artisan without the 
desire for increased wages. And every dynasty which 
has in part realised its dream of power has imme- 
diately transformed it into a dream of world power. 
And yet every dynasty has suffered shipwreck through 
this dream of world-domination; at last, the eagle is 
brought low by the arrow its own feathers have 
furnished. 

All this is so logical that we, as psychologists and 
historians, have not the right to make it a reproach 
against the dynasties. At the most, it is the nations 
who deserve reproaches because they were not willing 
or able to perceive at the right time the "will to 
power" of their dynasties, and so to restrict it in 
accordance with the general ideas of justice that it 
could no longer menace the general weal. This restric- 
tion — wherever it has been carried into effect — has 
rarely been a free and voluntary act, dictated by deep 
philosophical or moral conviction, but, for the most 
part, the result of external circumstances and bitter 



ONWARD! TO DEMOCRACY! 291 

economic necessity. The curse of an avenging God 
seems to lie upon the nations. They must wade 
through a Red Sea of blood and tears before they can 
escape from the Pharaohs. In the days of Moses 
our Lord God mercifully divided the Red Sea for the 
benefit of the Israelites, so that they could cross on 
dry foot into the Promised Land, but to-day, alas! 
He no longer performs miracles. It appears to-day, 
as it did in the days of Napoleon, as if the nations of 
Europe would drown in the Red Sea. But this is only 
appearance. The nations will reach the further shore, 
and above the bloodstained and hideous fields of battle 
the sun of the Promised Land of Liberty will at length 
rise. 

Every dynasty once dwelt in a fisherman's cottage 
and was, like Frau Ilsebill in Grimm's well-known 
fairy-tale, discontented with its fate. In the fisher- 
man's hut she dreamt of ducal and royal thrones and 
ordered her husband to tell the flounder, which he had 
set at liberty, of her desire. And scarcely was it 
fulfilled when Frau Ilsebill in her new royal palace 
dreamt of an imperial palace. When she had procured 
this also from the flounder and had dreamt for some 
time of boundless realms on which the sun never set, 
she next wanted to become like the Lord God Himself, 
and demanded of the flounder that he should find her 
a place in Heaven. And so her husband had to go 
once again and beg the wrathful flounder to satisfy 
his wife's ambition, as otherwise his house would be 
a hell. And whenever Frau Ilsebill secured a higher 
rank, the sea surged high and became dark and violet 
and blood- red, until the wrathful flounder at length 



292 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 

caused the imperial and papal palace to be destroyed 
with thunder and lightning, and the good fisherman 
found his Frau Ilsebill once more back in the wretched 
fisherman's hut on the shore. 

Thus it was in China and in Rome, in Persia 
and Spain, in Egypt and Mexico, in the Papal 
States and in France. Thus it was, has remained, 
and will always remain, as long as there are dynasties 
which enjoy direct intercourse with God and are served 
by an obliging fisherman who is always ready to defy 
the elements in order to satisfy his wife's vanity. 

For, in contrast to the servant girl who wants to 
become a countess and thereby at the worst ruins a 
few lovers, the history of Frau Ilsebill is at the same 
time the history of nations; she does not dream her 
dream of power like other mortals at her own risk and 
peril, but for the use and delectation of her subjects. 
Almost twenty years of war and a Red Sea of human 
blood were necessary in order to extinguish the dream 
of power of the great Corsican and to bring him back 
again to the fisherman's hut whence he had come. 

^ Jjf sji Jjf ^ 

We might now, when we consider the rise and the 
disastrous fall of every dynasty, say with Nietzsche 
that "history is an eternal repetition," and this 
would, at the close of our investigation, bring us back 
to the standpoint of the Treltschkes, Moltkes, and 
Bernhardis. That is to say, we should join with them 
in declaring war to be a law of nature and a civilising 
and educational force and in regarding its perpetual 
recurrence as a matter of course. 

Fortunately, however, history can only remain an 
eternal repetition so long as the essential conditions 



ONWARD! TO DEMOCRACY! 293 

remain the same. Hitherto, as we have seen, dynasties 
have been an essential condition of the world's history. 
But are they to remain so in the future? We say 
frankly. No! The Revolutions in England, France, 
and elsewhere, the declaration of human and civic 
rights and their more or less successful application 
to politics, have furnished the proof that dynasties 
have long ceased to be an essential condition, but, on 
the contrary, are only an artificially fostered attri- 
bute of modern humanity. For example, the history 
of Germany during the past century may be taken as 
a proof that dynasties constantly force their peoples 
into opposition to the great aspirations of humanity, 
and are thus only a hindrance to the only progress 
of mankind that is desirable. 

Destruction by lightning was an "eternal repeti- 
tion" until the lightning-conductor was discovered. 
But man set a limit to the divine and abso- 
lute power of the lightning, and since then no 
one asserts any longer that destruction by lightning is 
inevitable, divine, and the will of Nature. - The heated 
room and the fur cloak are, as it were, a protest against 
the Divine order, which intends that we shall feel cold 
in winter. We invented insurance companies as a 
protection against fires, damage by hail, disease, 
robberies, etc., all of which latter are also divine 
institutions. That is to say: Whenever mankind 
felt the eternal recurrence of certain events to be both 
painful and avoidable, it contrived to get rid of many 
divine institutions. Consider, for instance, the Plague, 
against which, in the Middle Ages, the only remedies 
were fast days and processions. 

Though dynasties by God's grace are not the Plague, 



294 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 

they are, like the Plague, an eminently divine institu- 
tion, the very existence of which is in direct antago- 
nism to everything that modern humanity must de- 
mand for the security of its existence and liberty. 

The present World War is in every sense so terrible 
that it is to be hoped that it has thoroughly disgusted 
nations with this "eternal repetition" of history. 
The desire for final emancipation from this scourge 
of mankind was never more general, more ardent, and 
more urgent than it is to-day. And therefore the 
nations will derive from this World War a sacred 
right to exclaim to the dynasties : 

"Enough, more than enough! Your day is over. 
We need you no more. You are adventurers and not 
statesmen. We wish at length to be ourselves. Away 
with your divine rights! Away with all the sacred 
trumpery of bygone days! We wish, at length, to 
have a policy of our own choosing. For we, and not 
you, express the meaning of the world. We, and not 
you, are vessels of God's grace. Hitherto we have 
been your chattels. We believed that you meant well 
by us. We now perceive that (less out of malice than 
by instinct and tradition) you have remained as you 
were, that you can never possibly entertain that idea 
of general weal and culture that we must demand at 
the present day. That which increases your fame 
increases our unhappiness; that which seems to you 
an element of the divine order of things seems to us 
a crime against humanity and civilisation. You wish 
to make us happy by means of war? To-day we have 
other tasks. We are no longer barbarians, for whom 
war meant livelihood, glory and sport. We desire 
peace. If your lust for adventure can only be satisfied 



ONWARD! TO DEMOCRACY! 295 

by war, go to the Indians and the negroes. Europe 
is no longer an arena for swashbucklers and tyrants. 
The taxpaying citizen, pledged to military service, 
shall be, henceforth, the sole sovereign of Europe. 
Even if it were proved that all the wielders of divine 
prerogatives were men of genius (and the world's 
history shows the opposite to be the case), we will 
not and cannot trust ourselves any longer to their 
mercy.'' 



The Prkrequisite Conditions for a European 

Peace 

What, therefore, we ask in the name of the future 
peace and civilisation of Europe is, in general terms, 
the continuation, completion, and the widest possible 
application of the principles proclaimed by the great 
French Revolution. The World War must complete 
the work of that Revolution, which has been inter- 
rupted by the dynasties, or, at all events, it must open 
the way to mankind for the gradual realisation of 
these immortal human ideals. 

And what we, in particular, ask of Germany is a 
general transformation of generally accepted ideas and 
institutions. 

The first and the most general demand that we 
German democrats and pacifists urge is : Germany for 
the Germans! German government by the German 
People. And in order that this popular government 
shall not, as hitherto, be merely a comedy for the 
delectation of exalted personages, we make this second 
fundamental demand : The German Army for the 



296 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 

German People! The armed force must be the sup- 
port and servant of the popular sovereignty ! 

Universal military service without popular sover- 
eignty is political serfdom. That an army composed 
of all the citizens of the nation should take the oath 
to the person of the sovereign may be very well for 
a negro or Aztec State, but in the case of a great 
modern nation it is a scandal which at length must 
cease. 

By the carrying out of these two fundamental 
reforms all the rest are achieved automatically : a 
thorough revision of the German Imperial Constitu- 
tion, abolition of the Prussian "three class" franchise, 
reasonably proportioned electoral districts, Ministers 
selected from the Parliamentary body and responsible 
to it, the abolition of all the political privileges of the 
Junkers and officers; in short, a safeguarding of the 
sovereignty of the will of the German people in all 
departments. 

How this new Constitution and popular assembly 
will deal with the monarchy (assuming that we are ab- 
solutely bound to have one) is a secondary matter. We 
shall be satisfied, in the first instance, with those fun- 
damental reforms as a result of which the will of the 
German people shall be declared supreme in Germany 
and shall retain the effective political power. Whether 
the head of the State holds the title of President, King, 
or Emperor, whether his dignity is hereditary or not, 
matters not a jot. The most progressive European 
democracy (Denmark) is not a republic, but a kingdom. 
Italy, England, Sweden, Norway, to some extent also 
Spain, are republics under monarchical titles. We are 
not concerned with phrases and etiquette, but with 



ONWARD! TO DEMOCRACY! 297 

actualities. And the actuality to be achieved must 
be that the head of the German State shall no longer, 
by divine right, satisfy his personal craving for power 
above the heads of the people, but that he shall become 
the executive organ of the will of the German people, 
and that the actual political power, at home and 
abroad, shall be in the hands of the German people. 

The World War has proved that a radical change in 
all those political Constitutions that still concede to 
the dynasties divine rights and the supreme command 
of their armed might is no longer to-day merely a 
question of home politics for any people, but a Euro- 
pean necessity. 

The World War has brought about an exceptional 
state of things, which, in the interests of Europe, must 
be utilised in every State which maintains an army, 
for the purpose of altering the Constitution In such a 
way that, henceforth, the people and not a dynasty 
by divine right shall dispose of the army, which is 
both paid for by, and composed of, the people. 

It may be that the creation of this exceptional state 
of things will prove the most Important advantage 
which the nations of Europe will reap from this sac- 
rifice of millions of lives. For that which, for the 
past century, could only exist as a vague theory, and, 
at The Hague and elsewhere, was openly scoffed at 
by high personages, namely, the idea of an under- 
standing between the nations based upon International 
agreements, may now, after the war has Inevitably led 
to a general discussion and settlement between the 
nations of Europe, be easily realised. Although the 
formation of a League of Nations for the securing of 



298 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 

the world's peace, advocated by Kant and all serious 
pacifists, has hitherto been wrecked on the divine rights 
of dynasties, the World War has now seen to it that 
this resistance shall not only cease, but shall be recog- 
nised as the chief cause of modern wars. 

A hundred years ago Kant demanded: that (a) 
the inhabitants of a State, in virtue of their citizen- 
right; (b) the States in their mutual relations, in vir- 
tue of international law; and (c) men and States in 
their mutual relations, in virtue of cosmopolitan law, 
may be "regarded as citizens of one world State," and 
he adds : ''This classification is not an arbitrary one, 
but is essential in reference to the idea of eternal peace. 
For, if even one of these were in a position physically 
to influence another and were yet in a natural state, 
then a state of war would be implied, from which we 
desire to emancipate ourselves."^ 

And as Kant insisted a hundred years ago, it is no 
longer a question of putting an end to one war, but to 
all wars. Since almost all the European nations are 
engaged in this World War, they will all, without ex- 
ception, be agreed with regard to ''the enforcement 
of Kant's first definite article of perpetual peace," 
which states clearly and positively : "The Civil Con- 
stitution of every State must be republican." 

We therefore demand that the exceptional condi- 
tions resulting from this war shall be utilised for the 
realisation of this fundamental reform in Europe, a 
reform equally applicable to, equally desired by, and 
equally efficacious for all countries and peoples, and 

^ Immanuel Kant, "Zum ewigen Frieden," published b}'- Reclam 
(Leipzig), note to p. 12, 



ONWARD! TO DEMOCRACY! 299 

without which no really sound state of peace can be 
brought to pass. 

All that respect for and belief in the authority of 
God-appointed dynasties, which has been bequeathed 
to us from the past, must give way before this funda- 
mental reform. And, especially in the case of Ger- 
many, there can be no "ifs" and *'buts." The foolish 
chatter of German professors about all that has *'be- 
come historic" must cease, for it is only that which is 
in process of ^'becoming historic" that must influence 
us. 

If, as we sincerely hope, the statesmen of the West- 
ern Democracies will have to speak the decisive word 
in the peace negotiations, then they will employ the 
power that they have won through the war to for- 
mulate and insist upon the satisfaction of demands ex- 
pressed somewhat as follows, and applicable to and 
binding upon all nations and States. 

1. The Civil Constitution in every State shall be 
republican. That is to say: no State shall, hereafter, 
be governed by divine rights and arbitrary principles. 
The chief command of the armed forces and the 
decision as to war and peace shall, henceforth, in 
all States reside in Parliaments formed on a basis 
of universal, equal, and direct suffrage, and endowed 
with responsible Ministers. 

2. So soon as in any State a coup d'etat is threat- 
ened or put into effect, which might in any way limit 
or even abolish these supreme powers of the Parlia- 
ment, the other States shall, in the name of the 
world's peace, have a right to protest aga'nst and, if 



300 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 

necessary, to frustrate by force of arms any attempt 
to restore personal despotism. 

This last condition is of the most vital importance. 
The coming peace must reckon, once and for all, with 
the invariable existence of the will to power; it must 
treat it as a law of nature, deeply rooted in the human 
heart, and therefore keep a tight rein on it, in that 
sphere in which it might become dangerous to the 
welfare of Europe, namely, in politics. 

States must, therefore, possess the common right to 
frustrate the warlike ambitions of individuals. The 
history of France, during a period of less than fifty 
years, displays two painful instances of the sorcery 
that gifted men with warlike ambitions are able to 
exercise upon the popular mind. Twice were the re- 
publican institutions of the country overruled by a 
Napoleon, and twice did the consequences of these 
coups d'etat bring Europe to desperation. It may 
happen, in fact we may confidently predict that it will 
happen, that in the future also warlike "supermen" 
will rise up, and that a nation will prove too weak to 
resist the force and fascination of their personality. 
We earnestly trust that the men who will presently be 
called upon to secure for Europe a lasting peace will 
do their work completely, and contrive to secure Eu- 
rope against the possibility of new wars in the future. 

International politics have been called "a concert of 
the Great Powers." If anyone makes a disturbance 
in a concert-hall he will probably, in the interests of 
the rest of the audience, be turned out. But if in the 
sphere of international politics some disturber of the 
peace has at his disposal such a powerful army that 



ONWARD! TO DEMOCRACY I 301 

he can hope to pit his strength successfully against the 
rest, it is not sufficient merely to turn him into the 
street ; he must be brought to reason by means of war. 
In order that the concert of the Great Powers may at 
length become harmonious and contribute to the hap- 
piness of the nations, care must be taken that any dis- 
turbers of the peace are henceforth deprived of the 
opportunity of making an interruption. Attacks upon 
the parliamentary regime of a State are attacks upon 
its peace. Anyone who endangers the Republican 
Constitution of the State endangers (even though at 
first only indirectly and instinctively) the peace and 
security of the nations, and must, in case of need, be 
prevented from carrying out his designs by the inter- 
vention of the neighbouring States. 

For, as we have said, peace does not depend so 
much upon the foreign policy as upon the internal 
Constitution of the States. If the Constitution is 
mediaeval, militarist, and generally autocratic, then 
sooner or later the foreign policy of the State will 
tend towards war. 

All the nations will be in favour of an arrangement 
of this kind; the German nation more than any; for 
no nation has suffered more from this war and no 
nation desired it less than the German nation. 



The speech of the German Imperial Chancellor on 
November Qtli, 191 6, compels me to make a digression. 

In this speech, for the first time in Prusso-German 
history, a German statesman expressed himself, in the 
name of the German Government, in favour of an idea 
which, as we have seen, has hitherto been strictly for- 



302 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 

bidden in the Fatherland of Kant. That which Kant 
and his disciples proposed, and which Prussian Min- 
isters and diplomatists have lustily abused in the 
Reichstag and in the Press and systematically thwarted 
at all the Hague Conferences, namely, the formation 
of a general League of Nations for the safeguarding 
of the world's peace, has now finally become the aim 
of the German Government. The Imperial Chancellor 
said: "If, when the w^ar is ended, this terrible de- 
struction of property and life is at length fully realised 
by the world, then throughout the whole world a cry 
will go up for peaceful settlements and for Constitu- 
tions which, as far as lies in human power, shall pre- 
vent the recurrence of such monstrous calamities. This 
cry will be so strong and so justifiable that it is bound 
to lead to this result : that Germany will honestly co- 
operate in considering any attempt to find a practical 
solution and in working for its realisation. All the 
more so if the war, as we confidently expect, produces 
political conditions which will further the free de- 
velopment of all nations, great and small." 

Golden words, which had they been only spoken 
ten years earlier and been accompanied by corre- 
sponding acts would have prevented this World War. 
But, unfortunately, they were not spoken until after 
twenty-seven months of the most hopeless war that 
the German Government has ever waged. And, un- 
fortunately also, they are in absolute contradiction 
with the speeches which the same statesman delivered 
on December 9th, 1915, and April 5th, 1916, when the 
military situation of Germany was more favourable 
than it is to-day. 



ONWARD! TO DEMOCRACY! 303 

And instead of showing by wise moderation that he 
is in earnest about this idea, the Imperial Chancellor 
immediately falls into the exaggerations typical of the 
newly converted, who by their obtrusive zeal give 
rise to the suspicion that they discarded their errors 
of yesterday only under compulsion. In fact, he not 
only answers for Germany's willingness to co-operate 
in creating this League of Nations, but he also at the 
same time demands that Germany should preside over 
it : "Germany is willing at any time to join this 
League of Nations. Yes, and even place herself at the 
head of a League of Nations which would keep dis- 
turbers of the peace in check.'* 

That is too much of a good thing. Your Excel- 
lency: one does not immediately make a bishop of a 
converted heathen. It would be ridiculous in peace 
time to place Germany "liber alles" after having pre- 
vented her at the cost of enormous sacrifices from be- 
coming "liber alles" by means of war. 

The pacifist ideal is still so unfamiliar to the leaders 
of the German State, that they view it from a military 
standpoint, as they do everything else, that is to say, 
they claim a controlling and commanding position in 
it. As if in the League of Nations dreamed of by 
Kant and his disciples there could ever be such a thing 
as a leader! 

But how lamentably far the leaders of Germany are 
from a true understanding of pacifist ideas and prac- 
tice is apparent not only from these turns of phrase, 
not only from the military traditions and mode of 
thought of our dynasty, but, above all, from their 
actions in the present unhappy time. Four days be- 
fore this beautiful pacifist speech was delivered, Wil- 



304 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 

Ham II. proclaimed the "autonomy" of Poland with- 
out consulting the people interested, that is, with de- 
liberate disregard of that international law the strict 
observance of which must be an essential condition for 
the formation of such a League of Nations. And at 
the same moment that the Imperial Chancellor was 
proclaiming this new ideal of peace to the nations of 
Europe, thousands of "lazy" Belgians were being de- 
ported to Germany, in open mockery of The Hague 
Conventions (which had been subscribed to by the 
German Emperor), to do forced labour. What con- 
fidence can the world have in a man who at the be- 
ginning of the war called treaties "scraps of paper," 
and at the very moment when he is inviting the na- 
tions to enter into new treaties is still treating them 
as scraps of paper? 

We must ask the same question when we consider 
the attitude of the German Government relative to 
its own nation. The German Reichstag has during 
the course of this World War frequently and emphati- 
cally put forward various democratic demands. It 
is true that, in its humility, it did not dare to begin 
at the beginning, that is to say, to demand the re- 
sponsibility of Ministers, redistribution of electoral di- 
visions, and parliamentary control over the army. But, 
with surprising unanimity, it demanded the control of 
foreign policy by the Reichstag, the abolition of the 
disgraceful state of "siege," of the precautionary su- 
pervision and censorship, the exemption of princes 
from taxation, the special privileges of the nobility, 
etc. The German Government either abruptly refused 
these demands, or, with pompous speeches, phrases, 
and promises, postponed them for later consideration. 



ONWARD! TO DEMOCRACY! 305 

A paltry inscription over the doorway of the Reichs- 
tag Palace and a few trifling reforms : this is all that 
the war, which in Russia has already brought about a 
sort of parliamentary regime, has done for Germany 
as yet. 

And is this Government, which before the war did 
everything in its power to discredit the ideals of 
pacifism, and which, since the beginning of the war, 
has, both at home and abroad, systematically trampled 
under foot any treaties and constitutional guarantees 
that happened to be inconvenient, now to be considered 
eligible for co-operating in the creation of a League 
of Nations, and even for presiding over its activities? 
This illusion can only be entertained by those ''scien- 
tific pacifists" who, like Dr. Fried, still continue to 
imagine that the European peace-omelette can be made 
of hard-boiled feudal eggs. 

The rest of us know only too well that it is easier 
for a camel to pass through the eye of a needle than 
for a representative of God's grace to pass through 
the portals of a democratic temple of international 
rights. If we tried to explain to the German Imperial 
Chancellor upon what conditions those "peaceful 
agreements and Constitutions" must necessarily be 
based, if they are really "as far as lies in human 
power" to safeguard peace, he would probably be 
highly indignant, and at once declare that this was not 
the meaning of his words. Then we should have to 
reply to him: 

Is your Excellency, in the name of His Majesty, 
in favour of the creation of a League of Nations for 
the safeguarding of the world's peace? Your Excel- 
lency has read Kant and, as we are delighted to ob- 



3o6 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 

serve, understood him better than those scientific 
pacifists who are not democrats ; otherwise, Your Ex- 
cellency would not have used the significant word 
''Constitutions" in your speech. Kant, in fact, realised 
125 years ago that international conventions without 
democratic national governments are a trick, which 
can ensnare only arch-revolutionists like Scheide- 
mann, or peace specialists like Fried. The first thing, 
therefore, that Your Excellency ought to do, if the 
Government of Germany desires honestly to establish 
a League of Nations for safeguarding the peace of the 
world, is to lay before the Reichstag to-morrow, in 
the name of the German Emperor and the Federal 
Council, a draft of a Constitution which would com- 
pletely transform the German political system. There- 
fore, enough of those trifling reforms and inscriptions 
with which you have hitherto delighted men like 
Scheidemann for whom revolution is merely a subject 
for oratory; but concede to the German people what 
they have most ardently desired for decades past: a 
parliamentary regime , reconstruction of the electoral 
districts, abolition of the supreme command of the 
army by the monarch, and so forth. 

What ? Your Excellency thinks these demands "re- 
volutionary" in the highest degree, ''dangerous to the 
State"? That seems a proof that you are afraid to 
think out Kant's idea to its logical conclusion. For 
these demands are only the logical and necessary con- 
ditions for the League of Nations that Your Excel- 
lency so heartily desires. If this League of Nations 
were not based on these democratic reforms, it would 
be only "a Holy Alliance" which once again would be 
subject to the pleasure of our God-appointed rulers 



ONWARD! TO DEMOCRACY! 307 

and would in a few days be annulled in accordance 
with the will of God. The fundamental idea of a 
monarchy by God's grace is in the most flagrant con- 
tradiction with the fundamental idea of the proposed 
League of Nations. Anyone who should attempt to 
reconcile these two opposites, that is to say, to make 
out of one who executes divine laws a representative 
of earthly reason, would be only acting a farce, even 
if he were unconscious of the fact. And, therefore, 
in the phrase "League of Nations'' we lay the em- 
phasis upon the last word. 

Your Excellency is perhaps of opinion that this 
international League of Peace can have nothing to do 
with the internal affairs of Germany, but that later 
we may be able to arrange something? No! Your 
Excellency, it must be now! At this very moment! 
Immediate peace is to be had at this price. Your Ex- 
cellency knows the true war aim of the Allied West- 
ern Powers just as well as we do. They are fighting 
for the democratising of Germany and — based upon 
this — the realisation of the plans for disarmament and 
a court of arbitration which Germany frustrated at 
The Hague, whatever Scheidemann and his like may 
say. Your Excellency has in your heart, as we know, 
the same sympathy with these Don Quixotes as we 
have. For your Excellency knows positively that the 
Entente is only an ^'Entente" because in Germany the 
monarchy by God's grace rules with absolute rights 
over war and peace. The Entente wants what Kant 
wanted! So do the German people! So does the 
whole of Europe! And Europe has learnt, with su- 
preme satisfaction, that at the bottom of your heart 
Your Excellency wants the same ! 



3o8 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 

But begin to be serious about it, Your Excellency! 
Begin now! Europe is bleeding to death! Peace can 
be concluded to-morrow if Your Excellency would 
take the first step towards the promised League of 
Nations by proclaiming the rights of the German 
people. 

A hundred years of Prusso-German history have 
taught us (apart from a few Scheidemanns) some 
wisdom. Whenever the storm has rattled the Palace 
windows we have received abundant promises of 
heavenly and earthly blessing, of Constitutions and 
liberties ; but when the storm had passed, not a word 
of all these promises was ever kept, and anti-democracy 
and divine rights flourished even more vigorously than 
before. The German people is not made up of 
Scheidemanns. The latter preached revolution and 
then became an enthusiastic champion of Emperor and 
Empire, when Tsarism began to be supreme in Ger- 
many. The German people is less ridiculous and more 
democratic. It has devoted itself with courage and in 
good faith to the defence of the Fatherland, and all 
the thanks it has got for it is absolute rule enforced 
by the sword, and this absolutism has been mitigated 
neither as a result of the fair promises of the Gov- 
ernment nor yet by the economic distress prevailing 
to-day in Germany. 

The German people is democratic in the real sense 
of the term. And, therefore, Your Excellency cannot 
expect that the German people will for all time be con- 
tent with democracy in the shape of inscriptions and 
promises. Set to work in earnest. Your Excellency! 
An immediate and an honourable peace is possible if 
you will prove to the German people (and at the same 



ONWARD! TO DEMOCRACY! 309 

time to the world at large) by democratic actions that 
the German Government from this day onward swears 
allegiance to the International principles of pacifism. 
This is the only way. 

Accordingly, it is a question first of all of the cre- 
ation and of the putting into operation of democratic 
republican Constitutions in all countries, and, secondly, 
of the appointment of an International police who shall 
not obtrude themselves in normal times but shall be 
constantly ready to check any threatened violation of 
these Constitutions. As the desire for war of a single 
individual suffices to force twelve desirous of peace to 
make war, it must be seen to that individuals who have 
an inclination towards war do not attain a position of 
supreme authority. Europe will not and dare not any 
longer tolerate an irresponsible dynastic policy of 
force. Every attempt of this kind must be stifled at 
the outset by common endeavour. Any recurrence of 
a Napoleon or a Bismarck must be made absolutely 
impossible. Humanity asks only for legislators, states- 
men, philosophers, poets, and not for conquerors. 

And even if the Bernhardis, Rohrbachs, Reventlows, 
Hardens, Keims, Delbrucks, LImans, Frymanns, 
Scheidemanns and their like are beside themselves 
with anger, that does not trouble us. Those among 
them who possess a conscience will understand that 
the days of the policy of force, when a few had a di- 
vine right over all others and when the fate of mil- 
lions was callously settled behind closed doors are at 
last at an end. The rest will doubtless continue from 
time to time to favour us with their scribbllngs in the 
cause of bloodshed. But, firstly, they will be talking 



310 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 

in the name of a principle that has become impotent ; 
and secondly, we shall, after this war, have a right 
to laugh at them openly until they are ashamed of 
themselves, and finally spare us their dreams of world- 
power. 

The Errors and Advantages of Democracy 

Only from this starting-point do the paths open out 
to further reforms. For only when the democratisa- 
tion of the Constitutions of all the States has been 
achieved can those further demands that have been 
already put forward by pacifists and socialists be dis- 
cussed and gradually realised — an international court 
of arbitration for the adjustment of all conflicts aris- 
ing between nations, special legislation against the 
bellicose tendencies of the so-called national Press, 
nationalisation of armament industries, conversion of 
standing armies into national militia, the pubHcity and 
parliamentary control of diplomacy, the opening of an 
era of free trade, and, finally, even, the abolition of 
that defence of country which is ingenuously con- 
demned outright by our present-day "anti-militarists" 
as being "militarism" and which is alleged to be the 
cause of the war. 

Whoever demands these and similar guarantees of 
peace without previously demanding that the expres- 
sion of the dynastic will-to-power should be eliminated 
from the Constitutions of the various States is like 
one preaching in a desert,^ and is either a Utopian or 

^For instance, a neutral (Nos. 1459 and 1633 of the Neiie 
Ziircher Zeitung, 1916) made quite a rational proposal to create 
an international Fund, in which all States should join and in 
which each should deposit a considerable sum in minted gold. 



ONWARD! TO DEMOCRACY! 311 

an intellectual coward. The political liberty of citi- 
zens is the liberty of liberties. The sovereignty of the 
peoples is and remains the indispensable condition for 
all earnest culture and guarantees of peace. Anyone 
proposing to reform society without giving society 
beforehand its indisputable right to autonomy is not 
proposing a reform, but only a mockery. 

If, then, we are looking for a rock upon which we 
can build a lasting and reasonable peace, let us take 
the popular will. The sovereignty of the popular will 
expressed in a democratic form of government must 
after this war become the ruler of Europe. Just as 
dynasties are born of war, have through wars arrived 
at the zenith of their power, and can only continue 
their existence by means of further wars, so, on the 
other hand, is democracy born from the will-to-peace 
of nations, develops its power in peace, and is des- 
tined to fulfil its most sublime purposes in internal 
peace. The existence and the conception of culture of 
the dynasty are inseparable from the employment of 

If a State declares war, and the universal opinion is that it has 
acted rashly and culpably, then its contribution will be confis- 
cated, and so forth. The control of the fund shall be entrusted 
to neutral delegates, whose special task it will be to see that no 
more secret treaties are concluded, etc. The significant word 
in this proposal is the word "control." This control can only 
exist in States having a republican Constitution; States with 
dynastic Constitutions have always from time immemorial re- 
jected any control over their actions {cf. the speeches of Wil- 
liam II). Accordingly, if any such proposals are to be rendered 
practicable, Kant's fundamental demand must first of all be 
satisfied, and this, unfortunately, has not been mentioned in 
these and similar proposals. All the world feels the "control" 
of politics to be the sole effectual guarantee of the future peace 
of the world, but no one says who it is that has always obsti- 
nately and dogmatically opposed it 



312 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 

military force. The existence and the conception of 
culture of democracy are, on the other hand, based 
upon the furthering and the safeguarding of the pop- 
ular weal. 

We modern democrats and pacifists are not roman- 
ticists, or Utopians, or metaphysicians. We are, in 
truth, further than any from regarding democracy as 
a paradise. No one knows the weakness of democratic 
government better than we do. As far as I am con- 
cerned, I think that in my book, *'Die franzosische 
Democratie'' (Leipzig, 1914), I have shown up these 
weaknesses better than many whose aim has been to 
attack democracy on principle. 

We know as well as our opponents do that the pop- 
ular will, even with the best electoral system in the 
world, is never quite accurately expressed ; that a great 
proportion of citizens will always remain politically in- 
different and will not go to the poll, so that the par- 
liamentary regime is, strictly speaking, a delusion. 
We perfectly understand that it may be a danger to a 
country if only one party rules, and that this party 
with its petty interests may hamper the establishment 
and development of great human principles. 

German scholars and politicians are not a little proud 
of the "stability" of the German Government and its 
independence of party groupings; they contrast it fa- 
vourably with the instability of democratic party gov- 
ernment, as a result of which a party that has arrived 
at power often completely annihilates the work of its 
predecessor. 

But for us, this instability of the democratic regime 
is also a guarantee for the prevention of war. It is 
true that the party government and nepotism of a 



ONWARD! TO DEMOCRACY! 313 

democracy may, here and there, corrupt a Minister 
and bring about a scandal, and, for a time, plunge the 
nation into such violent party feuds that it may seem 
as if the whole political system were entirely out of 
gear. But what are these evils in comparison with 
those born of the "stability'' of absolutism? In the 
first case, a Dreyfus or Rochette affair, which con- 
cerns only the French ; in the second case, the Kruger 
telegram, the Daily Telegraph interview, the jeers at 
The Hague Conferences — that is to say, things that 
are felt far beyond the black-white-and-red boundary 
posts, that alarm our neighbours, and necessarily ap- 
pear to them a menace to the world's peace. In the 
first case, a Panama scandal, a mutiny of soldiers, a 
railway ^strike, which our official representatives of 
culture regard with pity, as though they would say: 
Lord, we thank Thee that we are not like these de- 
cadent communities ! In Germany, on the other hand, 
we see official theories of State and international law 
of a mediaeval nature, description of treaties as scraps 
of paper, systematic disregard of all guarantees of 
justice and liberty both at home and abroad. Hence, 
that which, in the more loosely constructed democracy, 
attacks (or apparently attacks )the foundation of the 
nation, in a monarchy by divine right, thanks to its 
"stability," attacks and disintegrates the whole of 
human civilisation. On the one hand, the "corrup- 
tion" of a political system, on the other, the "cor- 
ruption" of an ideal of humanity. We have the less 
hesitation in giving preference to the former, in that 
it is for the most part only superficial. For who 
would deny that we, with our much-boasted "stability," 
did not at the same time possess a very flourishing 



314 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 

corruption within our frontiers? (Only read what 
the ^Tessimist'' in his book "Unser Kaiser und sein 
Volk" had to say about it as early as 1906). The 
only difference between us and France is that In our 
case scandals come to light solely by chance, and are 
at once suppressed, whereas their detection and dis- 
cussion (thanks to the rivalry for political power) be- 
longs, as it were, to the system of democratic gov- 
ernment. And as we are by no means all angels, a 
modern political system inevitably exhibits a certain 
amount of corruption. Let there be no illusion on this 
head. But, here too, publicity is the best guarantee 
for a gradual improvement. 

The boastful eloquence of German professors con- 
cerning the stability of a monarchical government is 
very strikingly refuted by the judgments of a man 
who, because he himself was an absolute monarch, was 
certainly more qualified to judge of such matters than 
all our Privy Councillors taken together. Frederick 
the Great wrote as early as 1747-8 as follows: 

"In monarchies the sole basis of government is the 
sovereign power of the ruler. Laws, military systems, 
industry, commerce, and all other component parts of 
the State are subjected to the arbitrary power of a 
single individual, among whose successors not a single 
one resembles the other. It follows that, as a rule, 
with the accession of each new prince the State is 
governed according to new principles. And that is 
the disadvantage of this form of government. Unity 
resides in the aims that republics place before them- 
selves and in the means which they employ towards 
their attainment. Hence it ensues that they rarely 
miss their aims^ In monarchies, on the other hand, 



ONWARD! TO DEMOCRACY! 315 

an ambitious prince is succeeded in turn by an idler, 
a pietist, a warrior, a scholar, a voluptuary. And 
whilst Fortune's shifting stage is ever displaying some 
new scene, the mind of the people, dazzled by the 
variety of the spectacle, takes no definite shape.*'^ 

From this it is clear that we republicans and paci- 
fists, in our views concerning the best form of State, 
are in very good company. We can, it is clear, re- 
fute the present-day panegyrists of the Hohenzollerns 
by the aid of the Hohenzollerns themselves, and Pro- 
fessor Delbriick would have some difficulty in recon- 
ciling his respect for the hereditary dynasty with in- 
sistence on the correctness of his ^'stability" theories. 

Nothing is perfect in this world. We human beings 
are everywhere compelled to choose the lesser of two 
evils. The finest democracy in the world is a poor 
affair compared with the grand ideal that great spirits 
have framed for it. But anyone who seriously aspires 
to free modem humanity at length from the scourge 
of war (and that is to-day the supreme task) must 
judge the worst democracy to be infinitely better than 
the best feudal monarchy. 

"Eternal peace'' is not a decree. It must, like every- 
thing else, be won step by step. And if even the best 
democracy in the world does not furnish any absolute 
protection against war, we must humbly confess that 
absolute protection against war is impossible in this 
imperfect world. The main point is that we finally 
recognise that without a will-to-war no wars are pos- 
sible, and that this will-to-war can only be dangerous 



1 «i 



'Konigliche Gedanken und Ausspriiche Friedrichs des 
Grossen," Deutsche Bibliothek in Berlin, pp. 46-7. 



3i6 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 

when It IS backed up by a political Constitution; and 
that after we have clearly recognised this, we seek 
for and establish that form of State and government 
in which the satisfaction of this craving for war is 
rendered as difficult as possible. 

This form of political government is beyond all 
doubt the sovereignty of the popular will, that is to 
say, democracy. For, whilst in all dynastic forms of 
government the will-to-war is, and will remain, a com- 
mand of God, that is to say, a necessary condition of 
human life, on the other hand, in democratic forms 
of government, the will-to-peace is a command of the 
people — that is to say, a necessary element of the State 
itself. 

No philosopher ever made a more absurd remark 
than Hegel when he said : 'The people is that portion 
of the State that does not know what it wants !" All 
history from the time when it first began to be written 
recounts the continuous conflict between people and 
dynasty. The existence of this conflict is a proof of 
the fact that peoples do, in fact, always know exactly 
what they want. I think that I have in this work, by 
a few examples, proved beyond contradiction that this 
was particularly the case in Prusso-Germany during 
the last century. We Germans (whatever the Chau- 
vinists across the Vosges and across the Channel may 
say to the contrary) are a nation like any other; we 
are subject to the same historical laws and necessities, 
we have the same ideals of humanity, and we are 
fighting against the same obstacles to true progress 
as other nations. 

The people, each and every people, has always and 
everywhere a will. It may cry "Hurrah !'' and applaud 



ONWARD! TO DEMOCRACY! 317 

military parades and the pomp of the head of the 
State, and this in the age of universal military service 
and of a settled code of law and morals, but it will 
never support a war of conquest. If it is ready, 
unanimously and resolutely, to protect its country, the 
home of its ancestors, and the treasures of its culture 
until the last drop of blood, yet it will never for the 
sake of a world-policy plunge into adventures and 
contend for spheres of influence in Further India or 
for railways in Patagonia. The question is to discover 
a form of government in which conquest can no 
longer be represented as an act of self-defence and 
the violation of solemn treaties as necessary for the 
safety of the country. 

This form of government is democracy. 

The will of all peoples to defend their fatherland 
and to reject every idea of conquest is universal. It 
is the same from Lisbon to Yokohama, from Mel- 
bourne to Stockholm. Let us, therefore, in full con- 
fidence commit the peace of Europe to the sovereignty 
of the popular will. It alone can be the basis of the 
era of true and peaceful culture now dawning in 
Europe. 

That a German at the beginning of this twentieth 
century had to write this book (yes: had to!), and 
that his mode of thought should appear so terribly 
revolutionary, is certainly no proof of the pre-eminence 
of German culture. For what does this book contain? 
It contains a description of conditions that existed in 
England and France 150 years ago. It contains a 
demand for reforms which in all the civilised coun- 
tries of the world have for decades past appeared to 



3i8 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 

the dullest peasant an understood thing. In fact, what 
I here demand for Germany has been possessed by 
the English, French, Americans, and Swiss for the 
past 150 years, by the Italians, Swedes, Norwegians, 
Danes, Dutch, Serbs, Bulgarians, Roumanians, Greeks, 
etc., etc., for some decades, and by the Chinese since 
quite recently. Only think of it! The Chinese! 

The storm-wind of history will and must finally 
bring political emancipation to Germany also. The 
romanticism of the revolutionary periods of 1789 and 
1848; the period of "storm and stress"; the categori- 
cal imperative of self -emancipation; these will and 
must be the fruits of this World War for Germany. 

Right, Right, and again Right : that is the founda- 
tion of a humanity ready for peaceful culture. Who- 
ever says "Right" says equality; the divine, traditional, 
and mystic special prerogatives of dynasties. States, 
and castes are mockeries of Right. 

Divine right in the sense of pomp, parade, phrase, 
and fiction? As much as you like, if you cannot exist 
without images of saints, incense, and ermine. But 
divine right as the supreme and guiding principle of 
European politics? Divine right in the sense of a 
right of possession over the individual members, the 
fate, the will, and the destiny of the nations, and the 
right to decide concerning war and peace ? A million 
fists would clench and threaten the slavish souls who, 
after the catastrophe of these days, would still answer 
yes! 

No half-measures, no lamentations, no cowardly 
compromise, no subtleties, no putting off till later! 
That would be treachery to our fallen brothers. No ! 
[All the high things must be brought low, all the 



ONWARD! TO DEMOCRACY! 319 

earthly divinities be swept away, all exceptions ban- 
ished and all special prerogatives abolished root and 
branch, and for all time! The earth for human be- 
ings, the heavens for the gods! Thus and only thus 
will the hunger of the nations for justice and peace 
at last be appeased. Only in this way will humanity 
be able to justify this massacre of millions before the 
tribunal of history. 

And, therefore, Germany has to begin to-day where 
the English, French, Americans, Swiss, etc., began 
250 and 125 years ago, and where the German classi- 
cists and champions of liberty broke down helplessly. 

That is in truth the great lesson which the World 
War imperatively demands that we should learn to-day. 

We have not been called barbarians, Boches, and 
Huns because our soldiers in Belgium and elsewhere 
are alleged to have wrought such devastation as did 
Attila's hordes. No; our political serfdom, our appar- 
ently servile adherence to mediaeval theories of the 
State, our barbarous religion of the sanctity and beauty 
of wars, our eminently un-German reliance upon 
discipline by force and our emphatic reiteration that 
*^Might overrules Right'' — all this together with the 
ferocious scholarship and the servility of our Privy 
Councillors of the Ostwald stamp, has won for us the 
name of "barbarians" ! A great, vigorous, and highly 
gifted people like ours can only play its true part in 
the world when it is its own master and proudly shapes 
its own destinies. But if, as was the case with us, it 
entrusts the public weal both at home and abroad to a 
handful of soldiers and learned mandarins, then it will 
be diverted from its true path, and will become a dan- 
ger to the world and an offence against civilisation. 



320 THE COMING DEMOCRACY 

If Bismarck was not Germany's blunder, then he 
was Germany's fate. In these days, no fatherland can 
be cemented by "blood and iron." Blood and iron 
can only be renewed and maintained by yet more blood 
and iron. Bismarck was our glory and our fate. 

Away from Bismarck! that is the lesson of this 
iWorld War for Germany. Justice and liberty, not blood 
and iron, are the cement of modem fatherlands. 

Let us take up again the threads of classic Ger- 
manism. Let us remember our intellectual heroes 
of the age of Schiller and Goethe, of our democratic 
national poets of the 'forties of last century. Only 
with their help, and only in their spirit, can the Ger- 
man problem be finally solved to the blessing of 
Germany and the world. 

Let us break with the development of the last 
century. The World War signifies the collapse of a 
system and a spirit of culture that were thoroughly 
un-German, that is, thoroughly Prussian. Let us 
join hands with the other civilised nations of the 
world as peaceable, equally privileged, and equally 
efficient labourers in the field of culture. Let us 
begin by creating that quite new, quite free, quite 
democratic culture the direction of which was indi- 
cated to us by Herder and Kant, by Lessing and 
Humboldt, by Goethe and Schiller. No longer 
"Deutschland iiber alles," but Germany with and by 
the side of all. Only so shall we be able to fulfil 
our true mission in the world. 

Onward! . . to Democracy. 

Democracy, in the world as it is to-day, is the only 
possible, the only desirable basis of any genuine cul- 



ONWARD! TO DEMOCRACY I 321 

ture. It is only this mother that is able to bear all 
the beautiful, promising children of whom we Ger- 
mans spoke all too soon: socialism, a true law of 
nations, intellectual liberty, and, possibly, complete 
disarmament. Without democracy these things will 
continue to be what they have been hitherto: carica- 
tures and abortions. 

Onward! . . to Democracy. 

Democracy is the only possible, only enduring 
basis of the future peace of nations. A peace con- 
cluded without a realisation of Kant's fundamental 
demand would be only patchwork and self-deception. 

Onward! . . to Democracy. 

This will and must to-morrow be the battle-cry of 
Europe in general, and of Germany in particular. 

Away from Bismarck! Germany for the Germans. 

Let that be the fruit of this terrible World War for 
Germany. 



THE MOST HUMAN BOOK OF THIS MOST 
INHUMAN WAR 

In the Claws of the 
German Eagle 

BY 

ALBERT RHYS WILLIAMS 

Special War Correspondent for The Outlook 



Some winced and cried aloud, others 
turned white with terror, still others 
laughed defiant to the end. Caught in the 
Claws, the author shared with these fellow 
prisoners the torments of trial as a spy by 
the German Military Coiirt in Brussels. 

Humor brightens the book where is de- 
scribed the faking of war photographs, 
and eternal romance lifts you above the 
red reek in the tale of the American girl 
the author aided in her search for her 
officer lover. 



Net $1.50 



E. P. BUTTON AND COMPANY 
681 Fifth Avenue New York City 

(3) 



PASSED BY THE 
CENSOR 

BY 

WYTHE WILLIAMS 

of the New York Times 

Paris in War-time; the Trials of the 
U.S. Embassy ; the Fighting on the French 
Front; the Soul and Organization of re- 
generated France; as seen by the Paris 
Correspondent of the New York Times, 
who was officially accredited to the French 
Armies on the Western Front, and was 
three times on the actual fighting front, 
as well as in a French military prison for 
trying to get there before he received a 
pass. 

Here is the real story of those early days 
of the war ; those days of confusion, of con- 
flicting rumor, and of fear; when the Ger- 
man hordes swept down on the Paris they 
had doomed. 



Net $1.50 



E. P. BUTTON AND COMPANY 
681 Fifth Avenue New York City 

(6) 



The 

German Republic 

BY 

WALTER WELLMAN 



How is the Great War to end? 

What is to come after the war? 

What is the "Irresistible Force now 
shaping the thoughts of the German peo- 
ple"? 

Here is a book that offers a sane and 
commonsense solution to Europe^s terrible 
problem. 

It is a book of vision, a book of creative 
thought, which may make history and is 
sure to influence the minds and imagina- 
tions of thousands. 



Net $i.oo 



E. P. BUTTON AND COMPANY 
68 1 Fifth Avenue New York City 



(7) 



A 

Student in Arms 

BY 

DONALD HANKEY 



Published originally in the columns of 
the London Spectator, these short articles, 
sketches, and essays, written by a man in 
the trenches, form a "war-book" of quite 
unusual kind, dealing with the deeper 
things of himian life. 

The high spiritual idealism which act- 
uates so many thousands in the ranks of 
the Allies finds a voice in it, and the men- 
tal attitude of the fighting-men towards 
religion, the Church, their officers and their 
comrades, is exhibited not only with san- 
ity and sympathy, but with a fine simplic- 
ity of language and an inspiring nobility 
of outlook. 

Twenty-four thousand copies of this book 

were sold in the first month of 

its publication in England 



Net $1.50 



E. P. BUTTON AND COMPANY 
681 Fifth Avenue New York City 



(8) 



N 302 85 



















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